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Because I'm a little concerned about whether you will find the topic
of judicial independence very interesting, I thought back to one of my
favorite authors, Mark Twain-Samuel Clemens. He went to Europe and
wrote letters back to the bumpkins in America about what civilized life
in Europe was like. Those letters were collected in a delightful book enti-
tled, Innocents Abroad. One letter addressed what it was like to attend a
Wagner concert. He started out his essay by saying, you know, "Wag-
ner's music is not as bad as it sounds."
Similarly, I think I can assure you that the topic of judicial inde-
pendence is not as boring as it sounds. The reason I can say that is be-
cause I have traveled all over the world on behalf of the American Judi-
ciary to talk about judicial independence. I've been to developing coun-
tries, like Rwanda; Arab countries like the United Arab Emirates and
Qatar; and modern well-developed countries like Canada and Russia.
Everywhere I go, I find admiration and envy for the judicial independ-
ence that we have in America.
Those countries may not like our government, they may not like our
president, they may not like our policies, but they all like and admire our
judicial independence. And they want to know how we achieved it.
It's quite an interesting story-how we developed judicial inde-
pendence. Of course, there are many chapters still to be written in this
story, and you young law students will be writing some of those chapters.
At the very end of this lecture, I have several suggestions I would like
you to consider.
But first I want to define judicial independence. Then, I want to dis-
cuss our history and how we obtained judicial independence, because it
turns out to be a very rare thing. I want to talk about some of the threats
to judicial independence that we are facing today. Finally, I will discuss
some things you can do to help preserve this almost unique asset we have
in America.
So first, what is judicial independence?
When I go abroad people say, ah, it must be wonderful, you're a
judge, you can do anything you want. You can order the president to do
this or that. You can order people to come and go and they come and go.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This Article is based on
Judge Ebel's remarks delivered to students at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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You are really independent, and you have all this fabulous power. Noth-
ing could be further from the truth.
From an institutional point of view we have almost no independ-
ence. We can't create our own budget. We can't fund ourselves, only
Congress can do that. We can't appoint our own members, only the
President with the consent of the Senate can do that-(this speech ad-
dresses the federal system, but much of what I say applies to the states as
well). We can't remove our members. Only Congress can do that by im-
peachment. We can't even establish our own jurisdiction. Congress could
eliminate all federal courts tomorrow under the Constitution-save only
the Supreme Court. And Congress can limit the jurisdiction of what we
can hear, and what we can decide at their will. Congress even can impose
jurisdictional restrictions on the Supreme Court.
That doesn't sound like the judiciary is very independent.
And we can't even enforce our decrees when we issue an order be-
cause we have no army to ensure compliance. So institutionally, we lack
independence and we are quite weak.
But what protects the judiciary is that the other branches are also
weak in other ways. Our strength comes not from independence but
rather from the co-dependency that each branch has upon the other
branches of government. The judicial branch is the only branch that can
definitively interpret the laws and resolve cases and controversies. The
judicial branch can enforce constitutional limits on the other two
branches and, of course, upon itself as well. Those are powerful tools.
So when people say that we have an independent judiciary, I say,
no. The judicial branch is co-dependent on the other branches, but hap-
pily the other branches are co-dependent upon the judicial branch as
well.
A better way to look at independence is not institutionally, but
rather as independence in our decision-making process.
When we make judicial decisions, we make them free of anybody
else interfering with our decision-making process, subject of course to
our need to obey and be bound by the Constitution first, and the constitu-
tional laws of the land.
In twenty-two years as a judge, no one has ever called me ex parte
and tried to persuade me how to decide a case. I have never had a gov-
ernment official tell me what to do, or even suggest it. I have never had
an offer of a bribe or intimation of a bribe. I have never had a politician,
a legislator, or a president call me and say, this is the way we want you to




When I went to another large and well-developed country, I asked
the President of the bar of their major city about the independence of
their judiciary. I asked, if you took their significant cases (putting aside
the routine fender benders), what percentage of those cases were decided
solely on the merits, and what percentage were, instead, decided or influ-
enced by bribery or government interference?
You know what he told me?
He said that maybe ten percent of such cases are decided strictly on
the merits, and about ninety percent are decided because the government
has called the judge and told him how to decide the case or there was ex
parte pressure or bribery involved.
Once that cancer sets into a country, it is almost impossible to ex-
cise it.
In America, if you get into a legal dispute, there is a place to go
where nobody is going to be bribing or threatening or imposing ex parte
influence or persuasion on the decision-making. That place is called the
courts.
So I would define judicial independence as a judiciary that decides
cases under the rules that are presented to it, under the evidence that is
presented to it, where all the litigants have an equal and open opportunity
to address the merits. Judicial independence really boils down to inde-
pendence from outside influences in making judicial decisions. It may
not be as grandiose or sexy as some of my envious friends in foreign
countries imagine, but it is every bit as important and unique as they un-
derstand it to be.
Now, how did this judicial independence come about?
Many countries have similar constitutional guarantees of judicial
independence, but it doesn't always play out in practice the way it has in
America.
So let me talk a little bit about the history of our country, because
how judicial independence came about is really interesting. Let's go back
to the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. It lists 25 reasons why
we were going to break off from Great Britain. And of those 25 reasons,
two explicitly talk about an independent judiciary. Isn't that interesting?
Approximately one-tenth of the grievances that lead to our independence
had to do with King George's interference with the independence of the
judiciary.
One of those grievances complained that King George was exercis-
ing influence over our judges by threatening to fire them or by reducing
their salaries. And the second complained that King George wouldn't let
us set up our own judiciary.
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Thus, an independent judiciary is on our birth certificate. It is part
of who we are and why we became a separate country.
Next, let's turn to the Constitution. It addresses judicial independ-
ence in Article III. And it says: All judicial power is vested in the Courts.
Then it defines judicial power to say: Judicial power is the right to re-
solve all cases arising under the Constitution, the statutes, or the treaties.
Wow. Any case, any dispute involving the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties, is vested in the judicial branch.
When I was in Malaysia I learned that about twenty years ago they
had a similar provision in their constitution that all judicial power was
vested in the Courts. But about twenty years ago Malaysia took that out
of their Constitution. There is an effort now in Malaysia to try to restore
the earlier provision back into their constitution.
With a specific nod to King George, we put another provision in our
Constitution that said federal judges have life tenure and judges' pay
can't be diminished during their lifetime.
But it took a lot more than these constitutional provisions to estab-
lish judicial independence in America. It took some very wise decisions
by some very wise judges to slowly take a step forward on independence,
and then maybe half a step back, and then a step sideways, and then two
steps forward, and then a step back.
The route to judicial independence had to be earned. It wasn't just
given to us full blown.
You all know the case of Marbury v. Madison, which was the case
where Chief Justice Marshall declared that judges have the power to de-
clare statutes unconstitutional.
We all remember the principle of that case. But you may not know
how remarkable that principle was at the time. It may seem normal now.
But it was shocking at the time because we were founded as a democ-
racy. And the Constitution says all power comes from the people. There
is undeniable tension between ultimate power residing in the people and
their elected representatives and the power of the courts to strike down
laws passed by those representations.
The people, through their elected representatives, can pass a law-
that is the very embodiment of democracy. But the courts can set that law
aside if it violates the Constitution. That was not a self-evident proposi-
tion, although now we have come to appreciate it as the embodiment of a
"constitutional" democracy.
How did the other branches of government allow Chief Justice Mar-
shall to come up with that rule that the courts can strike down legislation




Well, what had happened was there was a sharply contested election
between Jefferson and the incumbent President, John Adams. President
Adams was running for re-election against Jefferson and Jefferson beat
him.
But, before Jefferson could take office, John Adams tried to appoint
his loyalist cronies to government positions wherever he could.
And one of the people he wanted to appoint to a magistrate judicial
position was Marbury. So a judicial commission was issued for Marbury
to become a judge, the Senate approved it, and Adams signed it.
But before he could deliver the commission to Marbury (which was
required before it could become effective), Adam's term ended, and Jef-
ferson became President. Jefferson said, I'm not going to deliver that
commission to Marbury. So, Marbury sued.
But here's the twist. Marbury brought his suit directly in the Su-
preme Court. He didn't sue in the lower courts and let it work its way up
on appeal. He sought the Supreme Court's direct original jurisdiction and
asked the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus to Jefferson's Secretary of
State, Madison, to force him to deliver the commission.
Everybody was scared to death about that case, because they knew
that if the Supreme Court ordered Madison to deliver the mandamus to
get Marbury seated as a judge, Jefferson wouldn't obey it. And it would
provoke a terrific conflict. You can't have an independent judiciary if the
executive branch won't enforce judicial decrees?
So Chief Justice Marshall did an amazing thing. He said, yes, Mar-
bury should get his commission. But Marbury is seeking Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to issue a mandamus forcing Madison to seat him.
And that original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus comes only
from a statute recently passed by the new Congress giving the Supreme
Court original mandamus jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court then found that jurisdictional statute to be un-
constitutional. The Constitution lists a couple of specific areas where the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. But all of the rest of the cases
have to come up to the Supreme Court through appellate jurisdiction.
There are only a couple categories of cases listed in the Constitution that
can be filed in the first instance in the Supreme Court. And a mandamus
action is not one of them.
The Court ruled that when Congress tried to give the Supreme Court
additional power to issue a mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction,
it exceeded the Supreme Court's constitutional authority and hence that
statute was unconstitutional. And because the Supreme Court could not
give Mr. Marbury the mandamus he wanted, they threw his claim out of
court.
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Ah, Jefferson was happy. The Supreme Court was not going to
force him to seat Marbury as a judge. Congress was happy because to
Congress this looked like a modest, self-effacing Supreme Court decision
rejecting additional judicial authority that Congress tried to give to it. In
this early jockeying for power, that seemed to satisfy the new two
branches.
The other branches of government, therefore, accepted the decision,
and yet we now understand that it announced, for the first time, the most
powerful weapon that the judiciary has-the power to strike down laws
that are unconstitutional.
I can talk about a lot of other cases that contributed to our current
understanding of judicial independence, but the point I make is that judi-
cial independence in our country wasn't just birthed fully clothed the day
our country was created. It was slowly developed, step-by-step, by very
astute judges.
I was next going to talk about the New Deal cases. There are some
interesting stories there, but I don't have time. I'm going to skip that. I'm
going to just jump forward to Bush v. Gore.
One of the things that Marbury v. Madison announced was the doc-
trine called political question abstention. That is, if a case presents essen-
tially a political rather than a legal issue, the Court is not going to get
involved. A political fight is kind of like punching a tar baby. If the
courts weigh in on political fights, that will get mired in a morass.
Besides that, if the courts get involved in a political fight, the public
is going to see the courts as political and partisan. And then the courts
lose their indispensible asset of being viewed as neutral, objective, and
above the fray.
So the Court announced in Marbury that political disputes between
Adams and Jefferson were beyond the wisdom and jurisdiction of the
Court. And the Court has followed the doctrine of political question ab-
stention almost uniformly since then.
Twice we had contested presidential elections that were thrown into
the Senate for resolution. One involved Rutherford B. Hayes and one
involved the Jefferson/Adams election. And in both cases it was Con-
gress that decided which delegates to seat, which electoral college votes
to count, which ones not to count, which states to count, which ones to
disallow.
So when Bush v. Gore came along I was very surprised that the
Court took jurisdiction. I had predicted that it wouldn't.
Now, I have nothing to say about the outcome of the case-no
comment on whether I thought it was a good outcome or a bad outcome
or whether the merits were rightly or wrongly decided. I'm speaking only
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about the question of jurisdiction, whether the case should have been
taken at all by the Court. In my opinion, the "political question" doctrine
strongly counseled that judges stay out of basic political fights. Those
fights should be resolved ultimately by Congress.
I think my judge colleagues will mostly agree that the judiciary has
paid a heavy price for Bush v. Gore. It has resulted in a loss of public
confidence that the judiciary is politically neutral.
This loss of public confidence in the apolitical nature of the courts
is exacerbated by the fact that, with two exceptions, the Republican jus-
tices, that is the justices that were appointed by a Republican president,
supported Bush. All the justices appointed by the Democrats supported
Gore.
If the public ever really comes to believe that the judicial branch is
just another political branch of government, all is lost, because we have
no armies, we have no budget, we have no constituents. Our authority
ultimately rests on our reputation of neutrality and integrity.
Now, let me now speak about some of the current events that
threaten to undermine judicial independence.
One of the threats to judicial independence goes to our competence.
You see, the country will not continue to support judicial independence if
they don't believe judges are competent. Why should it? I mean, if
judges as a whole are not competent, of course the other branches would
want oversight over us.
So we have to prove with every case, every day, that we're compe-
tent. And that is getting to be increasingly difficult, because the laws are
getting increasingly complex. And the resources available to the judici-
ary are becoming increasingly scant.
Let me talk about how complex the laws are getting. Think of the
last time you ate a hamburger at McDonald's. That may have been yes-
terday. How many separate laws do you think had to be complied with
from the time that hamburger was born as a baby calf in Wyoming to the
time you ate it?
Somebody with way too much time on their hands actually calcu-
lated that. And they counted, as a separate law, every statutory provision
that had a different citation to it. So if there was a big statute that had 20
sections and 10 subsections, they would count each of those subsections
that would apply as a separate statutory obligation.
How many different statutory obligations had to be satisfied? A
hundred? Five hundred? The answer is 72,000; 72,000 ways that a fed-
eral judge could be involved in a judicial challenge to the making of a
hamburger for your eating pleasure. The first ninety days I was a judge I
had labor cases, tax cases, discrimination cases, environmental cases,
2011] 3 19
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coal cases, capital punishment cases, bankruptcy, an assassination at-
tempt on the President, and dozens and dozens of other issues. How
could I possibly master all of those things?
And, unfortunately, judicial resources are dwindling. They're dwin-
dling in the salaries paid to judges. They're dwindling in the resources
that support us, research, and so forth. What do you think the percentage
of the U.S. budget is that is allocated to the entire judicial branch? Of
course, the judiciary does not aspire to thirty-three percent of the budget
even though the judiciary is one of the three coequal branches of gov-
ernment. I mean, we would be happy with ten percent. Seems like a
modest enough proposal. We don't even come close to ten percent.
Okay, I'm going to set my sights really low. I'll take one percent of
the federal budget for our coequal branch of the government. We don't
even get that. We get two-tenths of one percent of the U.S. budget to
fund the entire judicial branch. That's less than is spent to fund a mid-
sized administrative agency. It's less than it costs to build one aircraft
carrier or three submarines. So the judicial budget is very tight.
That goes all the way from our support staff and our resources, to
our salaries. I took a two-thirds pay cut to become a judge. And since
then my judicial salary has fallen way below the inflation index.
In the last two years we've had two of our best active circuit judges
on the Tenth Circuit leave for more lucrative private engagements. It's
becoming a real problem.
And the funding problem is a hundred times worse in the states. I
am not at all claiming sympathy for the federal judiciary, because any
state court judge would say, my goodness, it is so much worse at the state
level.
But just to describe our workload. We are now deciding, on the
Court of Appeals, three times as many cases per judge per year as the
Court of Appeals judges had to decide in 1960.
If you asked a judge in 1960, are you overworked? They would say,
oh, man, am I overworked. And then if you said, we're going to fire two
of your colleagues and you have to do the work of three judges. They
would say, there is no way that is possible. Yet today each federal appel-
late judge decides three times as many cases as a single judge decided in
1960 on a yearly basis. Today I decide about 500 cases a year. Think of
what a case involves, up to 125 pages of briefs, thousands of pages of
record, precedent that has to be read and understood. And I have to de-
cide about two of those every single day.
Another threat we face in the judiciary to independence goes to eth-
ics. We have rules about ethics, what you can and can't do. I sat for
many years on the national Ethics Advisory Committee. And I now sit on
the National Appeals Committee for Ethical Changes. We do a good job
[Vol. 88:2320
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of enforcing judicial ethics. But some in Congress think they can do bet-
ter.
And so there is periodically a bill introduced into Congress to estab-
lish an inspector general's office for oversight of the courts. Well, that
would be disastrous to the concept of judicial independence because of
the intimidation Congress could exert by such oversight over our daily
decisions. If someone thinks we are being "activist"-whatever that
means-they could start an investigation. And so, we have to convince
Congress that we're doing a good job of policing ourselves. And that's
hard to do, because much of our policing is done below the radar level.
We do occasionally recommend that a judge be impeached by Con-
gress. But 99% of the time we can handle these matters more effectively
under the radar. We must, somehow, convince the American public that
we are serious about our own internal policing of compliance with judi-
cial ethics rules.
Finally, let me suggest a few things that you can do to help preserve
and advance judicial independence.
One thing you can do is to get involved with the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System. It is one of the premiere
institutes in America devoted to the independence of the judiciary and
the betterment of the Courts. It's located just across the street, and my
dear friend, Rebecca Love Kourlis, a former State Supreme Court Jus-
tice, runs it. They are doing things all over the country to ensure the in-
dependence of judges, integrity, competence, resources-all of those
things that I said you have to have to be independent.
You ought to find out about that institute. You ought to go over
there and see if you can volunteer your time. I know they have a bunch
of researchers, and I bet they could use more.
The second thing you can do is to be our constituency, because
judges don't have constituencies. We're not elected. We don't have any-
body to come to our defense. When we're accused of a bad decision or
being an activist judge, often, at least when I know something about the
decision under attack, the criticism is misinformed. You see, the political
branches of government look at the world very differently from the way
a judge looks at the world. The political branches look at the world
largely by the end results. Did this decision advance abortion or did it
advance pro-life? Did it advance the environment, or did it advance cor-
porations? Did it advance the tenant or did it advance the landlord?
That's what they look at. The political branches say, well, the judge was
pro-tenant, pro-landlord, pro this, pro that, or whatever, based on the end
result of the decision.
That's not the way judges look at things. Judges tend to focus on
process and let the end result wind up wherever it may. Judges ask, what
2011] 321
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are the rules? What does the statute say? What does the Constitution say?
What is the precedent? What is the evidence? What is our standard of
proof? Measure those things together. Once you get the ingredients to-
gether, the soup takes care of itself. I can't tell you how many times I tell
my clerks, after we have gone through that ingredients analysis, that I
may not personally like the end result of my own decision. But whether I
personally like or dislike a result is not the criteria by which I decide
cases.
I never issued a ruling because I'm pro this or pro that. Why? Be-
cause a judge cannot rule on the basis of the end result achieved without
sacrificing neutrality and fairness and those are higher values in the judi-
cial world.
We need people like you to spread the word that judging is different
than the way the other two branches of government operate. The judici-
ary is not a result-oriented branch. It is a process-oriented branch. And
the process is to ensure fair and objective trials-nothing more and noth-
ing less.
If a decision is being criticized politically, we need you to review
that case and then publicize your own legal analysis of the decision. Get
involved and explain how judges work and how the law works. If the
case is wrong, we deserve to be criticized. If it's right, tell people about
the process that lead to the decision.
We had a case that Judge Henry, our recent Chief Judge, wrote
years ago involving a prisoner in state prison that wanted estrogen treat-
ment. She had gotten a transsexual operation and was now a transvestite
woman, although she had started out life as a male. She wanted hormone
treatments to support her new femininity. She sued the prison asking for
hormone treatments. The district judge granted summary judgment for
the prison without converting it to a summary judgment and without giv-
ing her a chance to put on evidence. Judge Henry looked at that and said,
you can't grant a summary judgment without telling both sides that
you're going to convert the matter to summary judgment and without
giving the parties a chance to put on evidence. So he reversed summary
judgment for the prison and sent it back for evidence so that both sides
could put on their evidence and have their day in court.
What happened? There was a storm of criticism. Three or four con-
gressmen threatened to introduce a Bill of Impeachment against Judge
Henry as an activist judge because he was allegedly supporting trans-
gender rights at the cost of taxpayers' money. And it wasn't until some
law professors and some law students and some lawyers spoke up and
said that every law professor in the country would have agreed with
Judge Henry. It was a process case. Judge Henry had not decided that a
prisoner had a right to estrogen treatment in jail; he had only decided that
the plaintiflfprisoner had a right to her day in court to argue her case. The
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politicians in both the executive and legislative branches do not think
much about process. And you have to educate the public about that.
Well, very quickly, other things you can do. You can advocate for
adequate funding for judges. And leave the federal judges out of it, be-
cause we are, by most standards, well paid, and we have life tenure. State
judges really need money. They are woefully underfunded. Get active in
urging adequate funding for the state judiciary.
Another thing you can do is file a complaint if you think a judge is
acting unethically. You know, an ethics complaint does not require
standing. It's the only court-like proceeding I know of that doesn't re-
quire standing. You don't need to be a lawyer in the case. You don't
need to be a party in the case.
If you think a judge is acting unethically, the judge is biased, the
judge belongs to biased clubs, the judge has been intemperate on the
bench, the judge has acted improperly off the bench, the judge is arro-
gant, the judge is not listening, whatever, file a complaint and let us deal
with it. We can only resolve the problem when complaints come in. We
need to keep our own house clean and private complaints of judicial mis-
conduct help us to spot problems so we can correct them internally.
And then the final thing for you to consider is that when you reach
the ripe old age of mid-forties or early fifties, some of you should con-
sider throwing your hat in the ring for a judicial career.
It is one of the most wonderful jobs I can imagine. But I don't think
you should do it early in your careers, because you need a lot of experi-
ence first. And you need the strength of character that comes from years
of battling in the mine fields in order to insist on judicial independence.
See, you see, hopefully, the topic of judicial independence is not as
boring as it sounds.
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"NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION": A
BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
THE RT HON LORD JUDGEt
Luck plays its part in all our lives. My mother gave birth to me in
the tiny island of Malta in the middle of a bombing raid in which the
hospital took a direct hit. At that time, Malta was the most bombed place
on earth. Not so long ago my mother pointed out to me that she gave
birth to me without there being any water or electricity, and that a bomb
trajectory fifteen yards nearer to where she lay would have meant "no
you, no me, and no daddy," because my father was in the Royal Air
Force, serving King and country, in World War II, and had broken cur-
few to be with her. Luck plays its part in all our lives, sometimes for
good, sometimes for bad.
My mother is Maltese, and the present Lord Chief Justice of Eng-
land and Wales is only half English. I am proud of both my heritages,
and proclaim them. I still have memories of childhood, when my mother,
who was-and remains-a firm admirer of England, would nevertheless
turn to us children, and point out that we were half Maltese, and that this
was "the better half too." Or, when my father had annoyed her, when she
would tell us that "we," meaning the Maltese, "were civilised when
daddy was covered in woad"-that is war paint. My father was a lovely
man, and even as a child I knew that she was exaggerating. My father
had never worn woad in his life. But I venture to discuss these aspects of
my background, not merely to give you a true impression of a wonderful
and loving childhood, but to suggest that I have been offered the oppor-
tunity of the wider perspective that ought to follow from mixed national-
ity.
And that brings me to the more important points. Where I touch on
the affairs of the U.S., I offer my thoughts with due humility, apologising
in advance with the inevitable-but I assure you, unintended-errors or
insensitivities. And, having listened to the entire conference so far, for-
perhaps-picking up the wrong end of a particular discussion. No of-
fence is intended. What follows are my personal thoughts, as an outside
observer-an admiring outside observer certainly-but no expert. I am
profoundly aware that the true experts on your constitutional arrange-
ments are here, among you.
t Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. This Article is based on the Lord Judge's re-
marks delivered to the Tenth Circuit Bench & Bar Conference in August of 2010. Publication of this
Article would not have been possible without the efforts and support of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch.
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I was called to the Bar of England and Wales at the Middle Temple
in London. So was the man credited with coining one of the most historic
and symbolic phrases ever coined: "no taxation without representation,"
John Dickinson. He also wrote the Liberty Song in 1768:
"Then join hand in hand, brave Americans all,
By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall."
Five American lawyers from the Middle Temple signed the Decla-
ration of Independence.' The Americans were publicly supported, among
many others, by Edmund Burke, a Middle Templar, and all were greatly
influenced by William Blackstone, another. We know that the father of
the great Chief Justice Marshall, to whom I shall come, subscribed to his
own edition of Blackstone, and the Chief Justice referred to it in his
seminal decision in Marbury v. Madison. Just to be clear that men of
action as well as men of thought were involved, it was a Middle Tem-
plar, John Laurens, who fought at the battle of Yorktown and negotiated,
as George Washington's representative, the surrender of the British
forces. And when Washington was appointing his first justices to the
Supreme Court, two were Middle Templars. Two of that hugely impres-
sive line of justices from their day to this happened to have been with us.
And it is indeed a privilege that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor
have been here.
Mrs. John Adams, the wife of the second President, would have ap-
proved. Her letters show how determined she was that the founding fa-
thers should have recognised that half the human race was female. And
what a tribute to John Adams himself that such a remarkable and won-
derful woman should have loved him as she did. There must have been
something very special about him, and indeed in my view there was.
Dickinson's first journey to England in 1753, in what was not much
more than a wooden tub, took 59 days, 2 months. And he wrote home to
his mother that he had been sea sick on 35 of them. My wife, Judith, and
I arrived here after 9 hours in an aeroplane. But Dickinson, and hundreds
like him, braved the elements. A lot of them rather enjoyed their visit to
London, although according to Charles Carroll, perhaps a rather toffee-
nosed young man from Maryland, there were "few young gentlemen ...
to be found of sound morals." Well no doubt, for young men then-as
for young men always-wine, women, and song did not lack their attrac-
tions. The President of the first Continental Congress, who preceded the
first President of the United States as the titular head of the infant Repub-
lic, was a Middle Templar. This was Peyton Randolph. So were two of
the following Presidents of the Congress. Thomas McKean and Cyrus
I. I am indebted to Judge Eric Stockdale from England and Justice Randy Holland from
Delaware whose illuminating work, the Middle Temple Lawyers and the American Revolution, sets
out this fascinating story.
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Griffin. So were four drafters of the Articles of Confederation, so were
seven of those who signed the Constitution.
I am not drawing your attention to these facts for the purposes of
decoration. They matter to me personally because I believe that the rule
of law which we all espouse comes from deep within the roots of our
national histories. That is why they merit examination. The deeper the
roots go, the more entrenched they become in the unconscious as well as
the conscious soul of the nation. In our communities, the citizen does not
merely hope for justice based on the rule of law, but expects and de-
mands it. We live in happier lands just because these roots go so deep,
and my thesis is that your roots did not begin in 1776, and you should not
assume that they did.
One of the problems with history is that when we look back at what
happened, we assume that what happened would inevitably have hap-
pened. I mean no disrespect, but even if the American War of Independ-
ence was destined to succeed, those who took part in it had no particular
reason to believe that it would. It took great courage to sign up to it. As a
Middle Templar, I am proud of my forebears who had the courage to
take their stand of principle at an uncertain time when, if they had been
unsuccessful, they would undoubtedly have been hanged. That was a
point, I believe, explained by John Adams at one of the early Congress
meetings when the chubby, future President pointed out to one of his
skinnier colleagues that it would take him longer to die because he did
not weigh so much. Benjamin Franklin made the same point. If they did
not hang together, they would be hanged separately. That is something
we can laugh at now, but for them it was not a joke. The risks were huge.
Of course, for the reasons given by Thomas Paine in Common
Sense-that great seminal work-independence was bound to happen:
but not necessarily then, not necessarily as an outcome of their particular
struggle. Moreover, this particular war divided both nations. It was in
truth a civil war. That is why William Pitt, who only a few years earlier
had been the Prime Minister in London when the Colonists-that was
what they were called then-fought side by side with British soldiers in
the Seven Years War with France, was able, during the course of the
conflict, in a speech in the House of Lords, to assert that America could
not be conquered, and that he would seek to invoke what he described as
the "genius of the constitution." Edmund Burke, who was responsible for
one of my favourite sayings, that the rule of law demanded the hearing of
disputes before the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," confessed in
On Conciliation with America, that he did not know "the method of
drawing up an indictment against a whole people." These were great
Englishmen, who understood and spoke out in favour of the justice of the
Colonist position.
Here, as we have seen, Peyton Randolph was the first President of
Congress, a Middle Templar, but his brother John took a different view
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of the struggle, and he went to live and eke out his days in sad exile in
England. Yet his son, Edmund, became an aide to George Washington,
and his first Attorney General. But if you want to understand that this
was indeed a civil war, look no further than Benjamin Franklin himself.
His achievements were manifold. But in view of the discussion here this
week, perhaps I should point out that he changed Jefferson's mellifluous
style in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence from "we hold
these truths to be sacred and undeniable," to the much briefer, but the
inescapable and ultimately incontrovertible words which echo to us
down the ages: "we hold these truths to be self-evident." One word, or
perhaps two, are always better than three, and the one he chose put the
issue beyond argument. Returning to my theme, his son took the opposite
side to his father. They never fought in battle, but except on one occasion
to resolve the payment of a debt, I believe that they never spoke again.
His son's son, that is his grandson, took the same view as Benjamin
Franklin himself. Thus are the tribulations of civil strife imposed as a
burden on contemporaries who have to live through it. For you, of
course, an even greater civil war was to come. And by then we had had
our own civil war.
These considerations enable me to suggest to you that some of the
documents of English history which matter greatly to me, continue to
matter greatly to you, and should be seen as part of the foundation of
your nation. They include the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right
of 1626, the Grand Remonstrance of 1641, and the Bill of Rights of
1689. Your constitutional roots include a civil war which culminated in
the execution in 1649 of a monarch who proclaimed the Divine Right of
Kings, and the removal of another in 1688 when he sought to subvert the
constitutional changes consequent on the execution of his father. All
these events influenced the thinking of the Colonists, and the constitu-
tional arrangements which they were seeking to uphold. It was part of
their history, as it is of our history. And that is why I respectfully suggest
that it remains part of your history. But notice for the future: our civil
war was a war brought about in a struggle about the rule of law. Could it
possibly be that, in the Latin, rex est lex or rex est lex loquens? It was
lawyers-not exclusively lawyers, but many of the most influential
members of Parliament-who challenged the concept of the Divine
Right were lawyers. By the end of the Civil War, there was a public trial
of a monarch for waging war on his subjects. And we have the record.
The King argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to try him. In consti-
tutional theory, it was an arguable point. In practical terms, however, it
was doomed to failure. And his execution demonstrated the reality of the
17 'h century observation, "be ye never so high, the law is above you."
May I go back: Sir Walter Raleigh, a man who saw a great future in
the potato as well as tobacco, was a Middle Templar. I am not here on
behalf of the Middle Temple to receive a writ in a class action. He re-
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ceived a charter which enabled him to explore the east coast of America,
which is now Virginia. Less important, his nickname was "Swisser Swat-
ter." You may wonder how that came about. We are told that he was
engaging in very close social exchanges with a pretty young lady in
court, who began by saying "oh sweet Sir Walter," but who, as her rap-
ture increased found herself confined to uttering "Swisser Swatter." And
to think, that we thought that the joys of sex had only been discovered in
the last century.
One of the ships which explored Virginia, and settled a small num-
ber on Roanoke Island, was captained by Phillip Amadas, another Mid-
dle Templar. His efforts were met by a fine by the Benchers on the basis
that he was absent for longer than he should have been without permis-
sion. They presumably failed to understand that in those days timetables
across the Atlantic were not very efficient.
Another link is Sir Francis Drake, who sailed the Golden Hind
around the world, and in his circumnavigation explored the west coast of
America, now California. Our records show that his "happy return" was
greeted with much joy and acclamation at the Middle Temple. Francis
Drake is famous in English history for his determination, when the news
of the great Spanish Armada was approaching the coast of England in
1588, to finish his game of bowls, before returning to what became the
great sea battle. If the Armada of 1588 had prevailed, the history of the
U.S. would have been very different. There would have been no license
to the Pilgrim Fathers. The common law, and its principles, would have
been extinguished before they ever left the shores of England. Francis
Drake did make one observation, which I offer you as still encapsulating
a principle of life: "There must be a beginning of any great matter, but
the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished, yields the
true glory."
When you are called to the Bar at the Middle Temple you sign the
book, and I did, and so many of your forebears did, on a table made from
a gun hatch of the Golden Hind itself.
Interesting as these considerations all are, one of the great heroes
for us all, and that includes you, is Sir Edwin Sandys, who drafted the
first Royal Charter granted to the Virginia Company in April 1606. San-
dys was no supporter of the Divine Right of Kings. He was one of those
who questioned and opposed it. He found himself in the Tower for his
beliefs. But in 1618 he succeeded in obtaining the "Great Charter" for
Virginia. This charter established the right of settlers, and any of their
children born in the new colonies and plantations, to "have and enjoy all
liberties, franchises, and immunities to all intents and purposes as if they
had been abiding and born within this our realm of England." This lan-
guage was later to be repeated as other colonies were established, includ-
ing Maryland (1632), Maine (1639), Connecticut (1662), Carolina (1663
and 1665), Rhode Island (1663), and Massachusetts Bay (1691). And
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these words, hardly surprisingly, led those with trained legal minds to
question the constitutionality, or the legality, of the efforts of Parliament
in London in the Eighteenth Century to curtail or diminish what they
believed were their now longstanding rights. And the Virginia Charter
similarly provided guarantees for the Colonists of "self government,
freedom of speech, equality before the law, and trial by jury." Thus, it is
that 1776 was not about abstract rights. It was about the preservation of
what were believed to be existing rights.
One of the major complaints against the Stamp Act of 1765 was the
deprivation of those charged with contravening its provisions of trial by
jury. Another Middle Templar, Robert Goldsborough of Maryland, spoke
of "acts and legislative aggression by the mother country." And here was
the context in which Dickenson's great phrase, "No taxation without
representation" was coined. And, echoing the dictum of Sir Edward
Coke-one of my great predecessors-who, in 1616, was deprived of his
office and hurled into the Tower because he responded to the King's
belief that judges should be lions under the throne, that the judges would
do what it was appropriate for the judges to do, and who had suggested
in Bonham 's Case that statute was not always supreme. James Otis of
Massachusetts urged that "an act against natural equity was void." And
John Adams himself told a judge who was doubtful about the possible
nullity of an Act of Parliament, "tell the jury the nullity of acts of Par-
liament ... I am determined to die of that opinion."
Am I the only person here who is moved by the thought that as long
ago as 1618, a tiny band of individuals believed that concepts like free-
dom of speech and trial by jury actually mattered? At a time when such
concepts would have been beyond the comprehension of any other con-
temporary society of which I am aware. And we all still believe it. Your
constitutional arrangements-and ours-seek above all to ensure equal-
ity before the law. And in particular the concept that no one is above the
law or may break it with impunity was established by our civil war: self
government-what is now called democracy-should always be at work
in our constitutional arrangements: freedom of speech as a matter of
right, what President Roosevelt identified as "the first freedom"; and trial
by jury, that no one should be liable to imprisonment for a serious crime
unless he or she has publicly admitted it, or sufficient evidence has been
produced to enable twelve of his fellow citizens to be convinced of his
guilt. As Lord Devlin once memorably put it, trial by jury is the "lamp by
which we know that freedom lives." These venerable and venerated con-
cepts are an ineradical part of the fabric of both our societies, and our
constitutional arrangements are there to preserve and uphold the rule of
law. Not, of course, rule by lawyers or by judges, but the rule of law it-
self.
In the United States you have a written constitution. Contrary to
popular myth, we in Britain also have a constitution that is written. The
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main difference is this: your constitution is embodied in a single docu-
ment to which-as needs must-amendments or additions have been
made over the years. Our constitution is not. It is largely, but not exclu-
sively (but that would take a lecture of its own) to be found in statute, in
legislation enacted in Parliament. In our system, Parliament is sovereign.
It may-and in relation to all the great nations that were once part of the
British Empire, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India-it ceded
its theoretical sovereignty to another body: to a very limited extent it
ceded some of its sovereignty to the European Court of Justice in relation
to affairs arising in the European Economic Community. But ultimately
in the United Kingdom it is sovereign. Our recent constitutional changes
were produced by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005. It had many
facets, but notice the first and most significant is that it is an Act of Par-
liament. That process could not have happened in the U.S. Your constitu-
tion would have forbidden it.
The process for change began with an announcement by the Prime
Minister that the Lord Chancellor's office would be abolished. In other
words 1300 or 800 years (whichever it was, a very very long time) of
history would be wiped out. The initial proposal was met with severe
opposition in the House of Lords. The fact was that you could not abolish
the office. No less than 400 statutes provided for the existence of this
office. In the result the office of Lord Chancellor survived, but with radi-
cally altered powers. He is no longer the Speaker of the House of Lords,
nor President of the Courts of England and Wales, nor the Head of the
Judiciary, nor able to sit as a judge. Many of the responsibilities of the
Lord Chancellor were devolved to the Lord Chief Justice. Thus the Lord
Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary of England and Wales and
President of its courts. He is responsible for representing the views of the
judiciary to Parliament, to the Lord Chancellor, and to Ministers of the
Crown as, and when, necessary. He is required to maintain appropriate
arrangements for discipline, welfare, training, and guidance of judges-
within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor-as well as
maintaining arrangements for the deployment of judicial office holders
throughout the courts of England and Wales. He must negotiate with the
Lord Chancellor a budget for the efficient administration of justice. But,
above all, and I speak entirely personally, he must sit as a judge. For me
that remains his primary responsibility.
All that may lead you to understand why I spoke with the passion
that I did the other day about the need to manage time. I asked Judith's
permission to refer you to Andrew Marvell's poem To His Coy Mistress.
When I was a teenager I knew all the naughty bits, but now I cannot re-
member how long he intended to adore each of her breasts. I only re-
member that all around him he could hear "times wing6d chariot hurry-
ing near."
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This leads me on to point about which there was much discussion at
the conference. Another major change of our new constitutional ar-
rangements was the creation of an independent Judicial Appointments
Commission ("JAC"). Effectively, the Lord Chancellor and the executive
is deprived of involvement in judicial appointments. The Lord Chancel-
lor is not a member, nor is he represented among the members of the
JAC. In constitutional theory, every judge at every level is appointed by
the Queen. So the Commission recommends the appointment to her. Per-
haps I can tell you of the system for my appointment as Lord Chief Jus-
tice. The selection was made by a Commission consisting of two senior
judges, the senior Law Lord and the Master of the Rolls, together with
the Chairman of the JAC and her nominee, who could not be a judge.
They did not present a slate of candidates from which the Lord Chancel-
lor or Prime Minister could choose one. They put forward one name. The
Prime Minister is entitled to decline to recommend that name to the
Queen, provided he gives public reasons for doing so. If he does so, that
would have been a veto on my appointment. But the nuclear option could
be fired once: if it had been fired, the Commission would then have met
again, and the Prime Minister would then have had no option but to put
that name forward to the Queen for appointment. Similar processes fol-
low for all the senior Heads of Division and the members of the Supreme
Court. Although for appointment to the Supreme Court-which is the
final court for Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as England and
Wales-the head of the JAC for each of those countries forms part of the
selection panel.
I like to think that the selection of our judges and in particular the
senior judiciary is now as immune from the political process as it is pos-
sible to be in a democratic society.
Another change related to the removal of Lords of Appeal in Ordi-
nary from the House of Lords, and the creation of the new Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom. The previous members of the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords became the first members of the Su-
preme Court, and the Senior Law Lord became its first President. This
provision consolidated, in constitutional theory, the separation of the
judiciary from the legislature at the highest level. I hasten to add that it
did not turn a group of twelve lambs into lions: for years there has been
government complaints about the way in which-putting it shortly-the
Law Lords had failed to implement government policy, and frustrated
exclamation by politicians about judges frustrating the will of Parlia-
ment. The old Law Lords were lions alright. And they did not change
when they moved premises. Nevertheless the new Supreme Court has not
been vested with any additional power to the jurisdiction and authority
enjoyed by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords: and there
has been no diminution in its powers either.
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The result is that the final court in Britain, the Supreme Court, does
not enjoy the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court of the U.S. It
cannot strike down, and has never yet sought to strike down, legislation
properly enacted. There is a developing theory that any legislation which
can properly be said to be "unconstitutional" may be open to question,
but this is being tentatively explored in judgments. It has nothing to do
with the Constitution Reform Act itself.
Be all that as it may, as things stand, the role of your Supreme Court
in what in truth are social questions is, to British eyes, quite remarkable.
Let me take one example: the question of termination of pregnancy, is-
sues of life and death, and the dignity and autonomy of women. The atti-
tude of the law to these questions tells us much of what sort of a country
we are. For us, the issue of abortion was resolved by an Act of Parlia-
ment, the Abortion Act of 1967. For you, the issue has been resolved by
the Supreme Court. Am I wrong to understand that a five to four vote of
unelected judges represents the law which governs "we, the people"?
This is not a criticism. I am merely identifying an important difference.
And I shall offer my own theory for the difference in a moment.
This question of judicial voting in your Supreme Court led to an
element of the discussion at the conference which troubled me. I hate the
word "ideology" to be applied to any judge. Surely every judge applies
the law as he or she conscientiously analyses it.
Any politicisation of the process is fraught with danger. Judges are
not politicians. They are independent of the political process. And the
appointment of judges should not give anyone the opportunity for politi-
cal posturing, let alone political preference. I recognise that within your
constitution the functions of the Supreme Court are fundamental,
whereas if our Supreme Court reaches a decision of which Parliament
does not approve, Parliament can enact whatever amending provision it
likes. Nevertheless if the process of appointment to your Supreme Court
were the process in England and Wales I should be immensely troubled,
and for this reason. The more we allow the appointment of judges to be-
come part of the political process, the quicker the judiciary will become
subsumed in it. And what price then, judicial independence?
But how has all this come about? In my view-but I do not claim
any scholarship- the differences are a consequence of the circumstances
which obtained in the 1770s, and the very early days when the new re-
public was working out its own destiny. My thesis is that in England we
granted ultimate sovereignty to Parliament because it was through Par-
liament that we sought to curb the divine right of kings, first in conse-
quence of the ancient arrangements which prohibited the imposition of
taxation without parliamentary consent-"no taxation without represen-
tation" indeed-and then, as the claim for privileges and protection grew
when Parliament refused to endorse the King's request for additional
taxation without some concession from him, and ultimately by going to
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war. In other words, in our arrangements the potential for tyranny was
gradually removed by insisting on the parliamentary legislative process,
and victory in battle. In your situation, many years later-as we have
seen from Goldsborough, and Otis, and Adams, and perhaps most impor-
tant of all, from Jefferson's first draft of the Declaration, which directly
attacked Parliament- Parliament was undoubtedly perceived to be inte-
gral to the problem. Central to your grievances was the Stamp Act, an
Act of Parliament, not simply the diktat of a monarch, like the demand
for ship money was. Your ancestors were claiming the same right not to
be taxed unless they were represented which had been established, as
they believed, in their constitutional affairs for years: now it was being
taken away. And if that was being taken away, so could all the other im-
munities and privileges and principle, such as trial by jury, and so on. In
the 1760s and 1770s, Parliament in London appeared to be unwilling or
unable to see that the position of the Americans was entirely consistent
with established constitutional principles. For you a sovereign Parliament
was the problem. It could therefore not be the solution.
Consciously or unconsciously, the founders of the Constitution de-
cided on a method of limiting or controlling not only the executive, but
the legislature. For these purposes, the principle of separation of powers
provided the answer-at any rate in the sense of expressed constitutional
theory by John Locke at the end of the 17th century-formulated when
we in England were enmeshed in the development of a constitution based
on our own Bill of Rights. The celebrated French philosopher Montes-
quieu, who examined the English constitutional system in the 18th cen-
tury in the context of contemporary France: where the king was untram-
melled by the equivalent of Parliament, and enjoyed dictatorial powers,
perhaps best encapsulated in the-to our eyes-repugnant letters de ca-
chet. He, like Voltaire, believed that the solution to the dangers of an
absolute monarch had been achieved in England and attributed them to a
concept of a separation of powers which did not, and never had-and
indeed never has-existed in England. All this shows that you should
never doubt the value to lawyers of a legal or political theory which per-
fectly appears to address what their instincts tell them is needed. But so it
was, that the separation of powers assumed such crucial importance in
your arrangements.
The world does not love lawyers. It never has and it never will.
Sometimes the world is right, of course, but sometimes it is wrong. In his
early years, William Shakespeare wrote the history of the reign of King
Henry VI in three parts. These are blood infused offerings: that is what
his audiences wanted. In the whole of these three plays there is but one
joke. A rebellion led by Jack Cade comes into London, intent on trouble.
And when the rebels are mingling among themselves and asking how
they should begin, Shakespeare offers the immortal line "let's begin by
killing all the lawyers." And indeed in historical fact they did attack and
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destroy much of what is now the Temple, where the lawyers were al-
ready congregating. In the theatre everyone laughs. And it is a good joke,
but that rebellion is followed by the most terrible bloodshed. I shall come
back to it.
But what I suggest is striking about your revolution-and ours-is
this. Of course it was war. Men died and were maimed. There was much
suffering and much heroism. But when it was over, it was over. After the
execution of the king, I do not for a moment suggest that life was com-
fortable for his supporters, but when the fighting ended, they were not
rounded up and killed after a series of ritual trials. After your War of
Independence, those who supported the defeated king and Parliament
were allowed to leave if they wished. Again there was no rounding up
and series of ritual trials. Contrast that with the French Revolution which
occurred less than 20 years later than your own, or the Russian Revolu-
tion and the pogroms which followed them and the slaughter of different
classes of citizens. Is it too utterly fanciful to believe that these truly
were wars intended to establish legal principles by which the country
should be governed, and that the participants were genuinely not after
power for its own sake, and certainly not after absolute power, but for
power to be exercised within constitutional restraints? I think so, and
both our communities are indebted to this focus on legality.
After your war was won, one critical constitutional issue and one
critical social issue remained unresolved. The role of the judiciary did
not require to be addressed in those very early days, when a war had to
be fought and the peace properly secured. But when the issue did come
to be resolved, what was at heart was the success, or otherwise, of Jeffer-
son's campaign against the federal judiciary. In England we have a say-
ing, "cometh the hour, cometh the man." For you that hour was 1801,
and the man was Chief Justice John Marshall. In the history of the com-
mon law, his is one of the greatest and most influential of names. Proba-
bly more than any other judge-or to be fair to his brothers, any group of
judges-and probably more than any other leader of a group of judges, in
the decision in Marbury v. Madison his judgment established the consti-
tutional arrangements and defined the role of the judiciary within an in-
fant democracy. It was, in truth, law creation. Even for the moment ig-
noring the lecture to the Jefferson administration about the rule of law,
he in effect returned to Sir Edward Coke in Bonham's Case and, as you
all know, asserted, that it was for the court to interpret the Constitution. It
is just worth repeating my emphasis on the distinction between interpret-
ing the law as expressed in statute or at common law and applying it (the
role of the court in England and Wales) and the authority to interpret the
very constitution itself (the role of the Supreme Court). It is this that
brings into stark focus such issues as the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy, not as a matter of legal right capable of alteration or amend-
ment through Act of Parliament, but as a matter of constitutional entitle-
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ment in an arrangement in which amendments to the Constitution are-
and in reality, can only be-events of extreme rarity.
Jean Edward Smith, in his biography of John Marshall, summarised
the distinction between the tradition established by John Marshall and
our tradition in this way:
The English tradition held that the great constitutional documents of
British history were purely political statements that lay in the realm
of Parliament to interpret, not the courts. Jefferson subscribed to that
view: so did Jackson and even Abraham Lincoln doubted the
authority of the Supreme Court to resolve fundamental constitutional
issues in the course of ordinary litigation . .. Marshall took the oppo-
site position ... he consistently held that the Constitution was law.
But I want to highlight this remarkable feature. This was an infant
republic, beset with problems, not bound to survive, fortunate that Brit-
ain was concentrating on the defeat of Napoleon who had subjugated the
entire mainland of Europe. I am not perhaps wholly able disguise that I
do not share the view that Jefferson should be sanctified. Personally I
prefer Adams. But, I cannot withhold my admiration for Jefferson's
sense of constitutional propriety, that notwithstanding the public lecture
on the rule of law, and his profound disagreement with Marshall's deci-
sion, after what I regard as a show of defiance, the decision itself was
allowed to stand. In the long-term that secured the rule of law in the U.S.
I hope that a modem politician, elected to power in our countries, would
comprehend why in similar circumstances it would be appropriate to do
what Jefferson did.
There remained, of course, the social question. The issue of slavery
was not resolved. It still rankles a little that in the first draft of the Decla-
ration, a Virginian slave owner raged against slavery. It is even more
ironic, given that at the very time when there were those in Parliament
who were supporting the American cause, there were others who were
seeking to attack the slave trade. And indeed the great case of James
Somersett in 1772-heard before another of my predecessors, Lord
Mansfield-following an earlier decision from the reign of Elizabeth I
herself, finally and through a complicated process, established that the
ownership of a slave in England was incompatible with the laws of Eng-
land, irrespective of any legal claim which might be valid elsewhere.
There could be no property in another human being. But with all that
said, it is easy now for us to be critical of failure to address the slavery
issue in the early constitutional arrangements. And we know, that it all
culminated less than 100 years later in the ghastly catastrophe of your
civil war.
May I just return to Shakespeare's early Henry VI plays. They are
far from his greatest plays. We all know about his portrayal of human
fallibility and frailty in its many manifestations in Macbeth, King Lear,
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Othello and Hamlet and the rest. But I venture to suggest that there is
nowhere in the entire canon of Shakespeare's plays where the condition
of common man is better portrayed than in his description of civil war:
none better than the haunting scenes where one soldier pulls a body on to
the stage, and then unmasking his enemy, discovers that he has killed his
father, followed by another in which another soldier pulls a dead body on
to the stage, and after congratulating his opponent on his toughness in the
fight discovers that he has killed his son. These are haunting scenes,
filled with pity. The son remembers that he will have to tell his mother
what he has done, and the father remembers that he will have to tell his
wife that he has killed their boy. Although no mother or wife appears on
the stage, Shakespeare is able to convey that each of these women is
there-but invisible, not actually on the stage-weeping the bitter tears
of the lifelong grief that lies ahead, truly part of the dreadful lamentable
scene, symbols of the nameless but innumerable victims of the ghastli-
ness of a civil war.
My respectful view is that the founding fathers had little choice. If
the slavery issue had been addressed the cause about which they were
united would have been paralysed: with such deep seated divisions, we
might never have had a "United" States of America, but rather a conti-
nent of North America, fragmented to different states. Indeed the history
of the world in the last century would almost certainly have been differ-
ent, and not for the better.
With the greatest of deference I suggest that these appalling sacri-
fices of this civil war were not in vain, and that all who died must be
honoured. Their sacrifices should be regarded as part of the price of your
independence, your nationhood, your Constitution, and the greatness of
your country, exactly as forecast by John Adams, now carrying the im-
mense burden that it does, as the most powerful nation on earth.
My country once performed this role. It was known as Pax Britan-
nica. That is no longer our role. No one loved us very much for it. Eve-
ryone can find fault with it. And of course we made mistakes, but there
were a great number of plusses in the ledger too. You too will now at-
tract criticism, even when it is not deserved. If one of your young men or
women behaves in a way which all of you would find unacceptable, the
pictures flash around the world: there are no pictures of the brave young
man or woman who, at great personal risk, steps in to save the life of a
child in some foreign country. So your mistakes will be highlighted and
magnified, and the blessings you provide will largely be ignored. To be
the most powerful nation on earth is indeed a thankless task. Well, you
do not, and will not, lack for thanks from me.
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In February 2010, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
federal district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by Billy
Ray Alverson, an Oklahoma state prisoner sentenced to death for first-
degree murder. Among other allegations, Mr. Alverson contended that an
Oklahoma trial court had violated his due process rights under Ake v.
Oklahoma' by denying his request for funding for a neurological exami-
nation to assess the possible effects of head injuries that he had suffered
as a child.2 The state trial court had discounted the conclusion of a li-
censed clinical social worker that Mr. Alverson had shown signs of or-
ganic brain impairment and that further testing was warranted. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that ruling on appeal and
then denied post-conviction relief.3
Judge Paul Kelly dissented. In his view, the state trial court had
erred when it failed to approve funds for neuropsychological testing. He
reasoned that, "If Mr. Alverson had received a competent [neuropsy-
chological] evaluation, he very well could have presented evidence that
he was not a psychopath and that he suffered from an undiagnosed or-
ganic brain disorder reducing his culpability for his behavior."4 In that
event, Mr. Alverson would have been able to present this mitigating evi-
dence, and a jury might well have sentenced him to life imprisonment
rather than death.5
The contrasting opinions about the requested neuropsychological
evaluation in Alverson reflect an ongoing and evolving debate in the
t Adjunct Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University; Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert
H. Henry, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, 1994-2010. I would like to thank Judge
Henry for sixteen rewarding years in his chambers: it was an honor and a privilege to serve with
him. I would also like to thank Webster Cash, Lee Fanyo, and the advisors and editors of the Denver
University Law Review for their tireless work and their guidance. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my
wife Sheridan McCaffree, our children Robby and Aidan, and my mother Marjorie Ramana for their
love, encouragement, and support. My father, the late Dr. C.V. Ramana, inspired my interest in
mental health issues, and this article is dedicated to his memory.
1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
2. See id. at 83.
3. Alverson v. Workman, 595 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Alverson v.
State, 983 P.2d 498, 511 n.34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)).
4. Alverson, 595 F.3d at 1170 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
5. See id.
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Tenth Circuit's capital cases about the significance of evidence regarding
the defendant's mental health-which may include not only evidence of
organic brain damage but also evidence of cognitive impairments, mental
illness without a discrete organic cause, and evidence that the defendant
suffered "childhood privation and abuse."6
On the one hand, the court has stated that evidence like that con-
cerning Mr. Alverson's alleged organic brain disorder "is exactly the sort
... that garners the most sympathy from jurors" and that the significance
of this kind of evidence cannot be overstated.7 As a result, when a capital
defendant's counsel has failed to conduct an adequate investigation re-
garding that evidence and has then failed to present it during sentencing,
the Tenth Circuit has held that the defendant has been deprived of his
right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.8
Engaging in the two-part inquiry required by Strickland v. Washington,9
the court has concluded that (1) defense counsel "made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defen-
dant by the Sixth Amendment"10 and (2) counsel's errors rendered the
sentencing proceedings unreliable, thereby warranting a second hearing
at which the mitigating mental health evidence could be presented."
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has also concluded that this
same kind of evidence may constitute an aggravating circumstance that
supports the prosecution's contention that the defendant should be sen-
tenced to death.12 The court has characterized this evidence as "a double-
edged sword" and has held that counsel's failure to present it may well
be a legitimate strategy designed to save the defendant's life and that the
failure to present that evidence was thus not prejudicial. 13
These conflicting characterizations of mental health evidence pre-
sent considerable difficulties for capital defendants' counsel seeking to
craft an effective strategy during the sentencing phase, as well as for
reviewing courts that must assess that strategy under Sixth Amendment
standards. In this Article, I outline the mitigating and aggravating sides
of that "double-edged sword" by examining three of the Tenth Circuit's
decisions that have assessed the effects of counsel's failure to present
mental health evidence: Smith v. Mullin,14 Bryan v. Mullin,'5 and Wilson
6. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004).
7. See Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 131, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mullin, 379 F.3d
at 942).
8. See, e.g., Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1142-48; Mullin, 379 F.3d at 938-44.
9. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
10. Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1142.
11. See, e.g., id. at 1142-48; Mullin, 379 F.3d at 938-44.
12. See, e.g., Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1244-50 (10th Cir. 2008); Bryan v. Mullin,
335 F.3d 1207, 1222-23 nn.21-22 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970,
980 (10th Cir. 2001).
13. See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222 n.21; McCracken, 268 F.3d at 980.
14. 379 F.3d 919 (2004).
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v. Sirmons.16 The cases reach different results. Smith concludes that it
was patently unreasonable for counsel to fail to present the mental health
evidence and that there was a reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have returned a life sentence if he or she had heard the evi-
dence that counsel failed to present. In contrast, Bryan holds that in light
of the "double-edged" quality of similar mental health evidence, counsel
made a reasonable strategic decision to withhold the evidence from the
jury. Wilson concludes that, in light of the particular record before it, an
evidentiary hearing is required to assess the significance of the mental
health evidence.
Each approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent and em-
pirical studies, both of which conclude that mental health evidence may
be both mitigating and aggravating. In my view, that ambiguity, or "dou-
ble-edgedness," suggests a heightened role for the factfinder-either a
state court assessing a post-conviction Sixth Amendment claim for inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on the failure to present mental health
evidence or a federal district court adjudicating a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ha-
beas corpus petition and, in some instances, vested with discretion to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on such a claim. In the final section of
this Article, I suggest that a more fact-based approach to the assessment
of mental health evidence may help to resolve some of the apparent in-
consistencies triggered by the doubled-edged characterization.
A. The Mitigating Edge in Smith v. Mullin
The circuit's decision in Smith v. Mullin highlights the mitigating
edge of mental health evidence.' 7 After a jury convicted Roderick Smith
of the first-degree murder of his wife and four young stepchildren, rec-
ommending sentences of death (which the trial court imposed), Mr.
Smith alleged in post-conviction proceedings in both state and federal
court that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In particular, Mr. Smith as-
serted that his trial counsel did not understand that his client's borderline
mental retardation, mental illness, and organic brain impairment could be
presented to the jury as grounds for rejecting a death sentence. Both the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the federal district court re-
jected that claim.
15. 335 F.3d 1207 (2003).
16. 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008), affdon reh'g en banc sub nom. Wilson v. Workman, 577
F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009). On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit held:
[T]he panel in Wilson was correct in its holding that AEDPA deference does not apply
when, pursuant to [Oklahoma Appellate] Rule 3.11, the [Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals] decides an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without consideration of
non-record evidence that, "if true and not contravened by the existing factual record,
would entitle the petitioner to habeas relief' under Strickland.
Wilson, 577 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998)). 1 do
not consider that part of the Wilson holding in this Article.
17. Smith, 379 F.3d at 939-44.
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The federal district court concluded that Mr. Smith's counsel's fail-
ure to present mitigating evidence constituted deficient performance,
thereby establishing the first component of the Strickland inquiry.' 8
However, it further concluded that counsel's failure to present mental
health evidence was not prejudicial, reasoning that Mr. Smith's mental
illness "tend[ed] to portray [Mr. Smith] as an unstable individual with
very little control over his impulses" and would have "negated much of
the mitigation evidence actually presented to the jury of [Mr. Smith's]
good work history and friend's and relatives perception of [Mr. Smith] as
a kind hearted person." 9 In short, in the district court's view, the mental
health evidence offered by Mr. Smith at the evidentiary hearing was
"double-edged" and thus did not warrant the grant of habeas corpus re-
lief.20
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Mr. Smith's
counsel's performance was deficient. That conclusion was based in part
on the statement of Mr. Smith's trial counsel, who admitted at the evi-
dentiary hearing "[a]stoundingly," that he was unaware that evidence of
Mr. Smith's mental illness could be offered in support of the contention
that a death sentence was not justified.21 Because of that misunderstand-
ing, counsel invoked only mitigating circumstances that involved Mr.
Smith's surrender and confession to the police, his expression of re-
morse, the fact that he had not attempted to flee, a lack of stab wounds
on some of the victims, and the fact that his life had value to his friends
and family.22
Despite this rather cursory argument for a life sentence, there was
significant evidence regarding Mr. Smith's mental health that his counsel
could have presented. At the federal evidentiary hearing, Mr. Smith's
counsel established that his client was completely illiterate, that his IQ
was in the mentally retarded or borderline mentally retarded range, and
that his cognitive abilities and his emotional development resembled that
of a twelve-year-old child.23 In addition, when he was a child, Mr. Smith
had nearly drowned, and he had suffered brain damage as a result.24 At
the evidentiary hearing, a neuropsychologist testified that the near
drowning could cause damage to those areas of the brain that are in-
18. See id. at 939.
19. Id. at 943 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
20. Id. at 943 n. II (discussing the following Tenth Circuit decisions invoked by the district
court in support of the characterization of mental health evidence as "double-edged"); see also
McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 980 (10th Cir. 2001); Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-
78 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1282 (10th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Exec. Dir. of
Dep't of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 761 (10th Cir. 1996)).
21. Smith, 379 F.3d at 939.
22. See id. at 940.
23. Id. at 941.
24. Id.
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volved in emotional regulation. 25 About individuals who have suffered
such injuries, he explained:
[T]heir emotional regulation is also disrupted, and so their behavior
becomes erratic or out of control or aggressive, and any number of
emotional problems can result that are usually not consistent with
whatever is going on in the environment around them, and that repre-
sents the direct cause of the brain injury, as well as an inability to
cope or interact with stress or what's going on in the environment in
a way that most of us would see to be reasonable or prudent or under-
standable. 26
In addition, Mr. Smith's mother offered testimony at the evidentiary
hearing that corroborated the neuropsychologist's conclusions about the
effect of the oxygen loss on Mr. Smith's mental functioning. She ex-
plained that Mr. Smith became "slower . .. [and] didn't act like he un-
derstood whatever I said to him." 2 7 These changes resulted in Mr. Smith
being tormented by other children. He eventually finished high school
but lived with his mother until he moved in with his wife and her four
children.28
In contrast to the district court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Mr.
Smith's failure to present this mental health evidence to the jury at sen-
tencing was prejudicial under the Strickland standard-there was a rea-
sonable probability that, if the mental health evidence introduced at the
evidentiary hearing had been offered at sentencing, the jury would have
concluded that the "balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
did not warrant death."29 In that context, a reasonable probability meant
less than a preponderance of the evidence, but a probability "sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."30
The Smith panel's conclusions as to deficient performance and
prejudice are grounded in Supreme Court precedent regarding the pres-
entation of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. Ac-
cordingly, in order to elucidate the Smith decision as well as subsequent
circuit decisions that focus on the mitigating edge of mental health evi-
dence, I briefly outline the precedent that Smith applies.
1. Mitigating Evidence After Woodson v. North Carolina3 1
The path to the Smith panel's conclusion that "evidence of [his]
mental retardation, brain damage, and troubled background constituted
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (alteration in original).
28. Id. at 941-42.
29. Id. at 942 (quoting Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000)).
30. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942 (quoting Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002)).
31. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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mitigating evidence" 3 2 begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
Woodson v. North Carolina. There, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion
concluded that a state statute that made death the mandatory sentence for
all persons convicted of first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, in part because
the statute "fail[ed] to allow the particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before
the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."3 3 The Court explained:
[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind
rather than degree. A process that accords no significance to relevant
facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration .
. . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted
of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the
blind infliction of the penalty of death. 34
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,35 a plurality of the Court applied
those principles to a state statute that required a death sentence unless the
sentencing judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that one
of several specific mitigating factors existed.3 6 In concluding that the
statute violated the Eighth Amendment, the plurality explained:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from con-
sidering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.37
Then, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,38 the Court applied Woodson and
Lockett to a sentencing proceeding in which the judge had ruled as a mat-
ter of law that he could not consider the circumstances of a sixteen-year-
old capital defendant's troubled childhood. 39 The Court held that the re-
32. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942.
33. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
34. Id at 303-04 (citations omitted).
35. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
36. Id. at 607 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975)). Three of the factors
to consider are whether: (1) "The victim of the offense induced or facilitated [the offense]"; (2) "It is
unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation"; (3) "The offense was primarily the product of the of-
fender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the de-
fense of insanity." § 299.04(B)(1}-(3).
37. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted).
38. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
39. Id. at 111- 14. At sentencing, the defendant's juvenile officer testified that the defendant's
parent had divorced when the defendant was five years old, that the defendant had lived without
supervision, that his "mother was an alcoholic and possibly a prostitute," and that his father had used
excessive physical punishment. Id. at 107.
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fusal to consider those circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment, as
construed by Lockett: "Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sen-
tencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evi-
dence." 4 0 The evidence at issue was "relevant mitigating evi-
dence."41 Although in some cases, the Court stated:
[S]uch evidence properly may be given little weight.. . . [W]hen the
defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense there can be no
doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a
harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly rele-
42vant.
The Court subsequently explained that even "rather atypical" miti-
gating evidence may not be excluded, for example evidence that a
defendant had a "habit of inhaling gasoline fumes" and "had once
passed out" as a result, that after this incident "his mind tended to
wander," that he "had been one of seven children in a poor fam-
ily," "that his father had died of cancer," and, "that he had been "a
fond and affectionate uncle.A 3
In Penry v. Lynaugh,44 the Court offered a further explanation of the
significance of mental health evidence. The defendant there had pre-
sented evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood, but the
trial court's instructions did not adequately instruct the jury on how to
consider that information. 45 Concluding that the sentencing proceeding
had violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court stated that "[u]nderlying
Lockett and Eddings is the principle that punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." 46
"[E]vidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background,
or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defen-
dants who have no such excuse." 47
40. Id at 113-14.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Idatll5.
43. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 249 (2007) (discussing the mitigating evidence
in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987)).
44. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
45. Penry, 492 at 312. Instead, the instructions directed the jury to consider only the following
questions in determining an appropriate sentence: (1) did the defendant act deliberately when he
murdered the defendant?; (2) was there a probability that the defendant would be dangerous in the
future?; and (3) did the defendant act unreasonably in response to provocation? Id. at 310.
46. Id.at319.
47. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Williams and Wiggins
Although Woodson, Lockett, Eddings, and Penry establish that Mr.
Smith was entitled to present evidence regarding his cognitive impair-
ments, brain damage, and difficult childhood, two more recent cases pro-
vided the Tenth Circuit with direct guidance regarding his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim: Williams v. Taylor48 and Wiggins v. Smith.49
In Williams, the defendant's trial counsel had offered as mitigating
evidence at sentencing only "the testimony of the [defendant's] mother,
,50
two neighbors, and a taped excerpt from a statement by a psychiatrist."
The mother and neighbors described the defendant as a "nice boy" and
"not a violent person." 51 The psychiatrist reported a statement by the
defendant that during an earlier robbery the defendant had removed the
bullets from a gun so that he would not hurt anyone.52 During closing
argument, the defendant's attorney requested the jury to spare his life
because the defendant had turned himself in to the police.53 However, in
state post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Williams offered substantial evi-
dence of a "nightmarish childhood" and a diagnosis of "borderline men-
tally retarded." 54 In addition, post-conviction counsel established that the
defendant's parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of their
children and that the defendant, Williams had been severely beaten by
his father. 55 The defendant also submitted evidence of his good behavior
while incarcerated. 56
Concluding that the Virginia Supreme Court had unreasonably ap-
plied federal law, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had estab-
lished both components of his claim for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. With regard to counsel's deficient performance, the Court con-
cluded that counsel's failure to introduce voluminous amounts of miti-
gating evidence was not a tactical decision. As to prejudice, the Court
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court had misread Strickland59 and
had also failed to evaluate the totality of mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant. In the Court's view, "the graphic description of Wil-
48. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
49. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).




54. Id. at 395-96.
55. Id. at 395.
56. Id. at 396.
57. Id. at 396-97.
58. Id. at 396.
59. Williams, 529 at 391. In particular, in the Supreme Court's view, the Virginia Supreme
Court had erred in holding that Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) had modified the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in Strickland.
60. Williams, 529 at 397.
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liams' childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he
was 'borderline mentally retarded,' might well have influenced the jury's
appraisal of his moral culpability."61 This evidence supported the conten-
tion that the defendant's behavior was "a compulsive reaction rather than
the product of cold-blooded premeditation." 62
Similarly, in Wiggins, during the state court sentencing proceedings,
the defendant's counsel failed to challenge the prosecution's arguments
for the death penalty with available evidence regarding the defendant's
mental health.63 In state post-conviction proceedings, the defendant of-
fered a social history report prepared by a licensed social worker and
based upon records from social service agencies, medical facilities and
schools.64 The report found that the defendant's mother was a chronic
alcoholic who frequently left her children at home, "forcing them to beg
for food and to eat paint chips and garbage."65 The mother's abusive
conduct, which included beating the defendant and holding his hand on a
hot stove, led to his placement in foster care at age six, where he was
subjected to physical and sexual abuse.66 At sixteen, the defendant ran
away from his foster home and began living on the streets. 67
As in Williams, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant
had established both components of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.68 As to the deficient performance prong, the Court cited state
practice standards69 as well as the American Bar Association standards
for capital defense work, which provide that investigations of mitigating
evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that
may be introduced by the prosecutor." 70 In light of those standards, the
Court held that Mr. Wiggins' counsel's investigation of mitigating cir-
cumstances was unreasonably narrow in scope.71 The evidence subse-
quently compiled in the state post-conviction proceedings (documenting
61. Id. at 398.
62. Id
63. Instead, the defendant's counsel requested bifurcation of the sentencing proceedings.
Counsel sought to first argue that the defendant did not kill the victim with his own hand and then to
argue, in a second phase of the sentencing, that psychological reports and expert testimony demon-
strated that the defendant had limited intellectual capacity and had not engaged in an aggressive
pattern of behavior. When the judge denied the request for bifurcation, counsel made a proffer re-
garding this evidence. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515-16 (2003).
64. Id. at 516.
65. Id. at 516-17.
66. Id. at 517.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 535.
69. "[S]tandard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins' trial included the
preparation of a social history report." Id. at 524.
70. Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1(C), at 93 (1989)).
71. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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Mr. Wiggins' "excruciating life history") was readily available to his
trial counsel. 72
As to prejudice, the Court observed that the sentencing jury heard
evidence of only one mitigating factor-that Mr. Wiggins had no prior
convictions. 73 The information in the life history report was a "powerful
mitigating narrative.",74 In addition, in contrast to other defendants (par-
ticularly the petitioner in Williams v. Taylor), Mr. Wiggins did not have a
record of violent conduct that could be used to rebut the evidence in the
life history report. Accordingly, if the evidence in that report had been
introduced to the jury, there was a reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have declined to impose the death penalty. 76
3. Smith's Application of Williams and Wiggins
In concluding that Mr. Smith had established both the deficient per-
formance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis, the Tenth Cir-
cuit applied Williams and Wiggins.77 Observing that both Supreme Court
decisions cited the ABA Guidelines statement that mental health evi-
dence is "of vital importance to the jury's decision at the punishment
phase,"78 the Smith panel noted that the defendant's counsel had failed to
offer any mental health evidence at sentencing. 79 Thus, his performance
was clearly deficient under Williams, Wiggins, and the ABA Guide-
lines.8 0
With regard to prejudice, the Tenth Circuit explained that the cir-
cumstances in Mr. Smith's case were "quite similar" to those in Wil-
liams.81 In both cases, counsel's failure to present mental health evidence
meant that the jury never received an explanation for the defendant's
conduct.82 In both cases, the evidence that counsel failed to present was
"consistent with the view that [the offense conduct] was a compulsive
reaction rather than the product of cold-blooded premeditation." 83The
Tenth Circuit also noted that the evidence presented to the jury in Wil-
liams in support of the death penalty was quite strong, as it was in Mr.
Smith's case.84 Nevertheless, as in Williams and Wiggins, the fact that
the mitigation case presented by Mr. Smith's counsel at sentencing was
72. Id. at 537-38.




77. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 944.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 943.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)).
84. Smith, 379 F.3d at 944.
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"pitifully incomplete, and in some respects, bordered on the absurd,"
when combined with the fact that the mental health evidence subse-
quently presented offered a compelling explanation for his behavior-
was sufficient to undermine the Tenth Circuit's confidence in the death
sentence and therefore establish prejudice.
4. Supporting Empirical Evidence
In addition to Williams and Wiggins, the Smith panel invoked find-
ings by social scientists regarding the effect of mental health evidence on
jurors in capital cases. According to the court, the mental health evidence
that Mr. Smith's counsel failed to present "is exactly the sort of evidence
that garners the most sympathy from jurors." 86
First, the court cited the conclusions of a death penalty expert who
testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that jurors "respond to and
find mitigating [this type of evidence,] and [they] are more likely to vote
for life rather than death sentences in cases where there is . . . clear and
clearly presented evidence that the defendant has suffered some form of
mental illness." Next, the court cited a report from the Capital Jury
Project about interviews with 153 jurors from forty-one capital murder
cases in South Carolina. With regard to mental health evidence, the
jurors in the study were asked about the effects of evidence that: (1) "the
killing was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance"; (2) "the defendant had a history of mental illness";
and (3) the defendant was mentally retarded.89 In reporting the results,
Professor Garvey characterized these three categories of mental health
evidence as examples of reduced culpability.90 Within that broad cate-
gory, he distinguished "proximate reduced culpability" from "remote
reduced culpability." 91 "Evidence of 'proximate' reduced culpability is
evidence that 'suggests any impairment of a defendant's capacity to con-
trol his or her criminal behavior, or to appreciate its wrongfulness or
likely consequences."' 92 Remote reduced culpability involves the defen-
dant's character. It includes evidence that the defendant was abused as a
child as well as "other deprivations that may have helped shape the de-
fendant into the kind of person for whom a capital crime was a conceiv-
able course of action." 93 As Professor Garvey explains, "[P]roximate
85. Id.
86. Id. at 942.
87. Id. (alterations in original).
88. Id. (citing Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1559 (1998)).
89. Garvey, supra note 88, at 1564-65.
90. Id. at 1562.
91. Id
92. Id. (quoting Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 846 (1992) (book review)).
93. Id.
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reduced culpability speaks to the defendant's lack of responsibility for
what he has done; remote reduced culpability speaks to his lack of re-
sponsibility for who he is."94 All three questions about the defendant's
mental retardation or mental illness involved "proximate reduced culpa-
bility."95
The jurors' responses indicated that mental retardation had the
strongest mitigating effect: 44.3% of them reported that they were much
less likely to vote for the death penalty if this factor was present, and
29.5% stated that they would be slightly less likely to vote for the death
penalty.96 A history of mental illness or a particular mental illness that
influenced the defendant during the killing were not afforded the same
significance as evidence of mental retardation, but those factors were still
regarded as having substantial mitigating effect: 26.7% of responding
jurors stated that they would be much less likely to return a death sen-
tence if the defendant had a history of mental illness, while 29.5% re-
ported that they would be slightly less likely to do so.97 If the killing was
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance, the responding jurors reported approximately the same mitigating
effect: 24.5% stated that they would be much less likely to vote for the
death penalty, and 30.1% stated that they would be slightly less likely to
vote for it.98 Notably, the South Carolina jurors described other factors
related to the defendant's mental health as significantly less mitigating.
Only 18.5% ascribed any significant mitigating effect to the fact that the
killing was committed under the influence of drugs and only 18.3% as-
cribed any such effect to the fact that the killing was committed under
the influence of alcohol. 99 Similarly, with regard to evidence that the
defendant had been seriously abused as a child and that the defendant
had suffered extreme poverty as a child-examples of "remote reduced
culpability" in Professor Garvey's scheme-the jurors reported a simi-
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 1564-65.
96. Id. at 1559. 23.5% of the responding jurors reported that they were just as likely to vote
for the death penalty if the defendant was mentally retarded; 2.0% reported that they would be
slightly more likely to vote for the death penalty in that circumstance, while 0.7% reported that they
would be much more likely to vote for the death penalty. Id.
97. Id. 40.4% of the responding jurors stated that such evidence of mental illness would have
no effect, 2.1% stated that such evidence would make them slightly more likely to vote for the death
penalty, while 1.4% stated that the evidence would make them much more likely to vote for the
death penalty. Id.
98. Id at 1555. 37.1% of the responding jurors stated that they would be just as likely to
impose the death penalty, 4.9 % stated that they would be slightly more likely to impose the death
penalty, while 3.5% stated that they would be much more likely to impose the death penalty in this
circumstance.
99. Id. at 1565. In particular, 6.2% of jurors reported that they would be much less likely to
impose a death sentence if the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of the killing,
while 12.3% reported that they would be slightly less likely to impose the death penalty in that
circumstance. Id. at 1555. With regard to a defendant under the influence of alcohol, the percentages
were 6.1 and 12.2. Id. Both questions involve "proximate reduced culpability" in Professor Garvey's
scheme. Id. at 1562.
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larly limited mitigating effect.'00 A third of the jurors would ascribe some
mitigating effect to evidence that the defendant had been seriously
abused as a child, while only 15% gave any significance to the fact that
the defendant grew up in extreme poverty. o1
The Smith court also cited a study reporting national polling data on
attitudes toward the death penalty. The study found the fact that the de-
fendant was mentally retarded "much more" mitigating than other fac-
tors.102
5. Rejection of the District Court's Double-Edged Sword Analysis
Finally, the Smith court rejected the district court's application of
circuit precedent to find that evidence of Mr. Smith's mental illness and
troubled childhood was "double-edged." The district court had reasoned
that this evidence (which was offered at the federal evidentiary hearing)
tended to portray Mr. Smith "as an unstable individual with very little
control over his impulses" and would have "negated much of the mitiga-
tion evidence actually presented to the jury of [Mr. Smith's] good work
history and friend's and relatives perception of [Mr. Smith] as a kind
hearted person.,,t3 In the Tenth Circuit's view, these statements failed to
acknowledge the fundamental purpose of presenting mitigating mental
health evidence: to provide an explanation of how Mr. Smith's mental
illness caused him to commit such a horrific crime. In addition, the Smith
panel reasoned that the district court had misread circuit precedent. In the
cases cited by the district court to support the double-edged characteriza-
tion of Mr. Smith's evidence, the excluded mental health evidence would
have placed other evidence of the defendant's aggressive and violent
behavior before the jury, thereby undermining the mitigating effect.1 04 In
contrast, in Mr. Smith's case, the jury had already heard evidence of the
"aggravating edge" of Mr. Smith's mental impairments. 05
100. Id. at 1562.
101. Id. at 1565.
102. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Samuel R. Gross, Update:
American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448,
1468-69 (1998)).
103. Smith, 379 F.3d at 943 (alterations in original).
104. Id. at 943 n.1 I (citing McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2001);
Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1282
(10th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep't of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 760-61 (10th Cir. 1996)).
105. Mullin, 379 F.3d at 943 n.1 1. In its subsequent decision in Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d
131 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit followed Smith's analysis closely in holding that the defen-
dant's counsel's failure to present mental health evidence was both deficient and prejudicial. The
mental health evidence there included testimony that the defendant "was raised in an environment of
neglect and abuse," suffered from brain damage, and drug use, which the defendant had tried to
overcome. Id. at 1143-44. The court explained that the defendant's brain damage might be perceived
by lay persons as 'meanness' or antisocial behavior, but with expert evaluation and explanation is
properly explained as deriving from disruption and impairments to the nervous system." Id. "Al-
though the case against [the defendant] was strong and the murders in this case were horrific," the
Tenth Circuit stated, "courts have not hesitated to grant relief in similar circumstances where the
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B. The Aggravating Edge in Bryan v. Mullin' 06
In Bryan v. Mullin, a case decided one year before Smith, the Tenth
Circuit characterized the mental health evidence in a capital case in much
different terms. Like Mr. Smith, Robert Leroy Bryan was convicted of
first-degree murder in an Oklahoma state court. The victim was Mr.
Bryan's aunt, whose signature Mr. Bryan had attempted to forge on
promissory notes and agreements purporting to pay him millions of dol-
lars. Mr. Bryan had a history of organic brain disease, which may have
been related to a severe case of diabetes. Four years before the murder of
his aunt, Mr. Bryan had been charged with solicitation to commit another
murder. In that prior case, the trial judge initially found Mr. Bryan in-
competent to stand trial and sent him to a state psychiatric facility for
treatment. There, psychiatrists concluded that Mr. Bryan suffered from
an organic delusional disorder and was severely psychotic when he was
first admitted to the hospital. They further concluded that Mr. Bryan's
brain exhibited significant signs of atrophy. The psychiatrists treated him
with an antipsychotic drug, and they then determined him to be compe-
tent.
After unsuccessfully challenging Mr. Bryan's competency, a public
defender filed a notice that he intended to rely on an insanity defense.
Mr. Bryan and his parents stated that they did not want to rely on that
defense, and Mr. Bryan then hired new counsel. Neither at the guilt
phase nor at sentencing did the retained counsel present any mental
health evidence on behalf of Mr. Bryan.
After the Oklahoma state courts affirmed Mr. Bryan's conviction
and death sentence, Mr. Bryan filed a federal habeas corpus action alleg-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to present men-
tal health evidence during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. At
an evidentiary hearing before the district court, Mr. Bryan offered a re-
port from a psychiatrist that concluded that Mr. Bryan suffered from an
"extensive paranoid delusional system [and] fragmentation of
thought." 0 7 Similarly, a psychologist found that Mr. Bryan "suffer[ed]
from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question . .. his
legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged." 08 A brain scan
revealed that Mr. Bryan suffered from multiple areas of irreversible brain
damage.109
Despite this information, which seemed to resemble what the Smith
panel deemed "the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from
absence of available mitigation evidence left the jury with a 'pitifully incomplete' picture of the
defendant." Id. at I148 (quoting Smith, 379 F.3d at 944).
106. 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1230 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id
109. Id. at 1231.
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jurors," 0 the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's
denial of Mr. Bryan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim."' As to the
guilt phase, the court concluded that the evidence available to Mr.
Bryan's counsel at the time of the trial demonstrated that Mr. Bryan did
not have a viable insanity defense.1 2 As to the sentencing phase, the
court held that the record indicated that Mr. Bryan's counsel understood
the propriety of introducing mental health evidence as mitigation at sen-
tencing, but that his counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision not
to present the evidence-one that was "virtually unchallengeable" under
the Strickland standard for determining whether counsel's performance
was deficient.l" 3
In the court's view, counsel had two legitimate reasons not to pre-
sent the mental health evidence. First, Mr. Bryan's counsel "was con-
cerned that testimony by either [the psychiatrist or the psychologist]
might play into the prosecution's case that Bryan was a continuing threat
to society."'14 In support of that concern, the court invoked an admission
during the cross-examination of one of Mr. Bryan's attorneys during the
federal district court hearing. Mr. Bryan's counsel answered in the af-
firmative to the questions, "[E]vidence of a psychological problem with
the defendant . . . sometimes can be a double-edged sword in a capital
case?"" 5 Mr. Bryan's counsel was asked a second question: "[O]ften a
jury might accept evidence of a psychological or emotional problem as
evidence of aggravation?""' 6 Mr. Bryan's counsel acknowledged that,
"I've had that happen in several cases.""17 Second, Mr. Bryan's counsel
believed that relying on the mental health evidence would be inconsistent
with his defense in the guilt phase-that the prosecution had failed to
prove that Mr. Bryan had committed the offense. In the court's view, Mr.
Bryan's counsel had a reasonable concern that "an about-face during the
penalty phase might compromise Bryan in the eyes of the jurors."" 8
Four circuit judges disagreed with that analysis.'" However, as with
Smith, there is Supreme Court precedent that supports the Bryan major-
110. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942.
Ill. Bryan, 335 F.3d at l211.
112. Id. at 1219-20.
113. Id at 1223-24; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
114. Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222.
115. Id. at 1222n.21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1223.
119. In the view of the dissent, "Mr. Bryan's counsel provided the most ineffective defense I
have ever seen, amounting to a concession of guilt and relating none of the reams of compelling
mitigating evidence." Id. at 1225 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As to the
deficient performance component of the Strickland inquiry, the dissent concluded that Mr. Bryan's
counsel "made no attempt to provide the jury with the 'particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant."' Id. at 1245 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976)). As to prejudice, the dissent concluded that "[t]he compelling and exten-
sive evidence of Mr. Bryan's history of mental illness creates a reasonable probability that the jury
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ity's characterization of mental health evidence as an aggravating cir-
cumstance.
1. Strickland v. Washington, Burger v. Kemp,12 0 and Penry v. Ly-
naugh
In Strickland-the decision that establishes the governing standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims-the Supreme Court recog-
nized that alleged mitigating evidence may also have an aggravating
edge. 12 1 There, in preparing for a capital sentencing proceeding, the de-
fendant's counsel conducted a very limited investigation. He spoke to the
defendant about his background, and spoke by telephone with the defen-
dant's wife and mother. Counsel did not search for character witnesses,
and he did not request a psychological report. The defendant's counsel
later explained that his conversations with his client did not indicate that
the client had psychological problems.1 22
In post-conviction proceedings, the defendant alleged that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel in part because his attorney had
failed to request a psychiatric report and had failed to investigate and
present character witnesses.' 23 The defendant submitted affidavits from
friends, neighbors, and relatives as well as reports from a psychiatrist and
psychologist stating that although he was not under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance, he was "chronically frustrated
and depressed because of his economic dilemma at the time of his
*,,124cnmes.
After announcing a standard for assessing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Court applied it and found neither deficient perform-
ance nor prejudice.12 5 As to prejudice, it reasoned that the evidence prof-
fered in the post-conviction proceedings "would barely have altered the
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge" and would
"[i]ndeed. .. even have been harmful to his case: his 'rap sheet' would
probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports
would have directly contradicted [the defendant's] claim [at sentencing]
that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance ap-
plied to his case." 26
Three years later, in Burger v. Kemp, the Court engaged in similar
reasoning. The defendant, who was seventeen at the time of the murder
would have concluded that the mitigating evidence outweighed the continuing threat aggravator and
might also be viewed in a mitigating light as to past violent behavior." Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1245.
120. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
121. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
122. Id. at 672-73.
123. Id. at 675.
124. Id. at 675-76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 687-99.
126. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
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of which he was convicted, alleged that he had received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because his attorney had failed to present evidence that
the defendant had "an exceptionally unhappy and unstable childhood" 2 7
during which one of his stepfathers had beaten his mother in his presence
and the other had encouraged him to take drugs. 128 At the time counsel
was appointed, the defendant had an IQ of 82, functioned as a 12-year-
old, and had been diagnosed as having psychological problems.' 2 9 Never-
theless, in holding that the defendant had not received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, the Court concluded that the attorney's decision "not to
mount an all-out investigation into [the defendant's] background in
search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable profes-
sional judgment."' 3 0
The Court explained that the record at sentencing established that
the defendant had no adult criminal record.131 Information concerning the
defendant's troubled childhood could have revealed information about
his use of drugs, various encounters with law enforcement, and his vio-
lent tendencies. The latter evidence could have undermined the defen-
dant's contention in the guilt phase of the trial that he acted under the
influence of a codefendant. The Court endorsed the reasoning of the dis-
trict judge who conducted a hearing on the defendant's habeas corpus
claim:
On one hand, a jury could react with sympathy over the tragic child-
hood [the defendant] endured. On the other hand, since [the defen-
dant's] sanity was not at issue in this case, the prosecution could use
this same testimony, after pointing out that [the defendant] was nev-
ertheless responsible for his acts, to emphasize that it was this same
unpredictable propensity for violence which played a prominent role
in the death of [the] victim. 132
Although it does not involve an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the Court's decision in Penry expresses a similar view of mental
health evidence. In holding that a Texas jury was not properly instructed
on the significance of mental retardation as mitigating evidence, the
Court explained that "[the defendant's] mental retardation and history of
abuse [was] thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthi-
ness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he
will be dangerous in the future." 33
127. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 789 (1987).
128. Id. at 790.
129. Id. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 794.
131. Id. at 790.
132. Id at 794.
133. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
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2. Tenth Circuit Decisions Supporting Bryan's Double-Edged View
When the en banc panel decided Bryan, several circuit decisions
had already concluded that evidence of a defendant's mental illness
could be double-edged and that counsel's failure to present it was neither
deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland. The circuit's cases explained
the aggravating effects of this evidence in varying terms.
First, according to the court's decisions, the omitted evidence might
depict the defendant as impulsive and violent and thus more likely to
constitute a continuing threat to society, a characterization often argued
by the prosecution as an aggravating circumstance in support of the death
penalty. For example, in Cannon v. Gibson,134 cited by the Bryan major-
ity, 35 the court concluded that the defendant's brain damage and result-
ing mental disorder, which prevented him from using appropriate judg-
ment, might "have negated much of the mitigation evidence actually
adduced by trial counsel" and might have supported the prosecution's
contention that the defendant was a continuing threat.' 36
The circuit has also held that omitted mental health evidence may
reveal particular incidents of violent or antisocial behavior, thus under-
mining the defendant's mitigation arguments.'3 7 In this sense, the evi-
dence may contradict a particular theme that the defendant has previ-
ously asserted. For example, in Cannon v. Gibson, the court observed
that the defendant had presented mitigation evidence regarding his ex-
emplary work history, acts of kindness, his strong and continuing at-
tachment to his young daughter, his lack of a prior criminal record, and
his good conduct as a prisoner. 38 By depicting the defendant as an un-
stable individual lacking impulse control, the omitted evidence would
have undermined those arguments for a life sentence.'
39
134. 259 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2001).
135. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1222 (2003) (en banc).
136. Cannon, 259 F.3d at 1277-78. Other Tenth Circuit decisions have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 978-80 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
omitted evidence of the defendant's psychological problems, including a diagnosis of bipolar disor-
der, substance abuse, borderline and antisocial personality disorders, and multiple severe bouts of
depression and had exhibited suicidal thoughts and tendencies would have revealed the defendant's
impulsive and violent character and "could have bolstered the jury's conclusion that [the defendant]
represented a continuing threat to society (a factor ... [the defendant] vigorously disputed during the
[sentencing] proceedings)").
137. See, e.g., Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 782 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that
"[t]estimony concerning [the defendant's] substance abuse would have resulted in the introduction of
details of [his] prior convictions and violent conduct, which invariably resulted from his substance
abuse" and that "[tihe jury could have perceived such evidence as aggravating rather than mitigat-
ing").
138. Cannon, 259 F.3d at 1277.
139. Id. at 1277-78.
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C. Wilson v. Sirmons: Rounding the Edges
The circuit's decisions in Smith and Bryan adopt contrasting ap-
proaches to mental health evidence that are difficult to harmonize. As
noted above, in post-conviction proceedings both defendants offered
evidence of severe mental illness that their attorneys did not present at
sentencing. Yet the court viewed the evidence of Mr. Smith's organic
brain damage as humanizing him and potentially explaining "a shocking
crime." 4 0 On the other hand, Mr. Bryan's counsel viewed his illness as
supporting the prosecution's contention that he was a continuing threat to
society and thus deserved the death penalty, and the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that that assessment was reasonable.14' Although there are impor-
tant differences in the facts of the two cases-particularly the resistance
of Mr. Bryan and his family to the presentation of the mental health evi-
dence, which was not shared by Mr. Smith and his family 4 2 -those dif-
ferences do not seem sufficient to justify such different results.
To be sure, the difficulty is not merely a matter of the circuit's
precedent. The Supreme Court's decisions in Eddings, Burger, and Penry
characterize mental health evidence resembling that offered by Mr.
Smith and Mr. Bryan as mitigating, aggravating, or both. The Court's
decisions "call[] for a greater degree of reliability when the death sen-
tence is imposed," 4 3 but that degree of reliability seems difficult to ob-
tain when one must assess the effect of omitted mental health evidence
on a capital jury.
Although it does not completely resolve the tension between Smith
and Bryan, the circuit's 2008 decision in Wilson v. Sirmons offers sub-
stantial guidance for assessing mental health evidence in capital cases. I
read Wilson to call for more thorough scrutiny of counsel's decisions to
forgo the presentation of mental health evidence, as well as a more fact-
intensive approach to assessing the prejudicial effect of failing to intro-
duce such evidence-including the determination of whether the evi-
dence was indeed a double-edged sword. I first examine the Wilson deci-
sion and then consider its significance to the law of the circuit.
1. The Decision in Wilson
An Oklahoma jury convicted Michael Lee Wilson of first-degree
murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon.144 The victim was a clerk
at a convenience store where Mr. Wilson also worked.14 5 The jury found
140. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004).
141. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1220 (2003) (en banc).
142. As noted above, Mr. Smith's mother testified to his mental illness at the federal eviden-
tiary hearing. See Smith, 379 F.3d at 941.
143. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
144. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008), af'd on reh'g en banc sub
nom. Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009)
145. Id. at 1071.
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three aggravating circumstances: "(1) [that] the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) [that] the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3)
[that] it was probable that [Mr. Wilson] would ... constitute a continuing
threat to society."l46 The trial court followed the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Mr. Wilson to death.14 7
a. Mental Health Evidence Presented at Trial
Even though Mr. Wilson's counsel was appointed two years earlier,
he waited until three weeks before the trial to contact a mental health
expert.148 At that point, counsel hired a clinical psychologist, who then
proceeded to interview Mr. Wilson and administer several psychological
tests. The psychologist also reviewed school and medical records, and
read statements from five of Mr. Wilson's acquaintances. 149
During the sentencing proceedings, Mr. Wilson's counsel called six
witnesses in support of the case for mitigation: the psychologist, two
acquaintances from church, two teachers, and Mr. Wilson's mother. The
psychologist testified that Mr. Wilson's IQ of 126 placed him in the su-
perior range of intelligence, which meant that Mr. Wilson could "do
something with himself."15 0 The psychologist only briefly described the
results of the other tests that he had administered. In particular, the psy-
chologist informed the jury that Mr. Wilson had experienced "a severe
mental disorder with many of the personality scales elevated," and
"[t]hat would suggest that he has a severe personality disturbance." 51
The psychologist also presented a brief social history of Mr. Wilson. He
described Mr. Wilson's father as someone who was active in drugs and
alcohol and not involved in his son's life. The psychologist offered two
pictures of Mr. Wilson: "On the one hand, you have the picture of the
Sunday school-going child. On the other hand, you have the picture of
the gang and the uninvolved father, who did not set a particularly good
role model."15 2
The psychologist did not inform the jury of a more specific conclu-
sion that he had drawn from the tests he administered before trial "that
Mr. Wilson suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder
(severe without psychotic features), and post-traumatic stress disorder"
as well as indications of "paranoid personality disorder . .. with passive-
aggressive and schizotypal personality features." 53 During cross-
146. Id. at 1072 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4), (5), (7) (West 2002)).
147. Wilson, 536 F.3d 1064 at 1072.
148. Id. at 1074-75.
149. Id. at 1075.
150. Id. at 1076.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1075.
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examination-which the Tenth Circuit would later describe as "a train
wreck for Mr. Wilson"' 5 4 -the psychologist agreed with the prosecutor
that Mr. Wilson's test results supported the conclusion that Mr. Wilson
was "a psychopath" and was "the most likely to reoffend, based on the
studies."'15 The prosecutor invoked this testimony during closing argu-
ment, calling Mr. Wilson a "psychopathic killer based on the evi-
dence."' 5 6
During the mitigation phase, Mr. Wilson's church acquaintances
described him as "mannerable," "respectful," and "intelligent." 57 Mr.
Wilson's teachers, who had not seen him for five to six years, described
him as "respectful," "fun-loving," and a "very good student."' 5 8
Finally, Mr. Wilson's mother briefly testified, discussing Mr. Wil-
son's father and Mr. Wilson's participation in church.
b. New Mental Health Evidence on Appeal
During the direct appeal, Mr. Wilson's new counsel provided the
psychologist with additional school and social service records as well as
affidavits from Mr. Wilson's mother, sister, brother, and girlfriend (who
was also the mother of his child). The psychologist then performed a
second series of tests, which supported a diagnosis of paranoid schizo-
phrenia. The psychologist further reported that Mr. Wilson had a "severe
psychological disturbance with the possibility of delusions or hallucina-
tions."' 59 According to the psychologist, "Mr. Wilson believed that 'evil
spirits' possessed him at times, and . . . it was 'possible [Mr. Wilson]
could have been delusional at the time of the crime. Io60 In his view, this
information "may have helped the jury better understand [Mr. Wilson's]
emotional illness and how he could have participated in the crime."'61
The family members' affidavits also revealed new information that
had not been disclosed to the jury: Mr. Wilson suffered from depression,
concentration problems, and delusions. He heard voices and had frequent
memory lapses. Throughout his life, Mr. Wilson had experienced violent
nightmares, and he often suffered severe headaches that lasted for hours
and sometimes days. The affidavits further stated that Mr. Wilson's fa-
ther and brother were involved with drugs and gangs and that Mr. Wilson
had been surrounded by gang activity as he grew up. In an affidavit filed
in the direct appeal, the psychologist explained that his trial testimony
154. Id. at 1076.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1077.
160. Id. (second alteration in original).
161. Id.
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"could have been improved upon enormously [if he had] been provided
with the additional information [from the family members]." 6 2
Based on this new information from the psychologist and the family
members, Mr. Wilson argued on direct appeal that he had received inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected that claim, reasoning that the "mere fact [that] more evidence
could have been presented is not, in itself, sufficient to show counsel was
deficient."'16 3 Adjudicating Mr. Wilson's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition, the federal district court concluded that the Oklahoma court's
ruling was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.
c. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis of Mr. Wilson's New Mental
Health Evidence and His Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim
Mr. Wilson's appeal to the Tenth Circuit produced three opinions
from the panel: the principal opinion by Judge McConnell, a concurrence
by Judge Hartz, and a dissent by Judge Tymkovich.
Judge McConnell concluded that Mr. Wilson had established defi-
cient performance under Strickland. As to prejudice, Judge McConnell
observed, "It would be difficult, on this record, to conclude with any
confidence that the jury's verdict would not have been affected by a
proper presentation of the mental health evidence and related family his-
tory." 64 Because the federal district court had not reached the question of
prejudice and because the facts alleged by Mr. Wilson, if true, would
entitle him to a new sentencing proceeding at which the additional men-
tal health evidence could be presented, Judge McConnell concluded that
Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance claim should be remanded to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing.'ss
Judge Hartz did not join in Judge McConnell's analysis of Mr. Wil-
son's claim, but he concurred in the result.' 66 In contrast, Judge
Tymkovich dissented from Judge McConnell's analysis and the remand
to the district court. In his view, Mr. Wilson had established neither defi-
cient performance nor prejudice.16 7 Each of the opinions offers a differ-
ent assessment of Mr. Wilson's mental health evidence.
162. Id.
163. Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Douglas v. State, 951
P.2d 651, 680 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997)).
164. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093.
165. See id. at 1086.
166. See id. at 1123-25 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). After re-
mand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. On February 11, 2011, the court issued an
opinion rejecting Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court concluded that the
additional mental evidence offered at the evidentiary hearing would not have affected the jury's
decision to impose the death penalty. 2011 WL 744661, at *26.
167. See id. at 1125-48 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In Judge McConnell's view, the Supreme Court's decisions in Wil-
liams and Wiggins, as well as its 2005 decision in Rompilla v. Beard,168
emphasized "the importance of thorough investigation-in particular, of
mental health evidence-in preparation for the sentencing phase of a
capital trial."1 69 He contrasted the application of the Strickland standard
in these cases to the narrower application in cases like Burger v. Kemp.
In his view, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla established three im-
portant principles. "First, the question is not whether counsel did some-
thing; counsel must conduct a full investigation and pursue reasonable
leads when they become evident."l 7 0 Second, in determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable investigation, the court should first look to the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards for capital defense work.17' Finally, "be-
cause of the crucial mitigating role that evidence of a poor upbringing
... can have in the sentencing phase, defense counsel must pursue this
avenue of investigation with due diligence."1 72
From those principles, Judge McConnell concluded that: (a) coun-
sel's failure to hire the psychologist until three weeks before trial, (b) his
failure to interview family members, and (c) his failure to fully present to
the jury the mental health assessment that the psychologist had already
made constituted deficient performance. The first two deficiencies were
apparent from the text of the ABA Guidelines, which stated that "prepa-
ration for the sentencing phase, in the form of investigation, should begin
immediately upon counsel's entry into the case" 73 and that counsel
should consider "[w]itnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the
client's life . . . , from birth to the time of sentencing."1 74
168. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). In Rompilla, the Court concluded that the defendant had received
ineffective assistance of counsel even though counsel had interviewed five family members and
three experts who evaluated the defendant's mental health at the time of the offense. However,
counsel failed to examine a file regarding a prior conviction on which the prosecution relied in
arguing for the death penalty. That file would have led to "a range of mitigation leads that no other
source had opened up." Id. at 390. The information that counsel could have discovered included the
fact that the defendant was "reared in [a] slum environment ... came to [the] attention of juvenile
authorities, quit school at 16, [and] started a series of incarcerations . . . commonly related to
over-indulgence in alcoholic beverages." Id. at 390-91 (first, third, and fourth alterations in origi-
nal). "The same file disclose[d] test results that the defense's mental health experts would have
viewed as pointing to schizophrenia and other disorders, and test scores showing a third grade level
of cognition after nine years of schooling." Id. at 391. In the Court's view, "The accumulated entries
would have destroyed the benign conception of [the defendant's] upbringing and mental capacity
defense counsel had formed from talking with [the defendant] himself and some of his family mem-
bers, and from the reports of the mental health experts." Id Thus, the defendant had established both
deficient performance and prejudice and was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding.
169. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1083.
170. Id. at 1084.
171. Id. at 1084-85.
172. Id. at 1085.
173. Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.8.3 (1989)).
174. Id. at 1087 (first alteration in original) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.8.3 (1989)).
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As to the mental health evidence that Mr. Wilson's counsel had ac-
tually presented, Judge McConnell observed that the psychologist had
testified about Mr. Wilson's mental illness in only the most general
terms, stating that Mr. Wilson had a "severe mental disorder with many
of the personality scales elevated" and that these elevated scales sug-
gested that Mr. Wilson had "a severe personality disturbance." 7 The
absence of a more particular explanation of Mr. Wilson's mental illness
meant that the jurors could have regarded that illness as antisocial behav-
ior or "meanness,"176 rather than as providing an explanation for Mr.
Wilson's behavior that could support his argument for a life sentence.
The lack of specificity also left Mr. Wilson without an effective means of
responding to the prosecution's claim that he was a psychopath.
As to prejudice, Judge McConnell's acknowledged that the issue
was close. He wrote that "[t]here may well be grounds for skepticism" 77
that the jury could have been convinced to impose a life sentence if the
psychologist had provided the more thorough diagnosis at which he later
arrived. Yet, invoking Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases on the
importance of mental health evidence, including Penry, Rompilla, Ed-
dings, and Smith, he noted that the court did not "write on a blank
slate" 78 and that such evidence could not be summarily discounted. 17 9
Mr. Wilson's particular diagnosis added support to his claim of
prejudice. In Judge McConnell's view:
Diagnoses of specific mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipo-
lar, which are associated with abnormalities of the brain and can be
treated with appropriate medication, are likely to be regarded by a
jury as more mitigating than generalized personality disorders, which
are diagnosed on the basis of reported behavior, are generally insepa-
rable from personal identity, and are often untreatable through medi-
cal or neurological means.lso
In addition, based on this diagnosis, the psychologist could have
testified about the ways in which Mr. Wilson could not conform his con-
duct to the law. And, the psychologist's testimony could have been but-
tressed by personal narratives from members of Mr. Wilson's family.1 '
175. Id. at 1091.
176. Id (quoting Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1144 (10th Cir. 2007)).
177. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093.
178. Id
179. See id at 1093-94. Like the Smith panel, Judge McConnell cited empirical studies dem-
onstrating that "mental health evidence has a mitigating effect on juries." Id. at 1096 n.4. He also
noted that there were some conflicting studies, that most of the data on which the studies were based
was more than ten years old, and that more investigation would be useful. Id.
180. Id at 1094.
181. Id. (stating that "[t]here is evidence that expert testimony on mental illness is most power-
ful when combined with narratives from lay witnesses such as family and friends") (citing Scott E.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay
Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1163-64, 1185 (1997)).
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Finally, Judge McConnell's opinion acknowledged the potential
"double-edged sword effect" of Mr. Wilson's mental health evidence.
Agreeing that "[t]his [double-edged sword effect] could possibly be
true,"' 82 he added:
[I]f true[,] the point would apply not just to this case, but also to [the
Supreme Court's decisions in] Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, as
well as [the Tenth Circuit's decisions in] Anderson, Smith, and many
more decisions across the country holding that the failure of counsel
to present mental health evidence of this sort was prejudicial.
In Judge McConnell's view, those precedents did not allow the
court to reject Mr. Wilson's claim of prejudice on the grounds that the
mental health evidence was double-edged. He invoked the Tenth Cir-
cuit's statement in Smith that this kind of mental health evidence is "ex-
actly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from jurors."l 84
Moreover, in order to establish prejudice, Mr. Wilson was required
to show only a reasonable probability that one juror would have voted
differently. Although the additional mental health evidence might not
have persuaded some jurors, Judge McConnell thought it just as likely
that the additional evidence would have led at least one juror to have
empathized with Mr. Wilson to the extent of returning a life sentence.
Although Judge Hartz did not join in Judge McConnell's analysis of
Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance claim, he did agree that the case
should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. In his view, Mr. Wilson's
allegations, if true, would entitle him to relief. The record did not under-
mine his claim of deficient performance, and although "[p]erhaps the
record undermines the claim of prejudice, . . . that issue was not ad-
dressed by the district court and should not be resolved in the first in-
stance by [the Tenth Circuit]." '
Judge Hartz did express doubts about the strength of Mr. Wilson's
claim. He shared many of Judge Tymkovich's thoughts about the perils
of presenting mental health evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.
He thought it plausible that Mr. Wilson's counsel might have reasonably
decided, in light of the evidence of guilt (including a videotape of Mr.
Wilson's conduct during the robbery and murder at the convenience
store), that "a claim of mental illness would not get very far with the jury
or would even be counterproductive." However, the record did not
establish that counsel actually made such a decision, and Supreme Court
182. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1095.
183. Id. at 1095-96.
184. Id. at 1096 (quoting Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004)).
185. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1124 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
186. Id.
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precedent set a high standard for counsel in investigating and evaluating
mental health evidence.
In contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Tymkovich offered a
detailed explanation as to why Mr. Wilson's counsel's performance was
not deficient. In his view, counsel's pretrial investigation uncovered the
bulk of the information that Mr. Wilson later submitted in the direct ap-
peal, and counsel made a reasonable strategic judgment not to delve any
further into Mr. Wilson's mental health problems in his sentencing pres-
entation, but instead to emphasize his intelligence and capacity for re-
form. In contrast, the presentation of a schizophrenia diagnosis to the
jury "could have made [Mr.] Wilson's mental health problems appear
more intractable and untreatable, . . . add[ing] ammunition to the prose-
cution's case that [Mr.] Wilson was a dangerously ill person." Judge
Tymkovich invoked scholarship recognizing that "a mitigation defense
based purely on the defendant's mental health can be risky."'88 As to
prejudice, Judge Tymkovich noted that the jury had already heard evi-
dence regarding Mr. Wilson's mental illness; there was no reasonable
probability that the additional information from a more specific diagnosis
would have led the jury to impose a life sentence.189
2. Wilson's Significance
In many ways, the opinions in Wilson reflect the same conflict over
the proper assessment of mental health evidence as the opinions in
Bryan. Just as in Bryan, one opinion found the mental health evidence
that the jury did not hear was highly mitigating, while the another saw in
that same evidence a double-edged sword that defense counsel justifiably
withheld from the jury to reduce the chance that it would find the defen-
dant "dangerously ill." 90 Moreover, the fact that Bryan and Wilson come
out differently-that the earlier case affirms the denial of relief on the
grounds that the unpresented mental health evidence had an aggravating
edge while the latter one remands for an evidentiary hearing because of
the mitigating effect of that evidence-makes it difficult to discern a
standard that can offer guidance in assessing similar evidence in future
cases.
187. Id. at I139 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 1139-40; see also RUSSELL STETLER, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND MITIGATION 1
(2001), available at http://www.nynd-fpd.org/mental health/mental health mitigation.pdf (noting
counsel's task to "overcome juror cynicism toward mental health issues in criminal cases"); James
M. Doyle, The Lawyers'Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 442-
46 (1996) (noting difficulties of presenting mental illness as mitigation evidence); Leona D.
Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel's Evolving Duty to Assess and Present Mitigation at Death
Penalty Sentencing, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, I (2007) (noting tendency of counsel to limit mitigation
evidence "because it purportedly undermines residual doubt, because it has a double-edged effect of
inspiring jury fears, or because it opens the door to unrevealed criminal history"); Sundby, supra
note 181, at 1130-39 (explaining capital juror skepticism of mental health expert witnesses).
189. See Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1147 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id.atl39.
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Yet, in our view, there are some significant matters on which the
Wilson opinions offer meaningful direction. First, Judge Hartz's concur-
rence agrees with Judge McConnell's view of the importance of thor-
oughly investigating potentially mitigating mental health evidence.' 9' As
some scholars have noted, the Supreme Court's older ineffective assis-
tance of counsel opinions-like Strickland and Burger-permit rather
cursory investigation of mental health evidence, reasoning that the un-
presented evidence might support the prosecution's argument for aggra-
vating factors.192 The more recent cases (Williams, Wiggins and Rom-
pilla) require a comprehensive investigation, following the ABA Guide-
lines view that "[d]ue to the extraordinary and irrevocable nature of the
[death] penalty, at every stage of the proceedings counsel must make
'extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused."'l 93 In its view of coun-
sel's obligations, Wilson sides with the newer cases.194
Second, Wilson emphasizes that a court assessing an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim based on the failure to present mental health
evidence must examine the particular kind of evidence at issue. Some of
that evidence, like that presented by the psychologist at the initial sen-
tencing, may have only limited effect, while other evidence, like that
presented after the psychologist had time to review more records and
conduct more tests, may be significantly mitigating. Although Judge
Hartz's concurrence does not endorse the details of Judge McConnell's
analysis of the mental evidence, at the very least one can conclude that
he was persuaded to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing based on
the difference between the mental health evidence offered at sentencing
and the mental health evidence offered subsequently in Mr. Wilson's
direct appeal.
Third, Judge McConnell and Judge Hartz agree that the fact that
certain mental health evidence may have a double edge does not end the
inquiry. Further examination of that evidence may be useful in determin-
ing whether the defendant has established an ineffective assistance claim
under Strickland and is therefore entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
191. Id. at 1124-25 (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that "Judge McConnell's opinion estab-
lishes that the Supreme Court has set a high standard for defense counsel in capital cases with le-
spect to investigating mitigation thoroughly before settling on a strategy").
192. Christopher Seeds, Strategery's Refuge, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 987, 1012
(2009).
193. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES § 1.1 cmt. introduction (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 923
(2003).
194. Professor Seeds observes that "[the Supreme Court's] new cases emphasize the need for
comprehensive life history investigation and endorse the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, but leave
the old law of Burger.. .standing." Seeds, supra note 192, at 1012.
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D. The Double-Edged Sword After Wilson
The Wilson opinions also suggest several areas in which the law of
the circuit may offer further guidance for assessing mental health evi-
dence at issue in ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases.
1. A Threshold Standard for Assessing Mental Health Evidence
Wilson's careful consideration of the defendant's particular diagno-
sis and its potential mitigating effect suggests that it may be useful in
these circumstances to develop a threshold standard for evaluating men-
tal health evidence-one that explains what sort of mental evidence is
potentially mitigating enough to warrant further inquiry.' 95 In fact, three
Tenth Circuit cases decided after Wilson suggest that such a standard
may be developing: Gardner v. Galetka,196 Fairchild v. Workman,197 and
Young v. Sirmons.198
In Gardner, just as in Wilson, a capital defendant alleged in a fed-
eral habeas corpus action that a psychologist had been given insufficient
time to prepare a presentation at sentencing about the mitigating effects
of mental health evidence. Counsel contacted the psychologist only two
days before the sentencing proceedings began.199
Despite that extreme delay, the Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Su-
preme Court's conclusion that the delay was not prejudicial was a rea-
sonable application of Strickland.200 Although he had minimal time to
prepare, the psychologist had testified at the sentencing about the defen-
dant's unstable background and his family's history of criminal and sub-
stance abuse. 20 1 The psychologist did offer additional testimony in state
post-conviction proceedings. However, the difference between that tes-
timony and his testimony at sentencing was unlike the "enormous" dif-
ference in the two assessments made by the psychologist in Wilson. In
Gardner, there was nothing close to the "potent ... form of mitigation"
in Wilson-evidence of schizophrenia that was associated with
abnormalities of the brain and could be treated.202
The court made a similar distinction in Fairchild, concluding that a
capital defendant had presented only a "general and unfocused" argu-
195. See Samy Khalil, Note, Doing the Impossible: Appellate Reweighing of Harm and Mitiga-
tion in Capital Cases After Williams v. Taylor, with a Special Focus on Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 193,
209-18 (2001). The author argues that "once an appellate court finds that a defense attorney has
failed to uncover and present a certain 'threshold' amount of mitigating evidence, the court should
set aside a death sentence automatically, whatever the aggravating circumstances of a crime." Id. at
217. I do not make that argument here.
196. 568 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2009).
197. 579 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2009).
198. 551 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
199. Gardner, 568 F.3d at 880.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 883.
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ment in state court proceedings that his trial counsel did not present evi-
dence of conduct that could have caused head injuries (drug use, fight-
ing, and amateur boxing), but that the defendant had then presented a
potentially meritorious claim in federal court, one based on the claim that
counsel had failed to investigate available evidence that the defendant
suffered from organic brain damage.203
Finally, in Young, the court held that new mental health evidence
offered in state-post conviction proceedings would not have had a sig-
nificant mitigating effect, and it offered some explanation for that as-
sessment.204 In the post-conviction proceedings, the defendant had pre-
sented affidavits from family members, friends, and two psychologists,
and he claimed that his counsel should have presented that evidence at
sentencing.205 Concluding that the defendant had failed to establish
prejudice under Strickland, the court stated that none of the evidence was
"so unusual as to place [the defendant] outside the realm of the average
,,206person. Unlike many capital defendants, the defendant appeared to
have had a generally normal and happy childhood.207 In the court's view,
the two psychologists' affidavits did not establish that the causes of the
defendant's emotional distress were "substantially out of the ordi-
nary." 208 One of them concluded that the defendant likely suffered from a
"Compulsive Personality Disorder," but he added that "[t]his type of
psychiatric disorder is not typically associated with the commission of
homicide." 20 9 That concession deprived the diagnosis of the kind of ex-
planatory power of other kinds of mitigating mental health evidence.210
In my view, these decisions are helpful in clarifying the court's as-
sessment of mental health evidence in ineffective assistance claims, and
in grappling with its potential double-edged effects. A defendant's evi-
dence may fall short of a threshold standard for mitigating effect for a
variety of reasons: because it does not sufficiently explain the defen-
dant's conduct, because it would likely fail to elicit sympathy from a
sentencing jury, or, under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Williams,
because it would not "influence[] the jury's appraisal of [the defendant's]
moral culpability" or show that "his [or her] violent behavior was a com-
203. Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1149-51 (10th Cir. 2009). The court therefore
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the defendant should be al-
lowed to exhaust his claim. Id. at 1155.
204. Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 968-69 (10th Cir. 2008).
205. Id. at 961-66.
206. Id. at 968.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (alteration in original).
210. See, e.g., Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 943 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation, brain damage, and troubled background could explain "these
outbursts of violence and [how they] caused this 'kind hearted' person to commit such a shocking
crime").
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pulsive reaction rather than the product of cold-blooded premedita-
tion."211
By articulating a threshold standard regarding the mitigating effect
of mental health evidence, the Tenth Circuit may be able to offer useful
guidance to courts adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
In particular, if the additional mental health evidence falls short of that
threshold standard, then courts need not assess its potential aggravating
effects. On the other hand, if the evidence meets that standard, then an
explanation of why that standard has been met may assist courts in
weighing the mitigating and aggravating effects.
2. Assessment of the Aggravating Effects of Mental Health Evi-
dence on an Incremental Basis
Professors John Blume and Shari Lynn Johnson are two of the
harshest critics of the courts' application of the double-edged sword
analysis in assessing mental health evidence in ineffective assistance
claims in capital cases.2 12 They write that the doctrine is "[e]mpirically
[i]ndefensable and [d]octrinally [d]isastrous."2 13 Yet Professors Blume
and Johnson acknowledge that some evidence concerning a defendant's
mental health can be aggravating. For example, if the defendant tortured
his victim, evidence of that conduct, although it indicated mental illness,
would more likely support the prosecution's argument for the death pen-
alty than rebut it.214
Nevertheless, Blume and Johnson object to the way in which the
double-edged sword conception of mental illness evidence can truncate
the Strickland inquiry. Criticizing the Fourth Circuit's decisions, they
observe that "[t]here is no need to calculate prejudice in the context of
the case, because the Fourth Circuit simply presumes lack of prejudice
by affixing the 'double-edged' label to the unpresented mitigating evi-
dence." 215
211. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000).
212. See generally John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Dou-
ble-Edged Sword": Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right
to the Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480 (1999).
213. Id at 1501. Professors Blume and Johnson contend that "[t]he double-edged sword doc-
trine hypothesizes that evidence that seems intuitively mitigating may be, in the minds of some
jurors, actually aggravating." Id. at 1502. They reason that, for some subset ofjurors, "psychological
evidence which decreases the defendant's moral culpability may be interpreted as also increasing his
future dangerousness, and for some subset of this subset, that that increase in perceived future
dangerousness will outweigh the decrease in perceived culpability, thereby increasing the likelihood
of a death sentence." Id. In their view, even though this empirical proposition is "undoubtedly true,"
it does not establish that a jury would be more likely to return a death sentence because of this evi-
dence. Id That is because not all jurors will share this view of the connection between mental health
evidence and future dangerousness. See id. They also argue that the Strickland standards are suffi-
cient to analyze deficient performance and prejudice, without the gloss of the double-edged sword
doctrine. Id. at 1504-07.
214. Id. at 1502-03.
215. Id. at 1506.
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In my view, the Tenth Circuit has sometimes engaged in similar la-
beling and, as a result, has not undertaken a case-specific analysis of the
mental health evidence at issue. As I have noted, in concluding that the
mental health evidence that had not been presented until the post-
conviction proceedings was double-edged, the court in Bryan relied upon
testimony from one of the defendant's attorneys that "evidence of a psy-
chological problem with the defendant . . . can sometimes be a double-
edged sword." 216 The former counsel admitted that "in several cases" the
jury had accepted "evidence of psychological or emotional problems as
evidence of aggravation."217 There is scant discussion in the majority
opinion of the particular mental illness suffered by the defendant and
whether the jury would have regarded that particular illness as aggravat-
ing or mitigating.
As I have noted, the Tenth Circuit's decisions have offered three
explanations of the ways in which juries may perceive mental health
evidence as an aggravating circumstance. First, the evidence may support
the prosecution's contention that the defendant is impulsive and violent,
and therefore a continuing threat. Second, it may undermine a theme or
contention that the defendant has offered in the guilt phase of the trial or
as part of the case for mitigation (for example that the defendant did not
commit the crime or played a minimal role in it or that, except for the
crime at issue, the defendant has been a good citizen). Third, the mental
health evidence may reveal particular instances of other criminal or anti-
social behavior that could support the prosecution's arguments that ag-
gravating circumstances justify the death penalty. Yet, for each of these
potential aggravating aspects of the mental health evidence, there may be
case-specific reasons why a jury might not perceive the evidence to sup-
port a death sentence.
Most importantly, the defendant's mental illness may be treatable.
Indeed, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, Judge McConnell's
opinion in Wilson relies in part on medical literature indicating that the
symptoms of the schizophrenia suffered by the defendant there could
improve with medication.218
Similarly, the commentary to the ABA Guidelines cites studies
showing that "future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital ju-
rors, and is thus at issue in virtually all capital trials, whether or not it is
argued by the prosecution or is a statutorily mandated sentencing consid-
eration."219 However, in light of juries' overriding concern with defen-
216. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1223 n.21 (10th Cir. 2003).
217. Id.
218. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1094 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that "[d]iagnoses of
specific mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipolar. . . are associated with abnormalities of the
brain and can be treated with appropriate medication").
219. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES § 10.11 cmt. (2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 1062 (2003)
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dants' future dangerousness, the Guidelines' directive is not to avoid the
presentation of mental health evidence. Instead, the commentary ex-
plains, "[C]ounsel should give serious consideration to making an ex-
plicit presentation of information on [the defendant's future
dangerousness]."220 In addition to testimony about the treatment of the
mental illness, the evidence could include information about the defen-
dant's adaptation to the prison environment or other evidence rebutting
the continuing threat allegation.221
With regard to the possibility that mental illness evidence may con-
flict with other themes or contentions offered by the defense, I note that
222the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Wiggins. There, the defen-
dant's attorney had argued during the guilt stage that the defendant was
not directly responsible for the murder.2 23 Although the Court stated that
it might have been strategically defensible for an attorney to have pur-
sued that theme during the guilt phase, such a strategy was not necessar-
ily inconsistent with the presentation of the defendant's troubled back-
ground during sentencing.224 In addition, in light of the strength of the
available mitigation evidence that the defendant's attorney's did not pre-
sent, a reasonable attorney might have focused on the mitigation case at
sentencing rather than the weaker arguments during the guilt phase. Ac-
cordingly, with regard to the potential conflict between mental evidence
and other defense themes and contentions, there may well be case-
specific considerations indicating that the evidence is not double-edged,
at least not to the degree that reasonable counsel should completely ex-
clude it from the mitigation case.
Similar case-specific considerations may apply to the instances of
criminal or anti-social behavior that mental health evidence may reveal.
The Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Porter v. McCollum225 illustrates
that point.
In Porter, the Court overturned an Eleventh Circuit decision, con-
cluding that the Florida Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Strick-
land, and held that the defendant's counsel's performance was both defi-
cient and prejudicial.226 Counsel had failed to present evidence that his
client had served in horrific battles in the Korean War, had struggled to
recover upon return from the war, had a childhood history of physical
abuse, and had been diagnosed with brain abnormalities.2 27 In rejecting
(quoting John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue", 86
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398-99 (2001)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515 (2003).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 535.
225. 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam).
226. Id. at 452-55.
227. Id. at 453.
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the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Florida Su-
preme Court had concluded that counsel's failure to offer the military
records was not prejudicial because they revealed that the defendant had
28gone AWOL on several occasions and had been court-martialed. In its
view, "These periods of desertion would have significantly impacted
upon any mitigating effect that the evidence would have had, and indeed
they would have reduced this impact to inconsequential proportions."229
The Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that the evidence that
the defendant was AWOL was consistent with the overall theory of miti-
gation that he had presented in post-conviction proceedings-that his
combat experience caused immense stress and substantial emotional and
mental difficulties. 23 0 The Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the
AWOL evidence was merely aggravating "reflect[ed] a failure to engage
with what [the defendant] actually went through in Korea." 231
Porter thus supports the view that even though mental health evi-
dence may reveal instances of criminal or antisocial behavior, that fact
may not justify withholding the evidence from the jury. As in Porter, the
explanatory impact of that mental health evidence may outweigh its ag-
gravating effects. 23 2 The potential double-edged quality of mental health
evidence should therefore trigger a case-specific inquiry rather than fore-
close it.
3. Sears v. Upton233
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on mental health evi-
dence in capital cases offers further support for the fact-specific approach
to assessing mental heath evidence. In Sears, the evidence that defen-
dant's counsel failed to present included the defendant's childhood expe-
riences of sexual abuse, a severe learning disability, and brain damage
caused by several serious head injuries and drug and alcohol abuse. In
post-conviction proceedings, the Georgia trial court agreed with the de-
fendant that his counsel's performance was deficient, but it rejected his
claim of prejudice, reasoning that because his counsel had presented a
reasonable alternative theory of mitigation-involving the impact of the
228. Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 924-25 (Fla. 2001).
229. Id. at 925.
230. Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455.
231. Id.
232. The Third Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009), follows the
reasoning of Porter. Even though the defendant's mental health history, which his counsel had failed
to present, included evidence that the defendant was "a sadistic and dangerous sexual deviate who
committed at least one prior act" that resembled the crime at issue, the court concluded that the
defendant's mental health history acted "as a common thread that ties all this evidence together." Id.
at 129. "A single juror may well have believed that this unifying factor explained [the defendant's]
horrific actions in a way that lowered his culpability and thereby diminished the justification for
imposing the death penalty." Id.
233. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010).
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defendant's execution on the defendant's family-any finding of preju-
dice would be speculative.
The Court identified two errors in the Georgia court's analysis.
First, the state court's finding that the defendant's counsel had formu-
lated a mitigation theory that was reasonable "in the abstract,"234 did not
excuse it from engaging in a fact-specific prejudice inquiry. Second, the
court should have considered the new mental health evidence, along with
the evidence that counsel actually presented, to determine whether the
defendant had established a reasonable probability of a different result. 23 5
The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case to the Georgia court for
a "probing and fact-specific analysis" 23 6 of the prejddice component of
the defendant's ineffective assistance claim.
Significantly, the Court remanded for that inquiry even though
some of the omitted mental health evidence was double-edged. As Jus-
tice Scalia observed in his dissent, a psychiatrist who examined the de-
fendant found him to be "a narcissist" with a "grandiose" opinion of
himself, as well as "arrogant and self-centered."23 7 However, even
though the dissent concluded that it was more likely that the defendant's
"profound personality disorder, . . . made him exactly the kind of person
who would commit heinous crimes in the future," a majority of the Su-
preme Court was not convinced that this assessment of the mental health
evidence should foreclose further inquiry. Instead, in the majority's view,
competent counsel "should have been able to turn some of the adverse
evidence into a positive-perhaps in support of a cognitive deficiency
mitigation theory."238 Although the evidence might not have made the
defendant more likeable to the jury, the Court concluded, "it might well
have helped the jury understand [the defendant], and his horrendous
acts."239
The Court's decision in Sears thus confirms both the explanatory
force of mental health evidence that the Tenth Circuit recognized in
Smith and the importance of the fact-specific inquiry addressed in Wil-
son.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution requires a heightened standard of reliability in the
application of the death penalty. It also entitles the defendant in a capital
case to present evidence a broad range of mitigating evidence, including
evidence of his or her own mental illness. Yet when courts assess mental
234. Id. at 3265.
235. Id. at 3265-66.
236. Id. at 3266.
237. Id. at 3270 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 3264 (majority opinion).
239. Id.
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health evidence in capital cases, that heightened reliability often seems
hard to attain.
Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, Roderick Smith and Robert Leroy Bryan
received strikingly different opinions about the impact of the mental
health evidence that their trial counsel failed to present. One, Mr. Smith,
was informed by the court that the omitted evidence was highly mitigat-
ing, that his attorney's failure to present it violated his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, and that he was entitled to a new
sentencing hearing. The other, Mr. Bryan, learned that the additional
mental health evidence was a double-edged sword that his counsel had
made a reasonable strategic decision to exclude. The mental health evi-
dence that Mr. Bryan presented in habeas corpus proceedings was never
heard by a jury, and he was executed.
As troubling as those different results may be, the Smith and Bryan
decisions are each supported by Supreme Court precedent. The Court's
decisions hold that mental health evidence is sometimes mitigating,
sometime aggravating, and sometimes both. How a court will character-
ize the evidence in a particular case can be quite difficult to predict.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilson further illustrates the chal-
lenges in assessing mental health evidence. There, the three panel mem-
bers reached three different conclusions. For Judge McConnell, Mr. Wil-
son's additional mental health evidence warranted further proceedings,
allowing him the opportunity to show a reasonable probability that, with
further insight into his mental state, a jury would have returned a life
sentence. In contrast, Judge Tymkovich concluded that the evidence
proffered by Mr. Wilson in post-conviction proceedings could have sup-
ported the prosecution's contention that he was a continuing threat and
that, as a result, his trial counsel made a reasonable strategic judgment to
exclude it. Judge Hartz, the third member of the Wilson panel, agreed
only with the result of Judge McConnell's analysis-that a remand for an
evidentiary hearing was warranted.
In my view, that narrow point of agreement offers some hope for
developing a more coherent approach to mental health evidence in capi-
tal cases. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area, beginning with
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla and continuing through its more recent
decisions in Porter and Sears indicate that the assessment of mental
health evidence not presented to a jury may depend on a number of case-
specific, fact-intensive considerations: whether the illness is treatable;
how the structured prison setting would affect it; whether evidence re-
garding the illness would have open the door for the prosecution to intro-
duce episodes of violent or antisocial conduct to support its contention
that the defendant was a continuing threat; whether the evidence would
have undermined another viable theme or argument of the defense; and
whether, despite potentially aggravating effects, the explanatory power
of additional mental health evidence would have outweighed its detri-
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mental impact. As the Wilson panel concluded, evidentiary hearings may
allow those considerations to be more fully explored.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sears supports that view. There,
the Court drew a contrast between (1) a state appellate court's conclusion
that defense counsel's decision to exclude mental health evidence was
reasonable in the abstract; and (2) a probing and fact-specific analysis of
that evidence. It concluded that the latter was required. Although the
assessment of mental health evidence in capital cases will continue to
present enormously difficult challenges, the kind of inquiry required in
Sears may bring the courts closer to the heightened reliability that they
should strive to obtain.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. EDMONDSON: EMPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZATION LAWS, STATES' RIGHTS, AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION-AN INFORMED APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Few issues are as divisive in American politics as illegal immigra-
tion. The Republican and Democratic parties are engaged in a virtual
stalemate on the issue, and many would argue that the federal govern-
ment's comprehensive overhaul of immigration law-the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)-has been largely ineffective at
stemming the tide of illegal immigration.' In response, states and mu-
nicipalities have begun to enact statutes that seek to address the problem
by preventing employers from hiring unauthorized workers.2 These stat-
utes raise questions about the extent to which state and local govern-
ments can regulate in the area of immigration without triggering federal
preemption principles. One such example is the recent Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson.3 In
Edmondson, the court analyzed a challenge to the Oklahoma Taxpayer
and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 (the Oklahoma Act), which seeks to
regulate illegal immigration through employment verification.
Part I of this Comment outlines the relevant background informa-
tion regarding the federal regulation of unauthorized workers and pre-
emption doctrine. It also summarizes Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.,5 which provides a significant framework for determining the exis-
tence of federal preemption.6 Part II summarizes Edmondson, and Part III
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision. This Comment commends the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Edmondson as consistent with federal pre-
emption jurisprudence by arguing that, in conducting its conflict preemp-
tion analysis, the court placed appropriate weight on the goals of IRCA
when analyzing whether the Oklahoma Act was an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of these goals. It then argues that Edmondson, and the
recently decided Third Circuit case Lozano v. City of Hazleton,7 faith-
1. Randall G. Shelley, Jr., If You Want Something Done Right ... : Chicanos Por La Causa
v. Napolitano and the Return of Federalism to Immigration Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 603,612 (2010)
(citing Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007)).
2. Rachel Feller, Comment, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Ari-
zona's Improper Legislation in the Field of "Immigration-Related Employment Practices ", 84
WASH. L. REV. 289, 302-05 (2009) (stating that twelve states have enacted legislation requiring the
use of E-Verify, while only one has prohibited its use) (citations omitted).
3. 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010).
4. Id. at 750.
5. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
6. Id. at 865.
7. 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010).
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fully employ the implied preemption principles articulated in Geier by
conducting a thorough conflict preemption analysis after concluding that
sections of the state statutes were neither expressly preempted nor field
preempted. These decisions stand in contrast to the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,8 where the court
largely ignored Geier, and failed to conduct a proper implied preemption
analysis.9 This Comment concludes by discussing the implications of the
Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit decisions on federal and state immigra-
tion laws.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Regulation of Unauthorized Workers
In 1986, Congress enacted IRCA, which created a "comprehensive
scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United
States."' 0 IRCA was the first federal law that sought to decrease illegal
immigration by punishing employers for hiring unauthorized workers."
At the time Congress enacted IRCA, there were approximately three
million illegal immigrants living in the United States.12
In 1942, many of the illegal immigrants in the United States were
temporary farm workers hired due to the lack of agricultural laborers
caused by World War I.13 In response, Congress enacted a temporary-
worker program that allowed employers to hire workers from Mexico for
up to nine months of the year.14 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Ag-
ricultural Act of 1949, which expanded the previous temporary-worker
program to the Bracero Program.' 5 Workers were paid low wages under
the Bracero Program, allowing employers to reap greater profits.16 The
program ended in 1965, but during that sixteen year period, over five
million Mexican workers immigrated legally to the United States.17 In
the wake of the Bracero Program, employers continued to demand cheap
labor, and therefore, continued to hire and employ now illegal immi-
8. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,
130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
9. See id. at 866-67.
10. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
I . Shelley, supra note 1, at 627 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 52 (1986)). Prior to 1986,
federal law did not directly prevent employers from hiring unauthorized workers. Kati L. Griffith,
Comment, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 128 (2008) (citing HR. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 51-56).
12. Phi Mai Nguyen, Comment, Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration: Over Two




15. Id. The Bracero Program was an agreement between the United States and Mexico to
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grants.18 During the 1970s and 1980s, due to the widespread availability
of employment, illegal immigration numbers continued to rise.19 As ille-
gal immigration increased, so too did anti-immigration sentiment.2 0 This
sentiment was compounded by a fragile economy with high unemploy-
ment and rising costs and inflation.21 In response, Congress decided to
combat illegal immigration by eliminating the "pull" factors. 22 In theory,
if eliminated, these "pull" factors-such as increased employment oppor-
tunities and higher wages-would significantly reduce the impetus for
people to enter or remain in the United States illegally.23 In 1986, after
nearly a decade of debate and compromise, Congress passed IRCA, and
24President Reagan signed the bill into law.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that IRCA made prevent-
ing the employment of unauthorized aliens a central "policy of immigra-
tion law." 25 In order to more effectively combat illegal employment,
IRCA established an extensive program, known as 1-9, to confirm the
work eligibility of employees.2 6 Employers are required to verify the
work eligibility of employees by examining specified documents.27 If the
documents appear to be reasonably legitimate, the employer may not
request additional documentation. 28 This provision limits the potential for
29employment discrimination. In addition, employers who "attempt to
comply in good faith" with the requirements of IRCA are exempt from
civil and criminal penalties,30 thus representing Congress's attempt to
lessen the burden of verification on employers and minimize disruption
of business.3 1 Furthermore, IRCA does not require employers to verify
the work eligibility of independent contractors.32
18. Id. at 626.
19. Id.
20. See Adam L. Lounsbury, Comment, A Nationalist Critique of Local Laws Purporting to
Regulate the Hiring of Undocumented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 415, 419 (2008). This anti-
immigrant sentiment was based on the assumption that illegal immigrants negatively impacted the
"economic, social, and political well-being of the nation." Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. The incentives that drive people to enter or remain in the United States illegally are
often referred to as "push" and "pull" factors. Linda Sue Johnson, Comment, The Antidiscrimination
Provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1988). The
"push" factors that cause people to leave their home state include "unemployment, low wages, poor
living and working conditions, a depressed or unstable economy, and internal strife." Id. The "pull"
factors that encourage people to come the United States are "employment opportunities, higher
wages, and better working and living conditions." Id. at 1062-63.
23. See Lounsbury, supra note 20, at 419-20.
24. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1059.
25. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS
v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)).
26. Chamber ofCommerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 751 (10th Cir. 2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 767.
30. Id. at 751.
31. Id. at 767.
32. Id. at 751.
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In enacting IRCA, Congress sought to balance several competing
goals: "preventing the hiring of unauthorized aliens, lessening the disrup-
tion of American business, and minimizing the possibility of employ-
ment discrimination."33 Congress also added a provision to IRCA ex-
pressly preempting "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized ali-
ens." 34
Illegal immigration continued to rise throughout the 1990s.35 Con-
gress, in an attempt to fight this upward trend, sought to create a more
effective and efficient method for verifying employee work authorization
that could be used in conjunction with the 1-9 forms. 36 In 1996, Congress
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)37 which, among other things, created another employment veri-
fication system-the Basic Pilot Program (E-Verify). 3 8 E-Verify differs
from 1-9 in that it is an internet based system in which information is
submitted electronically, and the government then checks the employee's
information against an electronic database. 3 9 Congress, however, explic-
itly refused to require most employers to use E-Verify, rendering it an
entirely voluntary alternative to I-9.40 According to the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, in 2001, just over one thousand employers used
E-Verify, but by 2010, over two hundred thousand employers partici-
pated.4 1
B. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption Doctrine
The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing."42 The Clause has long been interpreted as providing that federal law
33. Id. at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 765 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
35. See Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing
OffSteam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 301 (2009).
36. See Naomi Barrowclough, Note, E-Verify: The Long Awaited "Magic Bullet" or Weak
Attempt to Substitute Technology for Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 797
(2010).
37. Id.
38. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S.Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115)..
In 2007, the Basic Pilot Program was renamed "E-Verify." History and Milestones, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov
/e-verify (found under "About the Program" sub-menu).
39. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 752. E-Verify compares information from the employee's 1-9
forms to data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Social Security Administration
records to determine employment eligibility. Id.
40. Id. at 768. E-Verify, however, is mandatory for many federal contractors. Id. at 772.
41. History and Milestones, supra note 38.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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preempts contrary state laws.43 Arising out of Supremacy Clause juris-
prudence, preemption doctrine delineates the boundaries of federal su-
premacy when Congress has enacted legislation, which is otherwise
within its enumerated powers.44 The preemption inquiry "starts with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be su-
perseded by . . . Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."45 Therefore, one must look to Congressional intent for
enacting a statute to determine if a state law is preempted.
Federal preemption can be either express or implied.46 Express pre-
emption exists "when Congress 'define[s] explicitly the extent to which
its enactments pre-empt state law."' 47 Some federal statutes exempt state
law that would otherwise be expressly preempted by way of a savings
clause.48 There are two types of implied preemption: field preemption
and conflict preemption. 49 Field preemption occurs when "the scope of a
statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field
exclusively."50 Conflict preemption occurs when a state law would make
it impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where state
law "stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."51 Furthermore, when state and
federal laws share a common goal, "[t]he fact of a common end hardly
neutralizes conflicting means[,]" and the foregoing preemption principles
still apply.52
C. Geier v. American Honda Motor Company
One of the Supreme Court's most recent and significant pro-
nouncements on the preemption of state law is Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co. In Geier, the Court held that a state tort law claim conflicted
with the objectives of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208
(FMVSS 208), and therefore was impliedly preempted.53 The case com-
menced after one plaintiff was seriously injured in an auto collision.54
The 1987 Honda Accord that the plaintiff was driving was not equipped
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405-06 (1819).
44. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1665 (2009).
45. Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
46. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
47. Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d
788, 792 (10th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See Zellmer, supra note 44, at 1661, 1668.
49. Id. at 1666.
50. Sprictsma v. Mercury, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
51. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fid.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
52. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 766 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 379 (2000)).
53. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000).
54. Id. at 865.
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with an airbag.5 5 The plaintiffs sought damages under District of Colum-
bia tort law, claiming that Honda was negligent by not equipping the car
with an airbag.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated FMVSS 208
pursuant to its power under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Transportation Act (Safety Act).57 The Court concluded that the Safety
Act's express preemption provision, when read with its savings clause,
excluded common law tort actions. However, the Court noted that a
savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
principles."5 In addition, the Court emphasized that it "has repeatedly
'decline[d] to give broad effect to savings clauses where doing so would
upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."'60 Fur-
thermore, the Court declined to find that the existence of a saving clause
or express preemption provision would create a "special burden" disfa-
1 61voring preemption.
Having concluded that the state tort law action was not expressly
preempted, the Court then addressed whether the suit was impliedly pre-
empted by FMVSS 208.62 Although the purpose of FMVSS 208 was to
improve automobile safety, it did not require the installation of airbags.63
The Court explained that FMVSS 208 was not a safety floor, but was
developed as a way to give automobile manufacturers a range of choices
among different passive restraint systems, all of which promoted FMVSS
208's safety objectives.64 Therefore, by requiring airbags and taking the
choice away from the auto makers, the state tort law stood as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of FMVSS 208's objective.
The Court gave significant weight to the history of FMVSS 208 and
DOT's explanation of FMVSS 208 in concluding that the state tort action
was conflict preempted.66 The Court deferred to DOT's explanation be-
cause of the technical nature of the subject matter and the complex and
extensive historical background of FMVSS 208.67 The Court added, "The
agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation
and its objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id. at 864.
58. Id at 868.
59. Id. at 869.
60. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)) (alteration in
original).
61. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
62. Id at 874.
63. Id. at 874-76.
64. Id. at 874-75.
65. Id. at 886.
66. Id. at 875-77.
67. Id. at 883.
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impact of state requirements."6 In sum, Geier provided the appropriate
framework with which to analyze whether state and local immigration
laws are preempted by federal law.
II. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. EDMONDSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act (the Oklahoma Act) to regulate illegal immigration.69 The
Oklahoma Act reflects the judgment of the Oklahoma legislature that
"illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness
... ,70 The Oklahoma Act seeks to prevent illegal immigration by stop-
ping the employment of illegal aliens through the use of mandatory veri-
71fication systems and various monetary disincentives.
Numerous chambers of commerce and trade associations brought
suit challenging three sections of the Oklahoma Act: Sections 7(B), 7(C),
and 9.72 Section 7(B) requires employers to use E-Verify to confirm the
employment status of their employees.73 If an employer refuses to use E-
Verify it is barred from contracting with Oklahoma public employers.74
Section 7(C) "makes it a 'discriminatory practice' for any employer to
'discharge an employee working in Oklahoma who is a United States
citizen or permanent resident alien while retaining an employee who the
employing entity knows, or reasonably should have known, is an unau-
thorized alien."' 75 "An employer who engages in such a discriminatory
practice may be investigated by the Oklahoma Human Rights Commis-
sion" (OHRC) and can be subject to temporary injunctive relief "and
affirmative relief, including reinstatement, back pay, costs and attorney's
fees." 76 However, if an employer uses E-Verify, it is exempt from liabil-
ity under Section 7(C).77 Section 9 requires all employers to obtain
"documentation to verify . . . independent contractor[s'] employment
authorization."78 If the independent contractor does not provide proof of
work authorization, then the employer must withhold compensation
equal to "the top marginal income tax rate" allowable under Oklahoma
68. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,496 (1996)).
69. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 750, 750 (10th Cir. 2010).
70. Id. at 753 (quoting Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, 2007 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 112, § 2 (West)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 753-55.
72. Id. at 750.
73. Id. at 753-54.
74. Id
75. Id. at 754 (citing Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 25, § 1313(C)(1) (2007)).
76. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 754.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 754-55 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit., § 2385.32 (2007)) (alterations in original).
2011] 38 1
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
law. 79 Employers who do not withhold the required amount shall be li-
able to the state for the remaining amount.80
The plaintiffs claimed that all three sections of the Oklahoma Act
were expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, and therefore
sought a preliminary injunction.8' The defendants opposed the injunction
and moved to dismiss on the basis that the chambers lacked standing,
certain defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) stripped the district court of ju-
risdiction to enjoin Section 9.82 The district court denied the motion to
dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction as to all three sections. 8 3
B. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction with regard to Sections 7(C) and 9, but reversed the district
court's grant of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Sec-
tion 7(B).84 First, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the three sections of the Oklahoma Act.85 In finding standing,
the court stated that the chambers had sufficiently demonstrated that the
injury threatened by the three sections was "real, immediate, and di-
rect[,]" and that the injunction requested would redress their alleged inju-
ries.86 Second, the court concluded that the Attorney General was not
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as to Section 7(B), but
that he was immune from suit as to Sections 9 and 7(C) because he was
not authorized to enforce those sections.87 Third, the court found that the
TIA did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Section 9.88
It stated that the Oklahoma Act fell outside of the scope of the TIA be-
cause Section 9 was an assessment seeking to regulate illegal immigra-
tion and not a tax with the primary purpose of raising revenue.89 Last, the
court undertook a preemption analysis to determine whether the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction as to the three sections was
proper.90 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court regarding Sections
7(C) and 9, finding that Section 7(C) was expressly preempted and Sec-
tion 9 was impliedly preempted. 9' The court, however, reversed the dis-
79. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 754-755 (quoting § 2385.32(A)).
80. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 755.




85. Id. at 759.
86. Id. at 756 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)).
87. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 759-60.
88. Id. at 761.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 764.
91. Id. at 771.
382 [Vol. 88:2
2011] CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V EDMONDSON
trict court's decision as to Section 7(B), finding that the section was nei-
ther expressly nor impliedly preempted by federal law. 92
The court began its preemption analysis by evaluating whether the
three provisions of the Oklahoma Act were expressly preempted. 93 Judge
Lucero stated that the proper express preemption analysis asks "whether
the state law at issue falls within the scope of a federal preemption provi-
sion."94 "IRCA preempts 'any State law imposing civil or criminal sanc-
tions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized ali-
ens."' 95 The court noted that IRCA does not define "sanction" as requir-
96
ing a punitive component.
The court determined that the penalties under Section 7(C) for firing
a legal worker while retaining an illegal worker-cease and desist orders,
reinstatement, back pay costs, and attorney's fees-are restrictive meas-
ures that fall within the definition of sanctions under § 1324a(h)(2) of
IRCA.97 The court added that the above penalties are consistent with the
generally accepted use of the term "sanctions" under federal law.9 8
Therefore, because these sanctions are imposed upon those who employ
illegal aliens, Section 7(C) falls within the scope of § 1324a(h)(2) and is
thus expressly preempted. 99
Conversely, the court concluded that Sections 7(B) and 9 were not
expressly preempted by § 1324a(h)(2) because neither "impos[es] civil
or criminal sanctions . . . upon those who employ . . . unauthorized ali-
ens." 00 Section 7(B) simply requires all employers to use E-Verify.10
An employer violates this section not by employing illegal immigrants,
but by refusing to implement the program. 102 According to the court,
because sanctions are distinct from the employment of unauthorized ali-
ens, this section does not come within the scope of § 1324a(h)(2) and
therefore is not expressly preempted. 0 3 Likewise, under Section 9, it is
irrelevant whether an independent contractor is an unauthorized alien.1 04
Under that provision the employer must verify the work status or with-
hold taxes of all independent contractors. 05
92. Id.
93. Id. at 765.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
96. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 765.
97. Id. at 765-66.
98. Id. at 765.
99. Id. at 766.







DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Having found that Sections 9 and 7(B) were not expressly pre-
empted, the court set out to determine whether the sections were none-
theless impliedly preempted based on conflict preemption principles.106 It
concluded that, although Section 9 did not make compliance with federal
law a physical impossibility, it did stand as an obstacle to accomplishing
the goals of IRCA and therefore was conflict preempted. o0 However, the
panel split in concluding that Section 7(B), which mandates the use of E-
Verify, was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's goals
under IRCA and therefore was not preempted.108
In its preemption analysis regarding Section 9, the court found that,
although this section did not make compliance with IRCA an impossibil-
ity, it stood as an obstacle to the implementation of IRCA because it in-
terfered with the methods chosen by Congress and therefore was conflict
preempted. 09 Specifically, Section 9 requires employers to verify the
work authorization of independent contractors.o10 In contrast, IRCA ex-
plicitly excludes independent contractors from verification require-
ments."' The court noted that this added requirement stood contrary to
the goals of IRCA by potentially exposing employers to federal liability
for employment discrimination and increasing burdens on businesses.112
In addition, Geier also supported the court's conflict preemption conclu-
sion.11 3 The court noted that "Section 9 would create obligations on con-
tracting entities that Congress expressly chose not to impose."1 14 Just as
state tort law could not hold automakers liable for not installing an airbag
in Geier, Oklahoma should not be allowed to require the verification of
independent contractors. 1 15
The last part of the court's preemption analysis addressed the Ninth
Circuit case of Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano."6 In Chicanos, the
court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) was neither
106. Id. at 766-67.
107. Id. at 769.
108. See id. at 771. Judge Lucero argued that Section 7(B) is conflict preempted because mak-
ing E-Verify mandatory would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress goals in
enacting IRCA. Id. at 768-70. He stated that Congress has concluded that 1-9 "strikes the best bal-
ance between preventing employment of unauthorized workers, easing burdens on employers, and
preventing employment discrimination." Id. at 768. Furthermore, Judge Lucero analogized mandat-
ing E-Verify to mandating airbags in Geier; Oklahoma should not be allowed to mandate the use of
E-Verify because it is voluntary under federal law and mandating its use would restrict employers'
choices. Id. at 769-70.
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expressly nor implied preempted by IRCA or the IIRIRA." 7 Like the
Oklahoma Act, LAWA was intended to combat illegal immigration by
targeting employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants." 8 The prin-
cipal sanction of LAWA was the revocation of state business licenses.1 9
The Arizona law also mandated the use of E-Verify.120 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that Oklahoma's reliance on Chicanos was misplaced because
the provision at issue in that case was a licensing law, and Oklahoma had
not asserted that its law is a licensing law.121 Most significantly, how-
ever, the Tenth Circuit opined that the Ninth Circuit's implied preemp-
tion holding was based largely on the Ninth Circuit's initial conclusion
that LAWA fell within the savings clause of IRCA. 122 The Tenth Circuit
expressed reservation with the ruling, stating it "is problematic because it
implies that the presence of an express preemption provision precludes
the possibility of implied preemption."123 The court was "unpersuaded"
by the Ninth Circuit's holding because its approach stood contrary to
Geier and generally accepted implied preemption principles.' 2 4
Last, the court evaluated the remaining factors for granting a pre-
liminary injunction.125 It found that the plaintiffs would likely suffer ir-
reparable harm absent a preliminary injunction as any monetary damages
imposed would be unlikely to be recovered due to the government's sov-
ereign immunity.126 Additionally, the balance of equities tipped in the
chambers' favor because an injunction would serve the public interest
and Oklahoma does not have a public interest in enforcing a law that is
likely unconstitutional.127
C. Concurrence
The concurring opinion, authored by Judge Kelly, offered an expla-
nation as to why Section 7(B) was not conflict preempted.128 Judge Kelly
argued, despite E-Verify's voluntary use on the national scale, "it is not
reasonable to assume that a mandatory program choice for state public
contractors conflicts with Congressional purpose."' 29 Judge Kelly opined
117. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
The court also held that LAWA did not violate the employers' rights to due process. Id. at 861.
118. Id. at 860.
119. Id.
120. Id.




125. Id. The plaintiffs would have had to demonstrate "a likelihood that they will suffer irrepa-
rable harm absent preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that the
injunction is in the public interest." Id (citing Attorney General v. Tyson Food, Inc. 565 F.3d 769,
776 (10th Cir. 2009)).
126. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 770.
127. Id. at 771.
128. Id. (Kelly, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 772.
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that Congress had foreseen the increased use of technology as evidenced
by requiring E-Verify for federal contractors.130 The concurrence con-
cluded "choice is not an end in itself and no evidence suggests that fed-
eral standards concerning immigration and employment-verification will
be compromised by E-Verify."l31
D. Dissent
The dissent, authored by Judge Hartz, argued three points. First, the
plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an injunction, as to Section 7(B),
against the Attorney General because they failed to show an actual and
imminent threat of injury traceable to him.' 32 Second, the dissent con-
tended that the TIA barred the chambers' Section 9 claim because the
TIA bars injunctions against tax-withholding statutes, and Section 9 is a
tax withholding statute.133 Additionally, the dissent argued that it is as
reasonable to infer that the purpose of Section 9 is to protect the integrity
of the tax system as to infer its purpose is to enforce immigration law.134
Third, Judge Hartz concurred with the other judges regarding the injunc-
tion of Section 7(C), but on narrower grounds.'3 5 He contended that rein-
statement, back pay, costs, and attorney fees are not civil sanctions under
IRCA, but rather, compensatory relief, which IRCA does not cover.' 3 6
However, because Section 7(C) imposes other civil fines that do come




Part A of the analysis argues that the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Edmondson was consistent with the three goals of IRCA: preventing
employment of unauthorized workers, preventing employment discrimi-
nation, and minimizing disruption of business. 3 8 Specifically, Section 9,
independent contractor obligations, conflicted with the goals of IRCA
and was preempted; whereas Section 7(B), which mandates the use of E-
Verify, does not conflict with the goals of IRCA, and therefore, the court
was correct in holding that it was not preempted by federal law. Part B of
the analysis contends that the Edmondson court more accurately and
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (Hartz, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. at 774.
134. Id. at 776-77. It is worth noting that Judge Hartz believed that the majority wrongly relied
on the motive behind the enactment of the Oklahoma Act in arriving at their conclusion that Section
9 imposed an assessment and not a tax and therefore was outside of the scope of the TIA. Id. at 776.
If more judges put aside motive in determining whether a state enactment imposed an assessment or
a tax, more states could disguise efforts to control immigration as tax laws, which are immune from
injunction. However, implied preemption principles would likely still bar many of these enactments.
135. Id. at 777.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
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faithfully applied the principles of implied preemption than did the Ninth
Circuit in Chicanos. The Ninth Circuit largely ignored the implied pre-
emption framework articulated in Geier by failing to place appropriate
weight on the goals of IRCA. Finally, Part C of the analysis discusses the
possible implications of the circuit courts' decisions on state and federal
immigration laws, and the soon to be issued Supreme Court ruling on the
constitutionality of LAWA.
A. Edmondson: True to the Goals oflRCA
When Congress enacted IRCA it sought to delicately balance three
goals: preventing employment of unauthorized workers, preventing em-
ployment discrimination, and preventing undue disruption of business.' 39
In Edmondson, the Tenth Circuit carefully considered each of these goals
in arriving at its decision that Section 9 was conflict preempted, while
Section 7(B) was not. The result was an informed holding that demon-
strated a superior approach to immigration and employment that was
faithful to Congressional intent.
1. Section 9 Was Conflict Preempted
The court properly concluded that Section 9, which requires em-
ployers to verify the worker authorization of independent contractors,
was conflict preempted. As the defendants argued, both the Oklahoma
Act and IRCA share a common goal of preventing unauthorized em-
ployment.140 However, although requiring employers to verify the work
eligibility of independent contractors would potentially further the goal
of preventing unauthorized workers, Section 9 runs completely counter
to the other two avowed goals of IRCA: preventing the disruption of
business and minimizing the possibility of employment discrimination.
The construction industry provides an apt example. In order to
complete a construction project, a general contractor (employer) will
often hire independent contractors to perform work that the general con-
tractor does not specialize in. 14 By requiring the general contractor to
verify the work authorization of each independent contractor, the hiring
process would slow considerably. Either individuals would have to be
taken away from their normal employment duties or the employer would
need to hire additional employees to verify the work authorization of
independent contractors. Either option results in the disruption of busi-
139. Id.
140. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 767 (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
379 (2000)).
141. See Kent W. Collier, Comment, The Nuts and Bolts of Bankruptcy, Trust Funds, and the
Construction Industry: Building a Solution for Subcontractors "Nailed" with an Unpaid Bill, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 623, 624 (2005). The terms "subcontractor" and "independent contractor"
are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., David F. Johnson, Employers' Liability for Independent
Contractors'Injuries, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2000).
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ness-falling behind schedule and paying additional employees both
result in increased costs for the employer.14 2
In order to avoid this disruption of business, employers will likely
resort to hiring those they know are authorized to work.14 3 Although pre-
venting the hiring of unauthorized aliens is one of the goals of IRCA, this
objective comes with an increased risk of employment discrimination. In
drafting IRCA, Congress took great pains to ensure that the new regula-
tory scheme did not increase discrimination. 1" For example, IRCA ex-
plicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship status or na-
tional origin,14 5 and if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that an employer has engaged in a discriminatory practice, the employer
may be subject to fines ranging from $100 to $10,000 for each act of
discrimination. 14 6 IRCA, therefore, imposes similar liability for hiring
unauthorized workers and discriminating against authorized aliens.1 47 In
contrast, Section 9 and the Oklahoma Act do not contain a provision
imposing liability on those who discriminate against authorized aliens.148
In and of itself, the failure to incorporate an anti-discrimination provision
does not necessarily mean that Section 9 conflicts with IRCA; however,
by requiring the verification of independent contractors, Section 9 poten-
tially exposes employers to federal liability as they strive to comply with
the additional state requirement. 149 Surely, federal liability qualifies as a
disruption of business.
In Edmondson, the court downplayed the foregoing argument by
noting that, in order to incur federal liability, an employer must act with
a specific intent to discriminate.15 0 Under Section 9, this possibility is not
far-fetched. For example, in many areas of business, contracts are
awarded through the use of a bidding system. 51 Typically, in this system,
the lowest bidder is awarded the contract.152 An employer would have a
strong incentive under Section 9 to award the contract not necessarily to
the lowest bidder, but to the independent contractor whose work eligibil-
ity could most easily be verified. It is not hard to imagine that under this
142. These employers would also need to confirm the work authorization of new hires, which
would further disrupt business.
143. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 217 (3d Cir. 2010) ("While drafting IRCA,
Congress heard testimony that imposing employer sanctions would create economic incentives for
employers to discriminate against workers who appeared to be of foreign origin.").
144. Patrick S. Cunningham, Comment, The Legal Arizona Worker's Act: A Threat to Federal
Supremacy Over Immigration?, 42 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 411, 416 (2010).
145. Id. at 417.
146. Id.
147. Id. The penalties for hiring an unauthorized worker range from $250 to $10,000. Id. at
415.
148. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 754-55 (10th Cir. 2010).
149. Id. at 769.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Janine McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' Liability
in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 387, 391 (1985).
152. See, e.g., id
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system, independent contracting companies owned and staffed by mi-
norities or recent immigrants would have less opportunity to win a con-
tract than a white-owned business.'5 3 In the alternative, if the employer
opted for withholding taxes instead of verifying eligibility, this again
would disrupt business by creating a larger financial burden on the em-
ployer-as the employer would still need to pay the contractor their
original compensation and simultaneously set aside additional monies for
the tax withholding. Additionally, Section 9 could lead to increased liti-
gation between general contractors and subcontractors regarding contract
disputes to determine which entity bore the financial burden for the
withholding. Because Section 9 would significantly disrupt the balance
of goals Congress sought to achieve in enacting IRCA, the court cor-
rectly concluded Section 9 was too large an obstacle and was therefore
conflict preempted.154
2. Section 7(B) Was Not Impliedly Preempted
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Section 7(B), which requires
the use of E-Verify, was not conflict preempted by IRCA gave proper
weight to state sovereignty while not disturbing the goals of IRCA. The
Third Circuit, in Lozano, and Judge Lucero concluded otherwise.'55 Yet,
their arguments are less persuasive because state mandated use of E-
Verify does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the goals
of IRCA.' 56
a. E-Verify Will Not Disrupt Business
Mandating the use of E-Verify will not disrupt business. One of
Congress's goals in establishing E-Verify was to make the work authori-
zation of employees more efficient.'5 7 To verify an employee's eligibility
using E-Verify, all the employer must do is electronically submit the
employee's information over the internet and wait for a confirmation.'
If the employee information matches the government records, the gov-
ernment instantly notifies the employer of the employee's eligibility.
This process certainly does not require more time than examining docu-
153. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1069 ("A primary reason for the opposition to the employer
sanctions scheme [of IRCA] was the concern that some employers, when threatened with civil and
criminal sanctions for hiring undocumented aliens, would discriminate against those applicants who
share a number of characteristics with those immigrant groups most commonly perceived as ille-
gal.").
154. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 769.
155. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210 (3d Cir. 2010); Edmondson, 594 F.3d at
768-69.
156. At issue in Lozano was a Pennsylvania town's licensing law that sought to reduce illegal
immigration through, inter alia, the mandatory use of E-Verify. 620 F.3d at 177-79.
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ments under the 1-9 system. 6 0 If, on the other hand, the employer re-
ceives a non-confirmation, it is required to do nothing aside from alerting
the employee of the non-confirmation.i In fact, the employer is man-
dated to take no action against the employee pending an appeal of the
non-confirmation, which must be initiated by the employee.1 62 Addition-
ally, a recent study of E-Verify conducted by an independent research
company, Westat, found that "employers are generally satisfied with the
program and feel it is non-burdensome."l 6 3
The Third Circuit contended that mandating the use of E-Verify
would increase costs to businesses in the form of set-up and training ex-
penses.'1 This additional burden is de minimus. First, the vast majority
of businesses have computers and access to the internet. Second, it is
estimated that the average implementation cost is $125 and the average
yearly cost is under $750, with three-fourths of the employers spending
less than $100.165 The burden imposed by mandating E-Verify does not
pose a tangible obstacle to the goal of minimizing the disruption of busi-
ness.
b. E-Verify Will Not Cause Increased Employment Discrimi-
nation
The mandatory use of E-Verify will not lead to increased employ-
ment discrimination. E-Verify provides sufficient safeguards against
discrimination through its appeals process and as evidenced by the fact
that Congress mandates its use for federal contractors.1 6 6 If the employer
receives a tentative non-conformation, the employee is notified and then
has eight business days to contest the tentative non-confirmation.167 Dur-
ing this period, the employer may not take any adverse action against the
employee.168 Furthermore, because the employer is shielded from liabil-
ity during this period, there is no impetus for it to discriminate against
the employee. 16 9
The Lozano court argued that E-Verify's unreliability will lead to
increased discrimination.17 0 The decision cites a 2007 congressional
160. Id. at 751.
161. Id. at 752.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERvs., WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY
PROGRAM: USCIS SYNOPSIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%2ODocs/Westat%2OEvaluation%20of%2Othe%20E-
Verify%20Program.pdf.
164. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. Shelley, supra note 1, at 623-24.
166. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008).




170. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2010).
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study that found foreign-born workers are thirty times more likely to
receive tentative non-confirmations than employees born in the United
States.17 1 Tentative non-confirmations, however, do not affect the final
determination of eligibility,172 and because the employer may not take
action during the appeals period, this non-confirmation will not result in
discrimination. Indeed, Congress has repeatedly refused to mandate the
use of E-Verify for the vast majority of employers,1 73 but nonetheless,
many businesses that contract with the federal government are required
to use the system.174 In 2008, President Bush issued an executive order
directing all federal departments and agencies to require federal contrac-
tors and subcontractors to verify the work authorization of employees
performing work under qualifying federal contracts. 75 The particulars of
the order are complex, but in short, all federal contractors and subcon-
tractors are required to use E-Verify with the following exceptions: con-
tracts for fewer than 120 days; contracts less than $100,000; contracts
where all work is performed outside of the United States; and commer-
cially off-the-shelf items and related services, which includes nearly all
food and agricultural products.176
President Obama has pledged his support to implement this execu-
tive order 77 and has committed significant budget funds toward improv-
ing and expanding E-Verify.17 8 There also appears to be bipartisan sup-
port in Congress for mandating the use of E-Verify for federal contrac-
tors and subcontractors.' 79 As a proportion of the total national work
force, federal contractors may not amount to much, but between January
2011 and the end of March 2011 the list of federal contractors with five
or more employees enrolled in E-Verify totaled nearly 2,500 pages. so By
171. Id. at 215.
172. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 752.
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id.
175. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008). The executive order took
effect September 8, 2009. "Federal contractors and subcontractors will be required to begin using the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' E-Verify system starting September 8, 2009, to verify
their employees' eligibility to legally work in the United States." Federal Contractors Required to
Use E- Verify System, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
Office%2Oof%20Communications/Press%2OReleases/FY%2009/Septembe 0 /o202009/far-rule-I -sep-
09.pdf (last updated Jun. 4, 2009).
176. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008).
177. Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Employment Verification with Administration's Com-
mitment to E-Verify, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 8, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr 1247063976814.shtm.
178. In 2010, the Presidential Budget contained $110 million for E-Verify. OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 72 (2009). The 2011
budget has allocated $137 million for E-Verify and a similar work authorization program. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T 82 (2010).
179. See Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Revives Bush Idea to Catch Illegal Workers, WASH. POST,
July 9, 2009, A4.
180. E-Verify Federal Contractors List "Updated", U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.
(Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify%
20from%20Controlled%20Vocabulary/E-VerifyFedContrListandQueryVol.pdf.
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mandating the use of E-Verify for federal contractors, the federal gov-
ernment has implicitly, yet strongly, rejected the argument that the sys-
tem is an obstacle to limiting employment discrimination. Last, it is im-
portant to note that Congress has repeatedly extended E-Verify and has
expanded its availability to all 50 states. 81 It seems doubtful that Con-
gress and the Executive Branch would make such a concerted effort to
proliferate the use of E-Verify if they believed that E-Verify conflicts
with the goals of IRCA.
The federal government actively pursues affirmative action pro-
grams designed to increase minority participation in federal business.182
Under the Small Business Act (SBA), the federal government seeks to
increase the number of federal contracts awarded to small businesses
"owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals."' 83 The act defines socially disadvantaged individuals as those
individuals who "have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without
regard to their individual qualities."' 84 In order to increase the participa-
tion of disadvantaged businesses in federal contracting, the SBA set a
"government-wide goal for the minimum participation of disadvantaged
business enterprises . . . at five percent of the value of all federal gov-
ernment prime contract and subcontract awards in a given year."' 85 In
addition to this government-wide goal, the SBA requires that each fed-
eral agency establish an annual goal that realistically reflects the maxi-
mum potential percentage of contracts that could be awarded to disad-
vantaged businesses.'86
It is paradoxical, if not utterly illogical, that the federal government
would promote the participation of minority owned businesses in federal
contracting through the SBA, yet, it would discourage the hiring of mi-
nority employees through the mandatory use of E-Verify for federal con-
tractors. Potentially, a minority owned business that benefits from the
SBA could then be required to discriminate against minority workers
using E-Verify. Such a contradictory situation can only lead to one con-
clusion; the use of E-Verify does not conflict with IRCA's goal of reduc-
ing employment discrimination.
c. E-Verify Will Help Prevent Unauthorized Workers
States requiring the use of E-Verify will likely further the goal of
preventing unauthorized workers more effectively than the 1-9 system.
181. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 200 (3d Cir. 2010).
182. Brian C. Eades, Casenote, Affirmative Action: The United States Supreme Court Goes
Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 771, 771 (1996).
183. Id. at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6) (1995)).
184. Eades, supra note 182, at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1995)).
185. Eades, supra note 182, at 773-74.
186. Id. at 774.
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One of the goals of Congress in creating E-Verify was to create a system
that would more accurately verify an employee's eligibility for employ-
ment. As discussed above, E-Verify is not perfect, but it does have
advantages over 1-9 for determining employee eligibility. E-Verify has
"reduced unauthorized employment among participating employers by
permitting employers to determine whether the information provided by
employees on 1-9 forms is consistent with the information on [Social
Security Administration] and [Department of Homeland Security] data-
bases."188 Without this additional verification method, employees can
easily forge documents because employers have no way of determining
their authenticity aside from their outward appearance.189 Furthermore,
one study found that E-Verify returns a tentative non-confirmation for
approximately ten percent of the requests.' 90 Out of the ten percent that
received tentative non-confirmations, few appealed the determination.'91
Of course, the failure to appeal could be due in part to factors aside from
the employee's work authorization status, but at least anecdotally, this
statistic would indicate the system is preventing unauthorized workers.
d. Section 7(B) is Not Conflict Preempted According to Geier
The conclusion that Section 7(B) was not conflict preempted is in
accordance with the preemption analysis in Geier. In that case, DOT's
decision not to require airbags was part of a deliberate and careful regu-
latory scheme.192 DOT even considered an "all airbag" standard, but
opted for a "gradual phase-in of passive restraints."'93 The agency found
that giving automakers a choice of several restraints was best in the
short-term and the long-term to accomplish its goals. 9 4 DOT stated that
allowing a choice in passive restraint systems "would help develop data
on comparative effectiveness, would allow the industry to overcome the
safety problems and high production costs associated with airbags, and
would facilitate the development of alternative, cheaper, and safer pas-
sive restraint systems. And it would build public confidence." 9 5 In short,
"safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative
protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in
every car."' 96
At first glance, the Third Circuit's and Judge Lucero's analogy ap-
pears sound: refusing to allow employers to choose their work verifica-
187. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010).
188. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Servs., Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program, June 2004, at 3).
189. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 751.
190. Shelley, supra note 1, at 631.
191. Id
192. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875 (2000).
193. Id. at 879.
194. Id. at 878-79.
195. Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 881 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25 (No. 98-1811)).
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tion method is the same as negating automakers' passive restraint choice
by requiring airbags. However, the voluntariness of E-Verify was not due
to calculated assessments like in Geier. For example, Congress made no
equivalent statement that the goals of IRCA would best be promoted by a
choice of verification systems instead of one. 19 7 To the contrary, Con-
gress strongly encouraged the use of E-Verify by expanding its duration
and extending its availability to all fifty states.198 There is also a strong
textual argument against conflict preemption. Congress could have for-
bid states from making E-Verify mandatory, as it did with regard to state
civil and criminal penalties under IRCA's express preemption provision,
but opted not to do so.'" Because E-Verify furthers the goals of IRCA, it
does not raise significant conflict preemption concerns.
B. IRCA, Geier, and the Circuit Split
In Edmondson, the Tenth Circuit more accurately and faithfully ap-
plied the principles of implied preemption than did the Ninth Circuit in
Chicanos. There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that LAWA was not ex-
pressly preempted because, as a licensing law, it fell within the savings
clause of IRCA. 200 The court determined that the mandatory use of E-
Verify and LAWA's potentially harsh sanctions20 1 were not impliedly
preempted because they were not an obstacle to the accomplishment of
202
the goals of IRCA. The Edmondson court distinguished the two cases,
because at issue in Chicanos was a licensing law and the Oklahoma Act
was not a licensing law. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit opined that it
found the Ninth Circuit's reasoning unpersuasive. After concluding that
LAWA was not expressly preempted, and then by conducting a cursory
implied preemption analysis, the Chicanos approach suggested that the
presence of an express preemption provision or savings clause prevents
the operation of implied preemption principles. This inferior approach
stands in opposition to the approach taken in Geier, where the Supreme
197. See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010).
198. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 864. The savings clause states that IRCA preempts all state sanctions "other than
through licensing and similar laws." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)). Furthermore, the
Court found that the savings clause should not have been narrowly interpreted because the power to
regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens has traditionally been left to the states. Chicanos,
558 F.3d at 864-65. This presumption against preemption in the area of employment of unauthorized
aliens is debatable, but nonetheless the existence of a presumption against preemption does not
negate the need to conduct a robust implied preemption analysis. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 768-69
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
201. LAWA imposes a graduated series of sanctions for violations. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 862.
The first infraction "requires the employer to terminate the employment of all unauthorized aliens,
file quarterly reports of all new hires for a probationary period, and file an affidavit stating that it
terminated all unauthorized aliens and will not intentionally or knowingly hire any others." Id. If the
employer violates the act during this probationary period the employer's business license is perma-
nently revoked. Id.
202. Id. at 866.
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Court conducted a thorough conflict preemption analysis after conclud-
ing that the claim was not expressly preempted.
In Geier, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the existence of a
savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
principles."203 After concluding that the express preemption provision of
IRCA saved LAWA, the Ninth Circuit appeared to largely ignore this
maxim of federal preemption doctrine. In concluding that LAWA was
not conflict preempted, the Ninth Circuit downplayed the potential for
conflict between the Arizona law and IRCA by stating "a hypothetical
situation in which an employer may be subject to conflicting rulings
from state and federal tribunals on the basis of the same hiring decision .
does not provide an adequate basis to sustain a facial challenge."204
The court concluded that, because a claim had not yet been brought un-
der LAWA, there was no record to demonstrate the effect of the act on
an employer. Therefore, the argument was essentially speculative and did
not create an implied conflict. 205
The Ninth Circuit's wait-and-see approach runs contrary to the ap-
proach taken in Edmondson. The Edmondson court concluded that Sec-
tion 9 was conflict preempted and that the potential risk of increased
liability was enough for an injunction when the law "upsets Congress'
carefully constructed balance by interfering with its chosen methods."206
IRCA exhaustively details a specialized regulatory scheme, and clearly,
sanctions are an important tool in the scheme.207 Because it is clear from
the text of the legislation that LAWA's sanctions stand as an obstacle to
the goals Congress sought to achieve in creating IRCA's sanctions, it is
not necessary to wait and see the effects of LAWA prior to deciding
whether it is conflict preempted.
The Tenth Circuit's implied preemption analysis was also superior
because it placed appropriate weight on the goals of IRCA in arriving at
the conclusion that Section 9 stood as an obstacle to the implementation
of the regulatory scheme and was therefore conflict preempted. In enact-
ing IRCA, Congress manifested a clear intent to create a comprehensive
and overarching regulatory scheme and corresponding civil and criminal
penalties.208 Even assuming that LAWA did fall under the savings clause,
the penalties imposed run counter to the enumerated penalties of IRCA,
and therefore, there was a considerable likelihood that LAWA could
expose an employer to federal liability by following the letter of Arizona
law. For example, by filing quarterly reports on all new hires during the
probationary period, an employer could come in conflict with the rule
203. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
204. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 856.
205. Id. at 867.
206. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 769 (10th Cir. 2010).
207. Id. at 751.
208. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210-12 (3d Cir. 2010).
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under IRCA preventing employers from asking employees for additional
documentation. Additionally, having an employer file an affidavit stating
he has fired all illegal employees, and that he will not hire other illegal
workers on pain of permanent loss of a business license, could likely lead
to firing and hiring decisions based on race or national origin, which is
obviously a discriminatory practice in violation of the goals of IRCA and
other federal laws. Furthermore, in signing LAWA, then Arizona Gover-
nor Napolitano noted that it was problematic that the bill lacked "an an-
tidiscrimination clause to ensure that it is enforced in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner." 209
Besides potential federal liability, LAWA places other burdens on
business owners. Minor burdens include asking employees for additional
documentation and requiring employers to sign affidavits. More signifi-
cantly, the Ninth Circuit wrongly discounted the plaintiffs' argument that
LAWA was impliedly preempted because the permanent revocation of a
business license is far more severe than IRCA sanctions and therefore it
conflicts with IRCA's goals. 210 Other licensing laws, with lesser penal-
ties, may not interfere with the goals of IRCA's sanctioning scheme, but
LAWA, by permanently revoking a business's license, imposes the ulti-
mate burden on employers: the loss of livelihood. In finding Section 9 of
the Oklahoma Act conflict preempted, the Tenth Circuit placed great
weight on the employer's burden to verify the work authorization of in-
dependent contractors. 211 The Edmondson court stated that the risk of
increased employee discrimination and employer burdens under "Section
9 . . . upsets Congress' carefully constructed balance by interfering with
its chosen methods."212 Clearly, both these dangers are present in
LAWA.
These types of situations raise serious conflict preemption concerns,
yet the Chicanos court limited its conflict preemption analysis and in-
voked Geier only to analyze the mandatory use of E-Verify,213 which is
not conflict preempted. In Geier, the Court took into account all of
DOT's goals in enacting FMVSS 208, but in Chicanos the Ninth Circuit
only considered the goal of preventing unauthorized workers. Ignoring
the goals of preventing employment discrimination and minimizing the
burden on employers resulted in an analysis that was overly simplistic.
Having wrongly ignored the two foregoing goals, the court's analysis
then flowed logically-LAWA was not expressly preempted based on
the savings clause as it was a licensing law, and LAWA did not stand as
an obstacle to accomplishing IRCA's goal of preventing unauthorized
209. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration
Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1716 (2009).
210. See Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 867.
211. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 769.
212. Id.
213. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 866-67.
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workers, and therefore, it was not impliedly preempted. This contrived
conclusion, however, contradicts long established federal preemption
jurisprudence that "has repeatedly declined to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme estab-
lished by federal law .... "2 14 And it is undisputed that IRCA is a "care-
ful regulatory scheme." Unless the courts undertake a meaningful im-
plied preemption analysis subsequent to an express preemption analysis,
states and municipalities will be able to essentially supplement or bypass
IRCA entirely by labeling employment verification laws as licensing
laws in order to fall within the savings clause.2 15
C. Edmondson, Chicanos, and Lozano: The Implications for State Immi-
gration Laws and Federal Lawmaking
By enacting LAWA, then Governor Napolitano hoped to pressure
the federal government into addressing immigration through more effec-
tive legislation.216 It is argued that by enacting their own immigration
laws states will pressure Congress to reform federal immigration laws,
and this reform will lead to greater and much needed state and federal
cooperation on immigration.217 Additionally, because the federal courts
have upheld these two immigration laws, at least in part, this will likely
motivate other states to pass similar legislation. Some municipalities and
states have already enacted similar legislation, but with mixed results. 218
The longer Congress waits before enacting new, improved legislation the
more challenges to state immigration laws will be decided in the courts
and the more varied these laws will become.
As more states enact new work authorization statutes, it raises an in-
teresting question. Will Congress base new legislation on successful state
statutes, or will courts strip away so much of each state law that none
will prove to be effective? In the past the courts have allowed states to
operate as small laboratories for developing new and innovative solu-
tions to the problems they face.219 The courts, however, are resistant to
allow states to continue to function as laboratories in areas of tradition-
ally federal law.220 One of the dangers of allowing states to enact their
own immigration laws is that the variety of enforcement approaches
taken could result in a "thousand borders," which would certainly be
problematic.221 For example, varied state work authorization laws could
214. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
215. See Shelley, supra note 1, at 616-17.
216. Id. at 633.
217. Id. at 637.
218. Id. at 632-33.
219. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220. See id. (majority opinion) (holding that regulation of marijuana under the Controlled
Substances Act is solely within the power of the federal government because of the Commerce
Clause).
221. Nchimunya D. Ndulo, State Employer Sanctions, Laws and the Federal Preemption
Doctrine: The Legal Arizona Workers Act Revisited, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 866
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make it very difficult for nationwide businesses to comply in their hiring
practices. This could pose a significant disruption to businesses as they
face more and more complex immigration laws with potentially harsh
penalties for non-compliance. Also, approaches taken by states to combat
illegal immigration could result in racial profiling.22 2 Federal immigra-
tion officers receive extensive training, including courses in immigration
and nationality law, but many states lack the funds necessary to provide
state agencies with similar training.2 23 This lack of training may force
state officers to rely on racial profiling to enforce state laws, and un-
doubtedly in communities where anti-immigrant sentiment already ex-
ists, this practice will be exacerbated. 2 24 Therefore, the courts' determina-
tion as to who has the power to regulate work authorization, the states or
the federal government, is important to the future of state legislation in
the area of immigration.
If the Supreme Court were to follow the implied preemption ap-
proach taken in Chicanos, which narrowly viewed obstacle preemption
in favor of more emphasis on express preemption, there could be signifi-
cant consequences as a result in this shift of the federal preemption para-
digm. 225 For example, if more emphasis is placed on express preemption
it may force more positive law making at the federal level.22 6 Congress
will be required to put more thought into considering the burdens and
benefits of a particular piece of legislation if it intends the law to preempt
contrary state enactments.227 One drawback to this approach is Congress
already conducts extensive hearings when crafting policy, and spending
more time and money on any one piece of legislation will draw resources
from other matters. Furthermore, it is not always feasible, or even possi-
ble, to predict all the consequences of a law. Therefore, it will be diffi-
cult, in some cases impossible, to draft express preemption provisions
that account for all possibilities.
Another possible consequence of increased reliance on express pre-
emption is that states would then be free to enact worker authorization
statutes where employers are strictly liable for hiring unauthorized work-
ers. Without implied preemption, states could simply label their worker
authorization laws as licensing laws, and then they would be free to im-
pose any penalties they felt appropriate. Penalties could range from revo-
cation of business licenses, like in LAWA, to increased costs for license
renewal for those who have hired unauthorized workers in the past.
(2009) (quoting Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 995
(2004)).
222. Ndulo, supra note 221, at 879.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 209, at 1714.
226. Id. at 1713-14.
227. Id. at 1723.
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Without the "reasonableness" safe harbor of IRCA, employers faced with
a law based on strict liability would surely discriminate against those
who appear Hispanic, or who speak English as a second language. 228 In
addition to this increased motivation to discriminate, employers would
also face a greater disruption of business. This disruption would occur
not only through the imposition of penalties, but as illegal immigration
and the use of fraudulent documents continue to rise, it is exceedingly
difficult for an employer to be absolutely certain that it is hiring an
authorized worker. When faced with a strict liability offense, employers
will surely use all means available to avoid penalties, including discrimi-
nation and extending additional resources to verify the work eligibility of
employees. Additionally, if the Court was to narrowly interpret conflict
preemption, it would represent a shift in the balance of power between
states and the federal government; states in the absence of a detailed ex-
press preemption provision would be free to craft their own immigration
laws, which would likely vary considerably from state to state.229
IV. CONCLUSION
Chicanos and Edmondson reveal significantly different approaches
to federal preemption. Edmondson faithfully applied accepted principles
of federal preemption, balancing states' rights and the goals of IRCA.
Alternatively, Chicanos was not consistent with federal preemption
precedent, and represented a shift toward increased reliance on express
preemption language. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Chica-
nos,230 and oral arguments were heard on December 8, 2010.231 The
Court's decision will surely have long standing consequences for immi-
gration and employment in the United States, and perhaps even for pre-
emption doctrine more generally.
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INCOMPLETE APPROACH, INCORRECT OUTCOME:
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, AND
THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF WEISE V. CASPER
INTRODUCTION
The public policy and political rhetoric of the last several decades
has reflected a societal interest in efficient government and streamlined
state action.' Partly as a result of such concerns, the Supreme Court de-
veloped the doctrine of qualified immunity.2 Because constant litigation
could significantly burden public officials, qualified immunity was de-
veloped to give lower-level public officials a line of defense against law-
suits stemming from their official actions. 3 Over time, this doctrine has
evolved through judicial efforts to balance public efficiency with the
right to private recompense.4
Qualified immunity is a recently developed product of judicial rea-
soning; freedom of expression, on the contrary, has been a foundational
element of constitutional democracy in the United States. As legal and
political authorities have routinely noted, the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of free speech has been a treasured and revered cornerstone of Amer-
ica's public discourse.5 Whereas courts have added a litany of exceptions
and caveats to other constitutional guarantees, the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause has remained sacrosanct and largely untouched.7
Complications arise, however, when public officials claim qualified
immunity for acts that seemingly run contrary to constitutional guaran-
1. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing (Oct. 27, 1964), available at
http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganChoosingl964.html; REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA,
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
2. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974) ("[1]t is important to note, even at the
outset, that one policy consideration seems to pervade the analysis: the public interest requires deci-
sions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the public."); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting that actions for damages against public officers involve social
costs including "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public
issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office"); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (warning that unfettered litigation against public officials "would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge
of their duties").
3. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (emphasizing the importance of "the need to protect officials
who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigor-
ous exercise of official authority" (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978))).
4. See id. at 813-14.
5. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Compelling Lessons in the First Amendment, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 795, 798-809 (2002) (reviewing MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVILEGE: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000)).
6. See, e.g., 68 AM. JUR. 2DSearches and Seizures § 49 (2010) (listing numerous exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on search and seizure in absence of a warrant).
7. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1701-02
(1991) (tracing the developments in First Amendment interpretation).
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tees.8 In Weise v. Casper,9 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
a unique factual scenario featuring a clash between First Amendment
rights and executive volunteers' claims of qualified immunity.10 Utilizing
an abridged legal analysis, the Weise court held that executive officials
could eject a citizen from a public speech solely on the basis of that citi-
zen's prior expression on an issue of public concern."
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit employed incomplete
legal analyses in deciding the qualified immunity and viewpoint dis-
crimination questions in Weise. As a result of this incomplete approach,
the Tenth Circuit's decision raises troubling concerns for public account-
ability, active citizenship, and constitutional development. Part I exam-
ines the evolution of the qualified immunity standard and describes the
modern test used to evaluate immunity claims by public officials. Part II
analyzes federal law controlling free speech and viewpoint discrimina-
tion issues. Part III outlines the Tenth Circuit's decision in Weise and
focuses on the majority's legal approach to the qualified immunity and
viewpoint discrimination issues present in the dispute. Part IV argues
that the Weise court used an incomplete approach in evaluating the de-
fendants' qualified immunity claims, and employed a similarly incom-
plete approach in evaluating the plaintiffs' freedom of expression argu-
ments. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit issued a ruling with troubling impli-
cations for civil rights litigants, politically expressive citizens, and con-
stitutional development.
I. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD
A. The Origins of Qualified Immunity
A public official's immunity from suit is a concept that finds roots
in English common law. 12 The King originally held absolute immunity
because English society widely accepted that a citizen could not bring an
action against the crown in a court licensed by the King.' 3 Eventually,
English law evolved to allow suits against the King by royal consent. 14
Absolute immunity for English judges was similarly a feature of English
8. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389-90 (1971); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
9. 593 F.3d 1163 (10thCir. 2010),cert. denied, 131 S.Ct.7.
10. Id. at 1165-66.
11. Id. at l70.
12. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1963); Adam L. Littman, A Second Line of Defense for Public Officials Asserting
Qualified Immunity: What "Extraordinary Circumstances" Prevent Officials from Knowing the Law
Governing their Conduct?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 645, 648 (2008); Gilbert Sison, A King No
More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine ofHead ofState Immunity, 78 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1583, 1584-1588 (2000).
13. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2, 4.
14. See Jaffe, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that petitions of right requiring the King's consent
allowed English citizens to seek relief against the Crown); see also Littman, supra note 12, at 648.
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common law.15 Finally-though it involved a long and protracted strug-
gle-the English Bill of Rights of 1689 granted members of Parliament
absolute immunity from criminal or civil action related to their official
speech and actions.16
Such were the norms that dwelled within the minds of America's
founding fathers. In the United States, absolute immunity for Congress-
men and Senators has constitutional roots in the Speech or Debate
Clause, which protects all members of Congress from official reprisal for
their political acts.17 American common law also recognizes absolute
civil immunity for the President when the suit stems from official ac-
tions.18 Similarly, common law has granted judges and prosecutors abso-
lute immunity for actions taken in the discharge of their duties.19
Apart from the President, judges, and prosecutors, there are count-
less other public officials. Consequently, qualified immunity developed
as a defense for these officials who could not claim the broad protections
of absolute immunity.20 Typically, this defense applies when a state or
local official faces individual liability for a constitutional tort in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action, or when a federal official faces individual liability
for a constitutional tort through a Bivens action.21 Absolute and qualified
immunity differ in important ways. While absolute immunity grants
high-ranking officials complete immunity from any civil action involving
their official duties, 2 2 qualified immunity shields other officials carrying
out their duties only under certain circumstances.23
The Supreme Court's first discussion of qualified immunity came in
Pierson v. Ray,24 a case where civil rights protestors sued individual po-
15. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 n.4 (describing the civil and criminal immunity for English
judges for "abuse of his jurisdiction").
16. Id. at 240-41.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
18. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) ("[W]e hold that petitioner, as a former
President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on
his official acts."); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding that private
actions against the President are not precluded by the separation of powers doctrine, even while the
President is still in office).
19. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 350 (1871) (declaring that judges are held accountable
through the possibility of legislative impeachment rather than the possibility of private legal action);
see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976) (holding that prosecutors are completely
immune from common law tort and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and that criminal law is the appropri-
ate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct).
20. See Littman, supra note 12, at 648-49.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (conferring a cause of action against state or local officials acting
under color of state law who deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights); see also Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (granting an
identical cause of action against federal officials who act under color of federal law and commit
constitutional torts).
22. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749-52.
23. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (holding that public officials are
entitled to qualified immunity only in circumstances where their conduct does not violate a clearly
established constitutional right).
24. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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lice officers in a § 1983 action.2 5 At the time, the common law allowed a
defense of good faith for law enforcement officers facing damages ac-
tions for torts.26 The defense gave officers immunity from suit if they
believed in good faith and with probable cause that their duty required
the actions in question,27 and in Pierson the Supreme Court extended this
defense to public officials facing § 1983 damage actions. 2 8 Seven years
after Pierson, the Court again confronted the qualified immunity issue in
Scheuer v. Rhodes,29 a case involving civil damages stemming from the
actions of National Guard officers during the famous anti-war protests of
1970 at Kent State University. 30 In Scheuer, the Court referred to the
affirmative defense outlined in Pierson as "qualified immunity" and ex-
plicitly added an objective element to the good-faith defense.3' Describ-
ing the new standard, the Court stated that "[i]t is the existence of rea-
sonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course
of official conduct." 3 2 By coupling an official's subjective good-faith
belief with an objective requirement of reasonableness, the Supreme
Court forged the elements of the modem qualified immunity standard.
B. The Modern Qualified Immunity Standard
The modern standard for the qualified immunity defense first ap-
peared in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.3 3 Featuring some of the same actors as
the landmark executive immunity case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald,34 Harlow
involved a damages action against presidential aides. 3 5 The Court re-
jected the aides' argument of derivative absolute immunity and held that
only qualified immunity applied to executive personnel.36 Moreover, the
25. Id. at 551-52 (1967). The plaintiffs in Pierson alleged that, while trying to desegregate a
bus terminal, they were unconstitutionally arrested by three Mississippi police officers. Id at 548-
50.
26. Id at 555 (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (1965)).
27. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (describing the defendants' claim that an arrest made in good
faith should not make defendants liable under § 1983).
28. Id at 557 ("We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of
Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment,
is also available to them in the action under § 1983.").
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. Id at 234-35 (1974).
31. Id. at 247 ("These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch of govemment, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.").
32. Id. at 247-48.
33. 457 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1982).
34. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
35. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. Plaintiff Fitzgerald claimed that defendants conspired to termi-
nate his employment in a manner that violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Id.
36. Id. at 810-11 ("Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, however, it sweeps
too far.... The undifferentiated extension of absolute 'derivative' immunity to the President's aides
therefore could not be reconciled with the 'functional' approach that has characterized the immunity
decisions of this Court . . .").
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Court expressed concern over the subjective good-faith element of the
qualified immunity defense; because many courts regarded a public offi-
cial's subjective belief as a question of fact, it was therefore conceivable
that many insubstantial claims could thwart early dismissal attempts and
proceed to trial.37 Consequently, the Court eliminated the subjective ele-
ment of the qualified immunity defense and imposed a purely objective
standard: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."08
Since Harlow, the Supreme Court has made notable structural al-
terations to the qualified immunity standard. Saucier v. Katz,39 a Su-
preme Court decision addressing qualified immunity in the face of al-
leged Fourth Amendment violations, crafted a two-pronged test for de-
termining qualified immunity using the elements identified in Harlow.40
First, Saucier required that lower courts must examine whether the ac-
tions alleged by the plaintiff show an actual constitutional violation.41 If
a court found that a violation had occurred, only then could it consider
the second prong of the standard: whether the right was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violation. 4 2 The Court recently modified the or-
dinal nature of this test in Pearson v. Callahan.43 Acknowledging that the
ordered nature of the Saucier procedure contradicted an interest in pre-
serving judicial resources, the Pearson Court removed the sequential
aspect of the qualified immunity standard and allowed courts to address
the two prongs in the order of their choosing. 44 Since the Pearson deci-
sion, courts have thus been free to exercise one of two options: quickly
dispose of "close call" cases by addressing the clearly established prong,
or examine whether the alleged facts establish a constitutional tort by
addressing the violation prong.
While an alleged violation is nearly always a matter of fact and cir-
cumstance, the "clearly established" prong presents a more muddled in-
quiry of law and reasonableness. The essential question, as stated by the
Supreme Court, is whether a reasonable public official would have "fair
37. Id. at 815-16 (noting the procedural difficulties imposed by FED. R. CIv. P. 56 and a
factual finding of good faith).
38. Id. at 818.
39. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
40. Id at 201.
41. Id. ("A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this
threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.").
42. Id. ("[Ilf a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions,
the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.").
43. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
44. Id. at 818 ("The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.").
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notice that her conduct was unlawful."45 Other cases, both before and
after Pearson, provide important considerations when considering the
question of fair notice.
The most notable consideration in "clearly established" inquiries
involves the idea of factual novelty. On one hand, the Court has stated
that inquiries regarding whether a constitutional right was clearly estab-
lished "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
,,46as a broad general proposition. However, the Court has also cautioned
that qualified immunity inquiries cannot become an exercise in circum-
stantial repetition. In United States v. Lanier,47 the Court addressed
unique facts involving a state judge accused of sexually assaulting sev-
eral litigants.48 The appeals court overturned the ruling against the judge
on the grounds that no controlling authority clearly established the rights
of the plaintiffs. 4 9 Despite the novel facts of Lanier, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and stated that the establishment of a right did not re-
quire "fundamentally similar" factual precedent.50 The Court formalized
this concept in Hope v. Pelzer,5 i a case where Alabama prison officials
52handcuffed prisoners to outdoor "hitching posts" for hours at a time. In
finding that an Eighth Amendment right existed for the prisoners, the
Court stated that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct vio-
lates established law even in novel factual circumstances."53 Thus,
Lanier and Hope stand for the idea that the existence of a right can be
sufficiently clear even if the exact actions in question need not have been
previously declared unlawful.54
Ultimately, all qualified immunity inquiries involving the clear es-
tablishment of a right must include two components: (1) an examination
of whether a public official has "fair notice" that her conduct is unlawful,
45. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
46. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
47. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
48. Id at 261. Though Lanier involved a criminal action under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and not a civil
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, the Supreme Court later used the Lanier analysis in formu-
lating novelty jurisprudence for qualified immunity claims in § 1983 and Bivens actions. See, e.g.,
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731 (2002).
49. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 263.
50. Id. at 269 ("Nor have our decisions demanded precedents that applied the right at issue to
a factual situation that is 'fundamentally similar' at the level of specificity meant by the Sixth Circuit
in using that phrase. To the contrary, we have upheld convictions under § 241 or § 242 despite
notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so
long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitu-
tional rights.").
51. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
52. Id. at 733-34, 741.
53. Id. at 741.
54. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful
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and (2) an examination of whether that conduct manifests itself in novel
fact patterns. In balancing fair notice concerns with this novelty inquiry,
the modem qualified immunity standard features a refined yet flexible
analysis for complicated questions of law and fact.
II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It would be fair to characterize the body of law surrounding quali-
fied immunity as complex and nuanced. By contrast, the law concerning
viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment is a veritable model
of clarity and consistency. The First Amendment guarantees, in relevant
part, that state actors shall not abridge "freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
",55Government for a redress of grievances. As evidenced by the coun-
try's speedy ratification of the Bill of Rights, the new Americans-
suddenly free from restrictive British rule-saw these freedoms as essen-
tial to a functioning republic.56 By the mid-Twentieth Century, the judi-
cial system began consistently referring to these freedoms as the singular
right to "freedom of expression."57
Numerous types of speech are protected under the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of expression.5 However, the right to ex-
press unpopular views on matters of social concern is perhaps the most
well recognized of all First Amendment protections. Born of colonial
discontent with England's practice of quashing American cries for politi-
cal reform, the First Amendment's most invariant and revered feature has
been the protection of political and social dissent.59 In a case protecting
the right of Jehovah's Witness students to remain silent during their pub-
lic school's recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, Justice Jackson elo-
quently stated, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. See Brian J. Buchanan, About the First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Mar. 7,
2011, 2:47:17 AM), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item-about firstamd.
57. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (holding that freedom of expression is
"derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against federal encroachment upon
freedom of speech and belief"); see also Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976, 980 (1969) ("[T]he First
Amendment did not build on existing law; it broke with tradition, set a new standard, and exalted
freedom of expression."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941) ("[T]he same standards of
Freedom of expression as, under the First Amendment, are applicable to the federal government.").
58. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591-92 (2010) (declaring that the First
Amendment protects unseemly depictions of animal cruelty from overbroad government censor-
ship); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972) (holding that reporters are entitled to ques-
tion public officials and seek the news under the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 448-49 (1969) (protecting speech that promoted violence as a means of accomplishing social
reform).
59. See Yassky, supra note 7, at 1701-02 (arguing that the First Amendment's protections
have evolved in response to various historical challenges, such as the Civil War and Great Depres-
sion).
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force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."60 Over thirty
years ago, a circuit judge bluntly noted that a citizen's views on policy
and politics is "entitled to the greatest constitutional protection."6' As the
Tenth Circuit recently stated, "[V]iewpoint discrimination is almost uni-
versally condemned and rarely passes constitutional scrutiny." 62
Such statements accurately reflect the judiciary's approach to af-
firmatively protecting the right to express or disavow a certain point of
view. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has shown little reluctance in
ruling against state actors that retaliate on the basis of viewpoint. Direct
retaliation for viewpoint expression is explicitly prohibited in nearly all
circumstances. An example came in Rankin v. McPherson.63 McPherson,
a public employee, was dismissed for remarking during a political con-
versation that she hoped a future assassination attempt against President
Reagan would be successful.64 The Court characterized the employee's
speech as a viewpoint on a matter of public concern and held that a citi-
zen's interest in making such statements outweighed any State interest in
controlling such remarks.65 Even actions that merely deprive, rather than
retaliate, are often impermissible. The Court held in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School66 that a public school's prohibition of a Christian
children's club use of school facilities for its after-hours meetings was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Similarly, Congress cannot
bar government-sponsored attorneys in welfare proceedings from taking
68cases that directly challenge certain welfare law provisions.
A review of Supreme Court holdings reveals that viewpoint dis-
crimination is only permissible in a handful of special circumstances.
One example of such circumstances involves speech made by public
employees during the discharge of their duties; these matters often result
in litigation against a public employer, and courts have held that dis-
missal of a public employee is appropriate if the employee's speech is
related to ordinary matters of duty rather than matters of public con-
cern. Another special circumstance involves the expression of public
60. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
61. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1047 (10th Cir. 1999).
63. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
64. Id at 380-81.
65. Id at 391-92. The Court made this determination because McPherson's statement did not
disrupt the normal functioning of the office, and because the statement was not public and in no way
discredited the office. In the absence of these mitigating circumstances, the Court ruled that a dis-
missal essentially based on political opinion cannot be maintained. Id.
66. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
67. Id. at 120 ("When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited
public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club
because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.").
68. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) ("The Constitution does not
permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner.").
69. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (upholding the dismissal of a
former deputy prosecutor for distributing an insubordinate questionnaire to fellow employees).
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school students.70 In such matters, the Court again recognized a narrow
exception to the general prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, stating
that the First Amendment does not require school officials to permit
speech reasonably seen as promoting drug use. 71 Absent any special cir-
cumstances-such as employment-related or student speech-the First
Amendment completely and thoroughly bars viewpoint discrimination of
any kind.
III. WEISE V. CASPER
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
On March 21, 2005, President George W. Bush delivered a speech
at a museum in Denver, Colorado.72 Tickets were available to the pub-
lic. 7 3 Plaintiffs Leslie Weise and Alex Young obtained tickets through a
congressman's office and arrived at the event in a personal vehicle with a
bumper sticker reading "No More Blood for Oil." 74 Upon approaching
the venue, an executive volunteer who had noticed the bumper sticker
stopped Weise and warned her against any sort of disruption. The staff
and volunteers at the event allowed Weise and Young to enter, but then
conferred to discuss a policy set by a White House official that prohib-
ited the presence of political dissenters at Presidential events.76 After
conferring, one of the defendants then ejected Weise and Young from the
event.77 The plaintiffs were not permitted to re-enter the museum, and the
executive staff later confirmed that the plaintiffs were ejected due to their
bumper sticker.78 Neither plaintiff disrupted the event at any time, and
both claimed that they never had an intention to do so.79
Weise and Young brought a Bivens action against each of the ex-
ecutive staff volunteers involved in their dismissal from the President's
70. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (noting that govern-
ment entities can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on public speech).
71. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 409-10 (2007) (holding that a principal's
confiscation of a student's banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" was permissible given the time
and setting of a school function).
72. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7.
73. Id. The procedure for obtaining tickets involved claiming the tickets through a U.S. Rep-
resentative's office by producing identification and signing one's name onto a ticket list. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. ("[Defendant] Casper told [Plaintiff] Weise that 'she had been ID'd' ... and 'that if
she had any ill intentions' or 'tried any funny stuff that [she] would be arrested, but that he was
going to let [her] in."') (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. ("Sometime before the President's speech, the White House Advance Office estab-




79. Id. According to the record, Young would have asked President Bush a question "if given
the opportunity." Id. at 1165-66.
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speech.80 All defendants named in the action asserted the defense of
qualified immunity.8 ' In the first series of proceedings, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado granted qualified immunity to
the defendants. 8 2 Plaintiffs made an interlocutory appeal to the Tenth
Circuit on the qualified immunity issue, and the appellate court dis-
missed the appeal due to insufficient facts regarding the defendants'
statuses as executive branch officials. 8 3 Upon remand and after further
discovery, the district court found that all defendants named in the plain-
tiffs' complaint were either executive staff members or volunteers "act-
ing under close government supervision."84 Based on this finding, the
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified
immunity, and the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit.85
B. Majority Opinion
A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the district court's grant of qualified immunity de novo.86 The majority,
in an opinion authored by Judge Kelly, upheld the district court's ruling
and declared that the defendants were entitled to the protection of quali-
fied immunity.87
The court identified the two-part qualified immunity test as control-
ling in the matter.8 Pursuant to the elective approach outlined in Pear-
son, the majority chose to begin its analysis by addressing the "clearly
established" prong of the qualified immunity test.89 At the outset, the
court declared that a clearly established right required a "Supreme Court
or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains." 90 The court also noted that, per the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Hope, the specific actions at issue in a case need not have been
80. Id. at 1165; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (establishing a cause of action against federal officials who, acting under
color of federal law, commit a constitutional tort).
81. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1166.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. As a result of the district court's enhanced inquiry, the record in the instant case
characterized the defendants as executive actors carrying out executive instructive policies. Id. at
1165.
85. Id. at 1166.
86. Id. at 1165-66.
87. Id. at 1165, 1170.
88. Id at 1166-67; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (discussing the "clearly
established" and "violation" prongs of the qualified immunity test first articulated in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
89. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1166; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) ("The
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be ad-
dressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.").
90. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir.
2007) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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previously held unlawful by controlling precedent.9 1 However, "in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."92
The majority then shifted its analysis toward the question of appar-
ent unlawfulness. With little equivocation, the court stated that broad
propositions of law alone cannot defeat a claim of qualified immunity;
only in exceptional circumstances will such propositions suffice.93 While
the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were correct in their argument
that the government usually cannot discriminate on the basis of view-
point,94 its opinion made clear that a more precise inquiry was appropri-
ate. Instead of focusing on the broader context of the First Amendment,
the court addressed the narrower question of whether a reasonable public
official would know that ejecting the plaintiffs on the basis of their
bumper sticker-or, previous expression-was unlawful.
The court concluded that no First Amendment doctrine (1) prohib-
ited the government from excluding the plaintiffs from an official speech
open to the public and (2) protected the plaintiffs' presence at the Presi-
dent's speech. 9 6 Because the speech itself-the plaintiffs bumper
sticker-occurred outside the event, the majority found that the plaintiffs
were not speakers for the purposes of a First Amendment inquiry.97
Though acknowledging that a bumper sticker is a protected form of ex-
pression, the court held that the plaintiffs past expression was legally
unrelated to the plaintiffs actual ejection. 98 The court explored several
cases involving the ejection of attendees from Presidential events, but
deemed that none of the cases were instructive on the issue of an atten-
dee's previously expressed viewpoint.99 Because no authority gave the
Tenth Circuit direct guidance in considering exclusion based on prior
expression, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' attendance was not a
clearly established constitutional right.100 Therefore, the majority granted
91. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[O]fficials
can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circum-
stances.").
92. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
93. Id ("[E]xcept in the most obvious cases, broad, general propositions of law are insuffi-
cient to suggest clearly established law.").
94. Id
95. Id. at 1168 ("Plaintiffs simply have not identified any First Amendment doctrine that
prohibits the government from excluding them from an official speech on private property.
96. Id at 1168-69.
97. Id. ("At the event itself, Plaintiffs were 'not speakers at all,' as their counsel conceded at
oral argument, but rather attendees.").
98. Id. The majority stated that, while some precedential authority speaks to the issue of
political dissenters being excluded from Presidential events, the critical distinction in the instant case
is that Weise and Young did not attempt to express themselves in a public forum. Id at 1169-70.
Rather, Weise and Young were excluded on the basis of past expression outside of the public forum
in question. Id.
99. Id. at 1169-70.
100. Id. at 1170 (noting that, because the cases cited by Weise and Young dealt with expres-
sion in the public forum rather than previously expressed viewpoint, these cases could not constitute
clearly established law).
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qualified immunity to the executive volunteers and dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims.o
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Holloway dissented from the majority's finding of qualified
immunity. 10 2 In a sharply worded opinion, the judge took issue with the
majority's reasoning on both qualified immunity and First Amendment
grounds.10 3
First, Judge Holloway's dissent noted that the plaintiffs' bumper
sticker "expressed an opinion on a matter of great public concern."' 04 In
the context of First Amendment precedent, the dissent thus saw this as
speech entitled to the maximum level of constitutional protection.105 As
Judge Holloway noted, discrimination between those supporting gov-
ernment policies and those who do not is flatly impermissible."o' Fur-
thermore, expression on matters of public concern is shielded from offi-
cial reprisal of any kind.107
Judge Holloway's finding of protected expression strongly influ-
enced the remainder of his analysis. Because First Amendment precedent
weighed strongly in favor of the plaintiffs' right to express their opinion
on a matter of public concern, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs had a
"clearly established" constitutional right under the applicable prong of
the qualified immunity test.'08 Moreover, the dissent also noted that the
Supreme Court's warnings of novelty in Hope v. Pelzer made it unneces-
sary for the plaintiffs to present factually analogous precedent; rather,
general statements of the law that apply in obvious ways can fulfill the
"clearly established" requirement. 0 9
In addressing the second prong of whether a violation actually oc-
curred, Judge Holloway stated that Casper and the other executive volun-
teers ran directly afoul of the First Amendment.' 10 The dissent concluded
that the ejection clearly violated the plaintiffs' rights.", Weise and
Young gave no indication of trouble and made no attempt to disrupt the
101. Id.
102. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1171-72.
104. Id. at 1170.
105. Id. at 1171 (citing Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975)).
106. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1175 (citing Glasson, 518 F.2d at 912).
107. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1174-75 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).
108. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1171 ("1 would hold that the rights so violated were clearly established
because of the fundamental importance of the right of free speech on topics of public concern . . .
109. Id. at 1177 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 741 (2002)).
110. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1171 ("[N]o reasonable officer could have believed that it was permis-
sible under the Constitution to humiliate these Plaintiffs solely because one of them had legitimately
exercised her right of free speech at another time and place.").




President's speech.1 2 Furthermore, Judge Holloway argued that the
plaintiffs were not speakers at the public event, so the defendants' argu-
ment-that the President has a right to control his own message-is in-
applicable in this instance." 3 Rather, Judge Holloway concluded that the
plaintiffs were ejected solely on the basis of Weise's protected expres-
sion; therefore, such an ejection, therefore, contrasted starkly with any
reasonable application of the First Amendment."14 Judge Holloway
wrote:
It is simply astounding, that any member of the executive branch
could have believed that our Constitution justified this egregious vio-
lation of Plaintiffs rights. "The right of an American citizen to criti-
cize public officials and policies and to advocate peacefully ideas for
change is the central meaning of the First Amendment.""
IV. WEISE V. CASPER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In deciding Weise v. Casper, the Tenth Circuit made two question-
able jurisprudential decisions. First, when considered in light of the nov-
elty concerns in Hope v. Pelzer, the court took an incomplete approach to
the "clearly established" prong of qualified immunity. Second, the court
also took an incomplete approach to the issue of viewpoint discrimina-
tion in the context of First Amendment precedent. The Tenth Circuit's
incomplete approach to these legal questions ultimately led to an incor-
rect decision in Weise v. Casper. The court set qualified immunity prece-
dent that imposed a higher burden on civil rights plaintiffs. Moreover,
the court missed an opportunity to construe the First Amendment in fa-
vor of active citizens, and instead offered a precedent that offers in-
creased protections for the questionable actions of government officials.
Consequently, the Weise decision makes the Tenth Circuit a potential
outlier and raises concerns of muted citizenship in light of expanded
governmental discretion.
A. An Incomplete Qualified Immunity Analysis
As detailed above, qualified immunity inquiries involve nuanced
questions of law and fact. Courts considering a defense of qualified im-
munity must evaluate the facts in light of two criteria: whether a right
was clearly established, and whether a violation of that right occurred. '6
In light of the facts, courts must decide which criterion should be ad-
112. Id. at il71.
113. Id. at 1175-76.
114. Id at 1171.
115. Id (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
116. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
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dressed first.'"7 When considering facts related to clearly established
rights, courts must also balance concerns of precedential notice with fac-
tual novelty."l8
Following Harlow and Pearson, the majority in Weise employed the
two-pronged qualified immunity test and elected to first address the issue
of a clearly established right." 9 Relying on precedent, the court noted
that a clearly established right exists when the law would put "a reason-
able official on notice that his conduct was unlawful."l20 The remainder
of the "clearly established" analysis focused on the dispute's factual ec-
centricities in light of precedential authority. The majority stated that no
First Amendment doctrine prohibited executive officials from excluding
the plaintiffs from a speech on private property. 121 They further held that
no authority spoke to the specific issue of ejection based on non-
contemporaneous expression.122 While the plaintiffs did offer factually
similar cases upholding the right of expression at public forums, the
court held that these cases were distinguishable because each involved
speech within the actual forum. Based on this lack of analogous prece-
dent, the majority concluded that "no specific authority instructs this
court (let alone a reasonable public official) how to treat the ejection of a
silent attendee from an official speech based on the attendee's protected
expression outside the speech area." 23
While accurate in its conclusions on precedent, the court's full
analysis is incomplete because it neglects the novelty considerations out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Lanier and Hope. As the Court reasoned
in Lanier, general statements of law are capable of giving public officials
fair warning of unlawful action. 12 4 The Court then formalized this idea in
Hope by stating that unlawful conduct can be apparent "even in novel
factual circumstances."l 25 The Weise court briefly noted these concerns
when describing the qualified immunity inquiry.126 However, the court
never considered the idea of novelty in the factual context of Weise. Af-
117. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (referencing Groh v. Ramirez, 540
U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
118. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753-54 (2002).
119. See Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7.
120. Id. at 1167-68 (citing Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199 (2004) (per curiam)).
121. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168 ("Plaintiffs simply have not identified any First Amendment
doctrine that prohibits the government from excluding them from an official speech on private
property on the basis of their viewpoint.").
122. Id. at 1169-70 (discussing federal cases that upheld expressive activity in public forums
absent actual disruptive activity).
123. Id. at 1170.
124. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) ("[G]eneral statements of the law are
not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitu-
tional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question, even though 'the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlaw-
ful . . . ."' (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))).
125. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
126. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1169 (noting the controlling concerns of novelty as expressed in
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, and Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
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ter concluding that no authority spoke to the facts of the case, the court
ruled in favor of the defendants and never examined whether the plain-
tiffs' ejection from a public speech by the President constituted novel
factual circumstances.127
This incomplete inquiry ultimately led to an incorrect result on the
qualified immunity issue. By failing to examine the novelty question, the
Weise court overlooked the possibility that First Amendment precedent
gave Casper and other volunteers notice as to the unlawfulness of their
actions. As the court correctly concluded, no precedent fully encapsu-
lates the factual circumstances of Weise; however, the court's analysis
never progressed to considerations of novelty. A reasonable observer
would likely conclude that absence of fully analogous precedent is itself
a strong indicator of novelty. Additionally, the unique facts of Weise and
Young's ejection also signal that novelty should be a relevant considera-
tion. However, the majority did not consider whether Weise implicates
the novelty concerns of Lanier and Hope. In failing to address this issue,
the court employed an incomplete approach to the qualified immunity
issue: the court enforced the reasonableness requirement protecting pub-
lic officials, yet omitted an analysis of the novelty considerations that
protect plaintiffs pleading unique factual scenarios. Consequently, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs legitimate argument of novelty and issued
a ruling that lacks the foundation of a complete qualified immunity
analysis.
B. An Incomplete First Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment flatly prohibits government discrimination on
the basis of viewpoint. 12 8 Political opinion is particularly shielded from
retaliatory state action, 129 and the body of law surrounding this idea is
clear, consistent, and robust.13 0 As Judge Holloway accurately remarked
in his dissenting opinion in Weise, "The prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination is unquestionably well established."13 1
The majority in Weise acknowledges that viewpoint discrimination
is generally prohibited. 13 2 However, the majority did little else to exam-
ine the plaintiffs' claim as a broad question of viewpoint discrimination,
even going so far as to say that a general discussion of viewpoint dis-
127. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168-70.
128. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
129. See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (1975) ("The right of an American
citizen to criticize public officials and policies and to advocate peacefully ideas for change is 'the
central meaning of the First Amendment."' (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964))); see also id. at 912 ("A more invidious classification than that between persons who support
government officials and their policies and those who are critical of them is difficult to imagine.").
130. See supra Part II.
131. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1177 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1167 (majority opinion) ("At the most general level, Plaintiffs are correct that the
government usually cannot discriminate against a speaker based upon that speaker's viewpoint.").
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crimination was unwarranted. 3 3 Instead, the court examined the narrow
question of whether the plaintiffs' attendance at a president's public
speech was protected from retaliation based on prior speech.13 4 The ma-
jority found no instructive authority on the issue.1 3 5 Ultimately, the court
ruled in favor of the defendants without discussing the ejection in terms
of discrimination on the basis of political viewpoint.136
As with the district court's qualified immunity analysis, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis of the viewpoint discrimination issue was incomplete.
In this instance, the incompleteness led to an unsound decision on the
First Amendment issues in Weise. First Amendment jurisprudence, par-
ticularly in the context of viewpoint discrimination, is clear in its prohibi-
tion of government reprisal against dissenting citizens. Weise's bumper
sticker expressed a dissenting opinion with respect to American foreign
policy. As the defendants admitted, the plaintiffs were ejected solely on
the basis of Weise's bumper sticker; there was no indication of present or
future disruptive activity on the part of either plaintiff.13 7 Moreover, the
decision to remove the plaintiffs from the museum was made in conjunc-
tion with an executive policy designed to bar attendance by political dis-
senters.' 38 Given the circumstances, this ejection can only be described as
a retaliatory action against those who held a viewpoint contrary to that of
the executive branch. In light of the strong body of law that prohibits
such retaliation, obvious problems with the Tenth Circuit's ruling arise.
Such a narrow holding that focuses on the mere time an opinion is ex-
pressed forsakes the larger demands of the First Amendment. By em-
ploying this incomplete approach, the court incorrectly analyzed the
case's freedom of expression issues and consequently dismissed a meri-
torious civil rights claim.
C. Effects of the Tenth Circuit's Ruling
On October 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Weise and
Young's petition for certiorari. 139 The Weise case would likely have pro-
duced an interesting result at the Supreme Court, especially given the
Roberts Court's expansive interpretation of the First Amendment.140 Te
133. Id at 1169 ("[The] discussion of impermissible viewpoint discrimination does not amount
to clearly established law that provides guidance in these circumstances.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1169-70.
136. Id. at 1170.
137. Id at 1165 (noting that the Secret Service told Weise and Young that the bumper sticker
prompted their ejection and that Mr. Young would only have spoken at the event if given the oppor-
tunity to ask the President a question).
138. Id.
139. Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7, 7-8 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (holding that a statutory
ban of animal cruelty videos is overly broad under the First Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment bars statutory limits on corporate
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fact remains, however, that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Weise is real-
istically the final word on the matter. As such, the decision will leave a
major legacy for legal actors in the Tenth Circuit. By employing a nar-
row approach to the issues in Weise, the majority's decision represents a
shift in Circuit jurisprudence with respect to qualified immunity and
viewpoint discrimination questions. Although the true depth of this shift
remain unclear, some conclusions still present themselves: if given the
weight of controlling precedent, Weise will substantially affect the for-
tunes of future civil rights litigants, chill the mechanisms of an active
citizenry, and stunt the growth of new Constitutional norms.
1. A Shift in Circuit Law
As discussed above, the Weise court approached the questions of
qualified immunity and viewpoint discrimination in an incomplete man-
ner.14 1 If applied to future litigants, this incomplete approach will have a
powerful effect on claims of qualified immunity and First Amendment
rights within the Tenth Circuit.
First, litigants seeking the enforcement of civil rights against state
or federal officials may find that defeating a claim of qualified immunity
requires a higher reliance on factual precedent than prior to Weise. This
heightened burden results from the Tenth Circuit's strict comparison of
Weise and Young's claim to previous qualified immunity cases. This
stringent analysis represents a genuine departure from the typical consid-
eration of novelty concerns. It is reasonable to see the novelty factor as a
balancing component of qualified immunity law rather than a narrow and
inconsequential exception.142 However, the Tenth Circuit's approach in
Weise treats the idea of novel circumstances with token mention rather
than careful balancing. As a result, the court imposes the tremendous
burden on Weise and Young to find precedent establishing the right to be
present at a public Presidential speech regardless of previously expressed
political viewpoint. 143
If the incomplete qualified immunity approach in Weise becomes
controlling authority in the Tenth Circuit, future civil rights litigants in
the Tenth Circuit will now shoulder the burden of finding factually iden-
tical precedent. Courts within the Circuit will, by default, be more per-
electioneering expenditures); see generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Consti-
tution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1250-73 (2010).
141. See supra Part lV.
142. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 111 (2010) (including novel factual circumstances as a
preliminary rather than secondary inquiry in qualified immunity cases); Jacob Heller, Abominable
Acts, 34 VT. L. REV. 311, 316-337 (2009) (arguing for reform of the "clearly established" test
because knowledge of wrongfulness can be presumed even in novel circumstances); Paul W.
Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional
Rights, 80 U. COLo. L. REV. 401, 418-29 (2009) (urging the re-implementation of a subjective
qualified immunity inquiry, in part because courts are now less likely to find constitutional viola-
tions unless the factual scenario has been clearly established).
143. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1169-70.
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suaded by factual circumstance rather than Constitutional claim. Conse-
quently, Bivens and § 1983 plaintiffs will find that their fortunes are in-
creasingly tied to whether the facts of their claim have been previously
litigated. On the other hand, defendants asserting qualified immunity will
have the stringent novelty analysis of the Weise court as an extra arrow
in their litigious quiver.
The second circuit-wide effect of the Weise decision relates to the
now-diminished protections for expressive citizens from government
reprisal. The court's narrow reading of the facts obscured the reality of
retaliatory action by government officials on the basis of political view-
point. 144 Because Weise's expressive activity was not within the confines
of the Presidential event, the majority held that it was not protected
speech and thus not subject to immediate protection from reprisal. 145
Should this minutiae-driven approach become the circuit norm, it would
redraw the traditional battle lines of viewpoint discrimination jurispru-
dence; the flat prohibition on government reprisal for political expression
may become a malleable concept in the Tenth Circuit. What Justice Jack-
son once called a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation" 46 would
become more akin to a traveling comet, drifting in and out of relevance
depending on present circumstances.
If claims of viewpoint discrimination become a more fact-specific
inquiry, parties to future disputes will encounter altered legal terrain.
Public officials who exclude or deprive on the basis of viewpoint will
receive greater protections, so long as their actions do not exactly mirror
the previous actions of officials who were denied qualified immunity.
Where defendants can identify a factual peculiarity involving contempo-
raneity, proximity, or manner, their actions are much less likely to be
considered retaliatory. Conversely, plaintiffs claiming viewpoint dis-
crimination must again plead their case on the basis of factual similarity.
If the expressive activity in question presents unique questions of cir-
cumstance, future plaintiffs will face an uphill battle in convincing a
Tenth Circuit court that their expression should be shielded from gov-
ernmental retaliation.
2. Cause for Concern
A shift in circuit approach is not in itself a reason for alarm. The
Weise decision, however, should give pause to practitioners and scholars
alike. When courts apply incomplete legal approaches and neglect a
complete legal analysis, there is a high risk of contravening well-
established legal and societal norms. Judicial tunnel vision, therefore, can
carry unfortunate consequences. In Weise, the Tenth Circuit falls prey to
144. See supra Part IV.B.
145. Weise, 593 F.3d at 168-70.
146. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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this hazard. The court's incomplete qualified immunity inquiry raises
troubling issues of accountability for public officials. By narrowing its
First Amendment analysis, the court also eroded judicial protection for
active citizenship. Additionally, both of these narrow approaches stymie
the development of civil rights within the Tenth Circuit. Ultimately, the
Weise decision represents a missed opportunity for the court to properly
balance legal considerations and move the circuit in a progressive direc-
tion on civil rights matters.
First, the qualified immunity approach of the court leads to a trou-
bling situation where public officials can erect an insurmountable wall
against a plaintiffs civil rights claim. While the doctrine of qualified
immunity exists to protect reasonable public officials from frivolous
claims, 147 the defense is not meant to serve as an impenetrable shield
against all civil rights claims. If plaintiffs are required to find factually
identical precedent, however, qualified immunity remains qualified in
name only. The main purpose of Bivens and § 1983 claims is to remedy a
violation of a plaintiffs civil rights at the hands of state or federal offi-
cials. 14 8 Giving these officials a virtually impenetrable defense does little
to serve the purpose of the claim. The absence of meaningful novelty
analysis in Weise, if used as a template for future cases, gives public of-
ficials higher levels of protection by imposing a higher burden of factual
persuasion on civil rights plaintiffs; only factual scenarios that have been
previously litigated stand a realistic chance of succeeding in court. Con-
sequently, Bivens and § 1983 actions become empty remedies for the
victims of constitutional torts.
The Weise decision is also troubling because it chills the mecha-
nisms of an active citizenry. The majority departed from First Amend-
ment precedent and engaged in a fact-specific analysis that never identi-
fied Weise's bumper sticker as expressive of a protected viewpoint.149
The consequences of this narrow approach are notable. The right to ex-
press dissenting viewpoints is central to the purpose and meaning of the
First Amendment.150 In practice, this right assures that citizens are able to
speak out on matters of public concern without fear of government repri-
147. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("It is the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-
faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct."); Littman, supra note 12, at 648-49 ("The qualified immunity defense
balances the public's interest in effectively vindicating constitutional guarantees with the state's
equally strong countervailing interest in protecting officials from the threat of liability when per-
forming official duties.").
148. See supra note 21.
149. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168-70.
150. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1964); Glasson v. City of Louis-
ville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975); Buchanan, supra note 56.
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sal.s'5 If the incomplete First Amendment inquiry in Weise becomes the
circuit norm, political dissent becomes a more loosely protected form of
expression. Unless the dissenting expression is clearly made at the time
of the alleged retaliatory acts, or unless the expression is made in a tradi-
tional manner, plaintiffs will have greater difficulties in proving imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination. Essentially, this creates a form of
second-class citizenship for citizens whose beliefs run contrary to ortho-
dox political thought. These citizens will find the judiciary less able to
protect their expression from retaliatory state action, and government
officials will in turn have wider latitude to discriminate against those
with dissenting beliefs.
Last, there are concerns in the area of legal development. If the
Tenth Circuit employs narrow approaches to questions of qualified im-
munity and viewpoint discrimination, it will be more difficult for new
Constitutional rules to emerge. When the novelty factor of Lanier and
Hope is largely bypassed, qualified immunity becomes the default ruling
for novel factual situations. If unique facts of time and manner control
viewpoint discrimination inquiries, only the most obvious situations of
expression and retaliation will warrant constitutional protection. Such
circumstances effectively halt the development of legal precedent-only
previously litigated disputes involving qualified immunity or viewpoint
discrimination will be controlling in the future. Essentially, this means
that the constitutional articulation of new rights is suppressed. If every
nuance of qualified immunity or viewpoint discrimination law had been
explored, this suppression would scarcely be cause for worry. However,
the idea that all possible scenarios or substantive rights have been ex-
plored in any area of the law is fundamentally unsound. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Teague v. Lanel52 stated that it was
unlikely that new due process rights would emerge for criminal defen-
dants. 153 The development of criminal procedure has proven this state-
ment false. 154 In situations of qualified immunity and viewpoint dis-
crimination, it would be similarly unwise to assume that new circum-
stances warranting a denial of qualified immunity or First Amendment
protection will not present themselves. The Weise decision, however, is
concerning because it precludes new developments in the law and
thereby runs contrary to the idea of common law adjudication within the
Tenth Circuit.
151. See Yassky, supra note 7, at 1710-13 (noting that, while originally crafted to guarantee
states' independence, the First Amendment evolved into a source of personal rights following the
national controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1797 and 1798).
152. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
153. Id. at 313.
154. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-162 (1994) (finding post-Teague
that a capital defendant's due process rights were violated when a jury considering the death penalty
was not instructed that life imprisonment carried no possibility of parole); see generally Linda
Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 459-92 (1994)




Weise v. Casper is a case that will affect Tenth Circuit jurispru-
dence in many ways. Unfortunately, the decision's effects are cause for
concern rather than celebration. In foregoing a thorough novelty analysis,
the majority diminished the precedential value of Lanier and Hope
within the Circuit. Also, the Weise court narrowed its viewpoint dis-
crimination analysis by focusing exclusively on facts of time and man-
ner. If the reasoning in Weise is applied in future cases, the effect of
these narrow approaches is three-fold. First, plaintiffs seeking to defeat a
claim of qualified immunity will now be largely bound by the facts of
their claim. This implicates concerns of official accountability for uncon-
stitutional acts. Second, claims of viewpoint discrimination will be
handicapped by factual discrepancies from previous cases. This altered
legal landscape risks the creation of second-class citizenship for political
dissenters. Third, both of these narrow approaches threaten the develop-
ment of future constitutional law; if litigants are bound to bring claims
that are completely identical to previous cases, it is unlikely that new
rules and rights will develop when necessary. Overall, Weise v. Casper is
a case that could mark the beginning of troubling constitutional devel-
opments in the Tenth Circuit.
Kelson Bohnet
* J.D. and M.P.P. Candidate, 2012. 1 would like to thank Professor Alan Chen of the Uni-
versity of Denver Sturm College of Law for his insight on qualified immunity and civil rights litiga-
tion. I would also like to thank the entire Denver University Law Review Board and editorial staff as
their diligence and input were invaluable during the publication process.
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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND RESOURCE DESTINY: HYDRO
RESOURCES, INC. V. US. EPA
INTRODUCTION
One of the schemes Congress enacted for settling the vast expanses
of the western United States was to deed to railroad companies alternat-
ing one-square-mile parcels on each side of the planned railroad.' Subse-
quent sales of parcels helped fund railroad expansion, but also created a
checkerboard of ownerships, sometimes including tribal sovereign own-
ership interspersed with private sections.2 In these areas, Congress at-
tempted to avoid checkerboard jurisdiction with respect to criminal en-
forcement3 by adopting 18 U.S.C. § 1151, a criminal statute that extends
U.S. federal jurisdiction over "Indian country."4 Section 1151 defines
"Indian country" to mean Indian reservations, dependent Indian commu-
nities, and Indian allotments.
In Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRI J),6 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that land adjacent to "parcels held in trust for the Navajo by
the United States"7 was not a "dependent Indian community" under
§ 1151(b).8 As described below, interpretations of § 1151(b) that disre-
gard the word "communities" in the statute result in the same checker-
board jurisdiction that Congress sought to avoid.9 Such interpretations
impact tribal sovereignty by taking from Indian'o communities the power
1. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRIll), 562 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRI Ill), 608 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
3. See Seymour v. Superintendant of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962); see
also Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205, 206 (10th Cir. 1964).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
5. Id. The fill text of § 1151 reads:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the lim-
its of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id.
6. 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
7. Id. at 1137.
8. Id. at 1166.
9. See Seymour v. Superintendant of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962);
HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1174 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (citing KENNETH BOBROFF ET AL., COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 194 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter COHEN'S]).
10. This Comment will use the term "Indian" not out of any disrespect for indigenous popula-
tions, but because of "its use in the relevant statutory language and precedents." HRI III, 608 F.3d at
1136 n.2.
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to control the destiny of valuable natural resources on or under their land:
for example, in the context of HRI III, uranium and drinking water.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes past impacts of uranium
mining on Navajo land, broad principles of Indian sovereignty, the min-
ing process that Hydro Resources, Inc. (Hydro) proposed, the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and then discusses the two primary inter-
pretations of § 1151(b): the two-step, multi-factor Watchman balancing
test and the two-part Venetie test. Part II summarizes the majority and
dissenting opinions in HRIIII, including the facts and procedural history.
Part III explains how principles of stare decisis can lead to encroach-
ments on Native American sovereignty and then discusses how a modi-
fied definition of "Indian lands" better aligns with congressional intent,
while enabling the Navajo to control the destiny of its land, drinking
water, and uranium. This Comment concludes that the HRI III holding
contradicts Congress's intent in enacting § 1151, but that this and other
problems may be avoided in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
Hydro has long intended to mine the disputed New Mexican land
for uranium." Past hazards impacting uranium miners, civilians, and the
environment 2 led the Navajo to enact a ban on uranium mining in
2005.'1 Such perils suffered by the Navajo include an increase in cancer
rates,14 contamination of structures built with uranium mining waste, 5
and contamination of groundwater.'6 Notably, the largest nuclear tailing
spill in U.S. history occurred in 1979 on Navajo land.17
Use of the in situ leach method that Hydro proposed using can miti-
gate many of the negative effects associated with conventional uranium
mining. It does not "disturb[] the natural surface, generat[e] dust, or
11. Id. at 1138.
12. See id at 1184 (Henry, J., dissenting) (citing Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustain-
ability, and Globalization: Charting the Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4
ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 188, 220 (2009)); see also Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and
Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437, 441-42 (2010) (detailing the pernicious effects of ura-
nium mining on the Navajo and their land).
13. See Dind Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 1301-03 (2005).
14. Judy Pasternak, Blighted Homeland: A Peril that Dwelt Among the Navajos, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 19,2006, at 2, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/19/nation/na-navajol9.
15. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF URANIUM
CONTAMINATION IN THE NAVAJO NATION: FIVE-YEAR PLAN 13 (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/regionO9/superfund/navajo-nation/pdf/NN-5-Year-Plan-June- I 2.pdf.
16. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 15, at 17-18; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 220;
Pasternak, supra note 14, at 11.
17. Tsosie, supra note 12, at 220.
18. See In Situ Leach (ISL) Mining of Uranium, WORLD NUCLEAR AsS'N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf27.html (last updated Mar. 2010).
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produc[e] waste known as tailings."l 9 However, in situ leaching involves
the injection of chemicals into the groundwater to dissolve the uranium
and the subsequent removal of uranium from the recovered solution,20
creating a risk of groundwater contamination. 21 Despite the risks of ura-
nium mining, regardless of method, uranium and other non carbon-based
fuels are poised as the best solutions to the energy needs of the future.22
Based partly on this potential, the price of uranium is currently more than
six times higher than it was a decade ago. 2 3
When mining companies seek to extract uranium on or near Indian
areas, issues arise of jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty. Under U.S. law,
Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" 24 that exercise "plenary
and exclusive power over their members and their territory subject only
to limitations imposed by federal law."25 Further, "[t]ribal powers of self-
government are recognized by the Constitution, legislation, treaties, judi-
cial decisions, and administrative practice."26 Accordingly, tribes retain
authority over matters unless and until relinquished by federal legislation
or treaty.27
The following section explains how the federal government deter-
mines whether it will grant permits for in situ leach wells, and then
briefly summarizes the relevant law regarding which government has
jurisdiction over particular areas of land.
A. Underground Injection Control Permitting Authority Under the Safe
Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), enacted in 1974, conferred
to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power
either to (1) grant Underground Injection Control (UIC) permits, which
19. In Situ Leach and Conventional Uranium-Recovery Methods, TEX. COMM'N ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/permitting/radmat/uranium/process.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2011).
20. See WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, supra note 18.
21. See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, GUIDEBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR IN SITU LEACH MINING PROJECTS 18 (2005), available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1428 web.pdf.
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Nuclear, ENERGY.GOv, http://www.energy.gov/
energysources/nuclear.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2011); see also Bruce Finley, Uranium-Mill Plan
Near Naturita Raises Concerns About Toxic Waste, DENVERPOST.COM (Sept. 16, 2010, 1:00 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_16087508 (stating that uranium will be used "for an anticipated
nuclear-energy renaissance").
23. See UxC Historical Ux Price Chart, UX CONSULTING COMPANY,
http://www.uxc.con/review/uxc_PriceChart.aspx?chart-spot-u3o8-full (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
The spot price of uranium was about $10 per pound in 2000. On March 28, 2011, the spot price was
$62.50 per pound. See id.; UxC NUCLEAR FUEL PRICE INDICATORS, UX CONSULTING COMPANY,
http://www.uxc.com/review/uxc Prices.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
24. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
25. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 4.01[1][b], at 210. See generally Aaron Huey, America's Native
Prisoners of War, TED (Nov. 2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/aaronhuey.html (detailing circum-
scriptions imposed on Native American sovereignty by federal law).
26. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 4.01 [1][a], at 205.
27. See id. § 2.03, at 128, 131, § 3.04[2][a], at 183, § 4.01[1][a], at 206.
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are required for in situ wells to "mitigat[e] the risk of contamination to
potential drinking water sources" 28 or (2) delegate such authority to the
stateS29 or Indian tribes. 30 Additionally, the EPA may exempt aquifers
from SDWA standards that do not now or will not in the future "serve as
a source of drinking water." 31
In 1982, the EPA delegated primary UIC permitting authority in
New Mexico to the State of New Mexico, 32 except for wells "on Indian
lands."33 The EPA has not delegated UIC permitting power to the Navajo
Nation for the type of injection wells in this case,34 so the EPA retains
UIC permitting authority over these types of wells. Therefore, the classi-
fication as "Indian land" of the land on which the wells will ber drilled
will determine whether NM or EPA will exercise UIC permitting author-
ity. To define "Indian lands" under the SDWA, the EPA adopted the
definition of"Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151.35
B. Section 1151(b) 36
Section 1151, adopted in 1948, codified language from two Su-
preme Court decisions to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over "In-
dian country." 37 In United States v. Sandoval,38 the defendant was crimi-
nally prosecuted for "introducing intoxicating liquor into the Indian
country," the Santa Clara pueblo. 3 9 The defendant challenged the validity
of the statute upon which the indictment was based, and the Court, there-
fore, considered whether Congress could criminalize the introduction of
liquor onto the Santa Clara pueblo. 40 The Court concluded that Congress
could criminalize such conduct and reasoned that the Commerce Clause41
and "an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the
28. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)-(2) (2006).
29. § 300h-l(b)(3).
30. § 300h-l(e).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 146.4(a) (2011).
32. 40 C.F.R. § 147.1600.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 147.1601.
34. See Hydro Res., Inc. v. U.S. EPA (HRII), 198 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2000). The
type of injection well here is Class Ill. Id. at 1232. Class Ill wells pertain to the in situ mining of
uranium. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6(c)(2) (2011).
35. 40 C.F.R § 144.3 (2011). In adopting the § 1151 definition, the EPA stated that it "be-
lieve[d] this definition [was] most consistent with the concept of Indian lands as the Agency ha[d]
used it in regulations and UIC program approvals to date." Underground Injection Control Program:
Federally-Administered Programs, 49 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45294 (Nov. 15, 1984) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 144.3).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006).
37. See§ 1151 hist.n.
38. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
39. Id. at 36.
40. Id. at 38.
41. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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United States ... the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care
and protection over all dependent Indian communities."4 2
The Court addressed a similar question in United States v.
McGowan.43 There, the defendant was criminally charged with introduc-
ing alcohol into the Reno Indian Colony.4 Noting that the Colony was
"validly set apart for the use of the Indians" and "under the superinten-
dence of the government,"45 the Court determined that the Colony was
established for the "protection of a dependent people."46
The text of § 1151(b), a federal criminal statute enacted in 1948,
codified the "dependent Indian communities" language from Sandoval as
interpreted in McGowan.47
C. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman 48
In 1995, the Tenth Circuit first declared how to determine whether
an area constituted a "dependent Indian community" under § 1151(b). 49
Relying on basic definitions of "community,, 50 the court in Watchman
employed a two-step test.51 First, a court must determine the appropriate
"community of reference" by weighing "the status of the area in question
as a community" 52 and "the community of reference within the context of
the surrounding area."53 Second, the court must weigh several factors to
determine if the community qualified as a "dependent" Indian commu-
nity: such factors include whether the United States has retained "title to
the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy" and "whether such
lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of de-
pendent Indian peoples."54
42. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.
43. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
44. Id. at 536.
45. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442,449 (1914)).
46. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 hist. n. (2006) ("Definition is based on latest construction ofthe term by
the United States Supreme Court in U.S v. ?dcGowan, 302 U.S. 535, following U.S. v. Sundoval,
231 U.S. 28, 46.").
48. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
49. Id. at 1543-45.
50. Id. at 1544.
51. Id. at 1543-45.
52. Id. at 1543.
53. Id. at 1544.
54. Id. at 1545 (quoting United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981)).
The other two factors were: "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants in
the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of government
agencies toward the area" and whether there is "an element of cohesiveness ... manifested either by
economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that
locality." South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (alteration in original).
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If the disputed area passed both the "community of reference"
prong and the "dependency" prong of the test, then a court would deter-
mine that the area constituted a "dependent Indian community."5
D. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government56
Subsequent to Watchman, the United States Supreme Court created
a test to find a "dependent Indian community" under § 1151(b). In Vene-
tie, the land in dispute was a reservation until Congress passed legislation
revoking reservation status.57 After the State of Alaska refused to pay a
tax that the Venetie Tribe tried to impose, the district court held that the
Tribe did not have the power to impose such a tax.58 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that a six-factor balancing test should be used to de-
termine whether the land constituted a "dependent Indian community." 59
The Ninth Circuit noted that there was only one "significant difference
between" its test and the Tenth Circuit's Watchman test: the Ninth Cir-
cuit "asses[es] the 'degree of federal ownership and control' over the
area in question while the [Tenth Circuit] ask[s] whether the United
States retains 'title' to the land in question."6 o
A unanimous Supreme Court, in 1998, abrogated the Ninth Circuit's
"degree of federal ownership and control" test, holding that the term
"dependent Indian communities" describes lands that "satisfy two re-
quirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Govern-
ment for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be un-
der federal superintendence."61 Satisfaction of the set-aside prong would
show that an "Indian community" occupied the disputed land.6 2 Fulfill-
ment of the superintendence prong would ensure that the "Indian com-
munity" was "sufficiently 'dependent' on the Federal Government that
the Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to
exercise primary jurisdiction."63 While rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
55. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546.
56. (Venetie II), 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
57. See id. at 524. Reservations were designed to "restrict the limits of all the Indian tribes
upon [American] frontiers, and cause [the Indian tribes] to be settled in fixed and permanent locali-
ties, thereafter not to be disturbed." COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 1.03[6][a], at 64. Tribal members on
Indian reservations are immune to many state taxes. See COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 8.03[l ][b], at 693.
Tribes may tax nontribal members in Indian country. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 8.04[2][b], at 715.
58. Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 525.
59. Id. at 525-26 (citing Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't (Venetie 1), 101 F.3d
1286, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit employed the following factors:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and
the federal government; (3) the established practice of government agencies toward that
area; . . . (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree
of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area was set aside
for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples.
Venetie I, 101 F.3d at 1294 (alteration in original).
60. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1292.
61. Venelie II, 522 U.S. at 527.
62. Id. at 531.
63. Id.
428 [Vol. 88:2
HYDRO RESOURCES, INC. V US. EPA
multi-factor approach, the Court stated that two factors were "relevant":
the "degree of federal ownership" over the area and "the extent to which
the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of depend-
ent Indian peoples." 64 To summarize, the Ninth Circuit's test differed
from the Court's two-step test in that the Ninth Circuit analyzed the level
of federal ownership and the degree to which the land could be to be
considered a "dependent Indian community" as factors in a multi-factor
test. The Supreme Court used these factors as elements, allowing for a
finding of a "dependent Indian community" only if the federal govern-
ment had set aside the disputed land and also superintended it.65
II. HYDRO RESOURCES, INC. v. U.S. EPA
Petitioner Hydro owns the surface and mineral rights6 6 to land in
northwestern New Mexico, 160 acres of which lie in Section 8, Town-
ship 16N, Range 16W (Section 8).67 The land sits in a checkerboard re-
gion, where land ownership alternates by parcel between "the state, the
federal government, the Navajo Nation, individual Navajos, and private
persons and entities."68 Although Hydro purchased its Section 8 land
outright, 69 it falls within the bounds of the Navajo Church Rock Chap-
ter.70 The Chapter is a "political and social unit of the Navajo Nation,"
with its borders determined by the Navajo.7 In addition, Hydro owns the
mineral rights to Section 17, which is adjacent to Section 8 in the check-
erboard.7 2 However, the "federal government holds the Section 17 land
in trust for the Navajos" and retains most of the surface rights.7
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In the 1980s, Hydro, not thinking its Section 8 land constituted "In-
dian country," applied to the New Mexico Environmental Department
(NMED) for its UIC permit.74 NMED then requested from EPA an "aq-
uifer exemption" to approve Hydro's application, an exemption that Hy-
dro would need in order to mine.
In 1989, NMED approved Hydro's UIC permit for Section 8, and
EPA approved NMED's request for the aquifer exemption.76 In 1992,
64. Id. at 531 n.7.
65. Id. at 530.
66. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1141 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
67. Id.at1136-37.
68. Id. at 1136.
69. Id. at 1134.
70. Id. at 1137.
71. Id.
72. HRII, 198 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
73. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1141 n.6.
74. Id. at 1140.
75. See id. The SDWA generally prohibits aquifer contamination, but exempts aquifers that
do not now or will not in the future "serve as a source of drinking water." 40 C.F.R. § 146.4 (2011).
76. HRIl, 198 F.3d at 1234.
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Hydro requested that its UIC plan be extended to cover its Section 17
land, and NMED applied for the mandatory aquifer exemption.7 7 In the
mid-1990s, a jurisdictional dispute between NMED, EPA, and the Na-
vajo Nation led the EPA to find the Section 17 land to be "Indian coun-
try" and the status of the Section 8 land to be in dispute.7 8 On Hydro's
and NMED's appeal of the EPA's determination, the Tenth Circuit held
that the EPA did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion by de-
termining the status of the Section 8 land to be in dispute, and it re-
manded the matter to the EPA to make a final determination as to
whether that land was a "dependent Indian community." 7 9 Separately, the
Tenth Circuit's holding that the Section 17 area constituted "Indian coun-
try" under § 1151(a) was not appealed.80 Therefore, the Section 17 area
falls under EPA jurisdiction81 because the EPA has retained authority
over Class III injection wells on Indian country.82
On remand, EPA concluded that Venetie modified the second step
of the Watchman test, but that the first step-etermining a community
of reference-survived. 83 Applying both steps of this test, EPA deter-
mined Hydro's Section 8 land to be "Indian country."84 Hydro appealed
EPA's decision, and the three-judge panel upheld EPA's land status de-
termination.85 Hydro then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for rehearing en
banc.86
B. Majority Opinion
After finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction,87 that Hydro had
standing,88 and that it would review EPA's interpretation of § 1151(b) de
novo,89 the Tenth Circuit majority turned to the issue of whether EPA
77. Id
78. See idat 1235.
79. Id. at 1254.
80. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1141 n.6.
81. Id.
82. See supra Part 1.A.
83. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1142.
84. Id. at 1143 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LAND STATUS DETERMINATION 13
(2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/water/groundwater/determination-comments/hri-
signed-land-status-determination-feb-07.pdf).
85. HRIIIl, 562 F.3d 1249, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2009).
86. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1143. The panel held the Section 17 land to be Indian country under
§ 1151(a) and, therefore, the EPA retains jurisdiction. Id. at 1141 n.6. The Section 17 holding was
not appealed. Id.
87. See id. at 145.
88. Id. at 1144-45. EPA challenged HRI's standing on the basis that the "final land status
determination imposed no constitutionally cognizable injury on HRI." Id. at 1144. The majority
agreed with the panel opinion that "the outlay of funds necessary to secure a second UIC permit
from EPA, on top of the one HRI ha[d] already secured from NMED, amply qualifie[d] as a concrete
and particularized, actual and imminent injury." Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 1146.
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was correct in determining that the Watchman "community of reference"
test survived Venetie.90
The majority first looked to Venetie's interpretation of the plain
meaning of § 1151(b). The requirement that the federal government set
aside the land, the majority explained, "ensures that the land in question
is occupied by an 'Indian community."' 9' Next, the federal superinten-
dence requirement "guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently
'dependent' on the Federal Government." 92 The majority then applied
this test to find that the federal government had not set aside Hydro's
Section 8 land, which Hydro owned outright, and did not superintend the
land. Therefore, Hydro's Section 8 land did not constitute "Indian
country." 94 The court reasoned that if it continued to allow Watchman's
"community of reference" test, land that had not been "set aside by Con-
gress for Indians [could] become Indian country simply because of its
proximity to other lands that are federally set aside and superintended." 95
The majority then provided an illustration to demonstrate this flaw of
Watchman's "community of reference" test.
The majority hypothesized that a couple popping a bottle of cham-
pagne could be charged with a federal crime if they were on land that a
"Navajo Chapter ha[d] asserted for itself."96 The majority reasoned that
only a court could determine, by conducting the "community of refer-
ence" test post hoc, whether the land constituted Indian country. 97 Thus,
the "legality of one's actions would . . . become a . . . guessing game." 98
Such a result would disregard Congress's intent and, therefore, the
Watchman "community of reference" test was no longer valid.99
The majority then reviewed the statute's history to determine
whether the Watchman "community of reference" prong survived Vene-
tie. The majority noted the Venetie Court's reasoning that § 1151(b)'s
"use of the phrase 'dependent Indian community' was intended to codify
language from the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Sando-
val and United States v. McGowan.00 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
"[n]othing in Sandoval or McGowan suggests that . . . 'dependent Indian
communities' should be determined by a court's perceptions about local
90. Id. at 1147.
91. Id. at 1149 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 (1998)).
92. Id. (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 531).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1152.
96. Id. at 1161 (explaining that the introduction of alcohol into a dependent Indian community




100. Id. at 1155 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 527-31 (1998)).
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social, political, or geographic affinities."' 0 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that whether land constitutes a "dependent Indian community"
does not depend on the community, but rather on whether Congress has
set it aside for Indian use and whether it remains federally superin-
tended.102
Finally, the majority examined the statute's structure to determine
the "community of reference" test's survival. Indian reservations, classi-
fied as "Indian country" under § 1151(a), are "traditionally created by
and delineated according to boundaries Congress has set or sanc-
tioned."'03 Similarly, allotments, as recognized under § 1151(c), are "a
product of congressional action."' 04 Section 1151(b) describes areas that
are neither reservations nor allotments, but that are still "explicitly set
aside for Indians by congressional mandate and superintended by the
federal government."io0 Therefore, the majority reasoned, "the creation
of Indian country hinges on some explicit action by Congress." 0 6 Be-
cause Hydro's land did not pass this "explicit action" test, the majority
held it was not a "dependent Indian community." 07 Thus, neither the
federal government nor the Navajo will have control over the aquifer,
and New Mexico will control granting Hydro's UIC permit.
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Judge Ebel
Judge Ebel disagreed with the majority primarily on the applicabil-
ity of the Venetie test. 08 While agreeing that the Venetie two-part test
applies to the land in question, Judge Ebel argued that a new "commu-
nity of reference" test must be used initially to determine the land in
question before applying the Venetie test.'09 Although the Court in Vene-
tie rejected the Ninth Circuit's multi-factor test, Judge Ebel read Venetie
to allow for consideration of "[t]he degree of federal ownership of and
control over the area, and the extent to which the area was set aside for
the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."" 0
Judge Ebel propounded a three-step test to determine the appropri-
ate community of reference."' This test would analyze whether the pro-
101. Id. at 1156.
102. Id.





108. See id. at 1168 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1179.
110. Id. at 1177 (quoting Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.7 (1998)). The Navajo Nation agrees.
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posed community had "reasonably ascertainable boundaries," the coher-
ence of the land within those boundaries, and the coherence of "the uses
to which the land is put and the people inhabiting the land."ll 2
Applying this test, Judge Ebel would determine the Church Rock
Chapter to be the appropriate "community."ll 3 Applying the Venetie test
to the Church Rock Chapter, then, Judge Ebel determined that it was a
dependent Indian community and therefore subject to federal jurisdic-
tionl14 because the federal government had set aside most of this com-
munity for Navajo use and superintended it." 5
Judge Ebel also considered § 1151 's purpose of avoiding checker-
board jurisdiction to support employment of a "community of reference"
test.1 6 By looking only to title, Judge Ebel reasoned that the majority's
approach "would completely eviscerate this congressional purpose."' 17
Additionally, Judge Ebel argued that the concept of community in
§ 1151(b) should be afforded "heightened importance" in an environ-
mental context because aquifers extend beyond definite land bounda-
-118ries.
2. Judge Henry
Judge Henry, who agreed with Judge Ebel, wrote separately to un-
derscore his disagreement with the majority's opinion.11 9 Judge Henry
noted that the majority is "veer[ing] away from that fundamental con-
cern" of avoiding checkerboard jurisdiction.12 0 Judge Henry referenced
the "grave consequences," one of which being groundwater contamina-
tion, that previous mining operations have had on the Navajo to explain
his hesitation in applying § 115 1.121
III. ANALYSIS
Both HRI III and Venetie interpreted and applied § 1151(b) because
the EPA used that criminal statute to define jurisdictional bounds under
the SDWA.122 But reliance on § 1151 is inappropriate in the mining con-
text given its pedigree. Further, granting UIC permitting jurisdiction to
the State of New Mexico for in situ wells may lead to the contamination
of a Navajo drinking water source. In the alternative, adoption by the
112. Id
113. Id. at 1180.
114. Seeid.at1182.
115. Seeid.at 1181-82.
116. Id. at 1172-73.
117. Id. at 1172.
118. Id. at 1174.
119. Id. at 1182 (Henry, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1184.
121. Id.
122. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
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EPA of a different definition of "Indian lands" would respect Navajo
sovereignty while minimizing checkerboard jurisdiction.
A. Section 1151 is a Weak Basis upon Which to Establish Civil Jurisdic-
tion
The Tenth Circuit in HRJ III accepted that § 1151 applied 2 3 because
the EPA tied the SDWA "Indian lands" language to the definition of
"Indian country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 124 Section 1151, though, is a
criminal statute describing where the federal government, rather than a
state, retains criminal jurisdiction.125 Although it is a criminal statute, the
court in HRI III explained that § 1151 had been used "often" to "define
the scope of federal authority over civil and regulatory matters" and cited
page 527 of Venetie and § 3.04[1] of Cohen's Handbook of Federal In-
dian Law.126 First, this section will follow the Venetie trail and then pur-
sue the Cohen's authority to determine the precedential strength of ap-
plying § 1151 to the context of uranium mining.127
1. Venetie
Like the Tenth Circuit in HRI III, the Supreme Court in Venetie
stated that § 1151 "generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction."1 28
For authority, the Court looked to footnote two of DeCoteau v. District
County Court for the Tenth Judicial District.1 29 In footnote two, the Su-
preme Court in DeCoteau recognized the application of § 1151 to ques-
tions of civil jurisdiction. 30 The DeCoteau Court cited there, as author-
ity, footnotes from three U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
First, the Court in DeCoteau cited a footnote of McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Commission,132 a case involving Arizona's attempt to
impose an "income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income de-
rives from reservation sources."' 33 This footnote, however, did not refer
to § 1151.134 Rather, both the footnote itself and the sentence that it sup-
ports stated that consent of the tribe was required for the state to assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations.' 3 5 Therefore, this
authority supports the proposition that tribal sovereignty should be re-
123. See HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1134-35 (majority opinion).
124. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006); HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1138.
126. HR IIII, 608 F.3d at 1138.
127. Judge Ebel, in his dissenting opinion, cites the additional authority of Enlow v. Moore,
134 F.3d 993, 995 n.2 (10th Cir. 1998), but this trail merely reaches the same destinations as those of
Venetie and Cohen's.
128. Veneie II, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
129. 420 U.S. 425 (1975)
130. Id. at 428 n.2.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 178 n.17 (1973)).
133. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 165.
134. See id. at 178 n.17.
135. See id. at 178 & n.17.
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spected unless the tribe relinquishes it, and not that criminal jurisdiction
statutes, such as § 1151, may apply to questions of civil jurisdiction.
Next, the Court in DeCoteau cited a footnote of Kennerly v. District
Court of Montana,136 a case regarding the attempt of the owner of a gro-
cery store located on an Indian reservation to collect against reservation
Indians who "purchased some food on credit.' 37 This footnote provided
examples of explicit extensions of civil and criminal jurisdiction to states
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.138 The examples men-
tioned neither § 1151 nor the application of federal criminal statutes to
civil contexts.' 39 Therefore, this footnote does not provide support for the
proposition that § 1151 can be applied to civil or regulatory questions.
Last, the DeCoteau Court cited footnotes five, six, and ten of Wil-
liams v. Lee, 140 a case concerning the attempt of an operator of a general
store on an Indian reservation to collect against two Indians for goods
sold on credit.141 Footnote five mentioned § 1151, but only because it
stated that federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes on Indian reserva-
tions committed against Indians by non-Indians.142 Footnote six did not
mention § 1151, but described congressional grants of civil and criminal
jurisdiction to states. 143 It did not describe how or when federal criminal
statutes have been applied to determine civil jurisdiction.14 4 Neither did
footnote ten mention § 1151; rather, it described a federal statute that
grants federal consent to state criminal and civil jurisdiction over reser-
vation Indians.14 5 This footnote did not describe the application of federal
criminal jurisdiction statutes to questions of civil or regulatory jurisdic-
136. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428 n.2 (citing Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Mont., 400 U.S. 423,
424 n.l (1971)).
137. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 424.
138. Id. at 425 n.1.
139. Id.
140. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428 n.2 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 n.5, 221 n.6,
223 n.10 (1959)).
141. Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18.
142. Id. at 220 n.5. Footnote five also cites a previous edition of Cohen's, which discusses
federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country by and against Indians and
non-Indians. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 307 (1958). Crimes committed by
Indians against Indians are ordinarily subject to tribal jurisdiction. Id. 319. Crimes committed by
Indians against non-Indians in Indian country are ordinarily subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 320.
Crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians are ordinarily subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at
323. And crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians are ordinarily subject to state juris-
diction. Id. at 324.
143. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221 n.6.
144. Id. Footnote six also cites to the 1958 Revision of Cohen, but only to refer the reader to a
discussion of special Indian laws relating to Oklahoma. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note
140, at 985.
145. Williams, 358 U.S at 223 n.10. Subsequent to this opinion, "Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act which changed the prior procedure to require the consent of the Indians involved
before a State was permitted to assume jurisdiction." McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz.,
411 U.S. 164, 178 n.17 (1973) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a)).
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tion.14 6 Therefore, these footnotes do not provide support for the proposi-
tion that § 1151 can be applied in civil or regulatory contexts.
2. Cohen's 3.04[1]
In addition to Venetie, the court in HRI III also cited Cohen's Hand-
book on Federal Indian Law to support its proposition that § 1151 has
been applied to civil issues. 14 7 Section 3.04[1] of Cohen's, in relevant
part, states that the "modem definition of Indian country is found in the
criminal code, but applies in the civil context as well." 4 8 The footnote to
this statementl 49 references, as one authority, a footnote from a case' 50
which, in turn, cites DeCoteau, described above.
As another authority, the Cohen's footnote instructs the reader to
see Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,s a case regard-
ing the power of Oklahoma to "impose income taxes or motor vehicle
taxes on [Indians]." 5 2 While that case does mention § 1151, the page
cited by Cohen's does not. Rather, the case discusses § 1151 as it per-
tains to the inability of states to tax'5 3 members living not only on reser-
vations, but anywhere in "Indian country" as defined by § 1151.154 While
this case demonstrates the extension of § 1151 to a civil context, the ex-
tension is made out of deference to tribal sovereignty.'55 Therefore, this
case supports the proposition that § 1151 can be applied in civil contexts,
but only to the extent that states generally do not have jurisdiction to tax
within "Indian country." The acceptance in HRI III of § 1151's valid
application to civil matters illustrates how, by distorting precedent, ex-
tensions of § 1151 have progressed from respecting tribal sovereignty to
seizing it.
The Tenth Circuit in HRI III cited Venetie and Cohen's to support
the EPA's linkage of "Indian lands" in the SDWA to "Indian country" in
§ 1151.is6 At bottom, the authorities the HRI III majority used to support
the application of § 1151 are not persuasive. The Venetie and Cohen's
trails lead to footnotes that do not justify applying § 1151 to determine
jurisdiction for mining purposes. Rather, the precedential cases listed in
the various footnotes, at best, apply to the extension of criminal jurisdic-
146. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 n.10.
147. HRIIII, 608 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 2010)(en banc).
148. COHEN'S, supra note 9, § 3.04[l] at 182.
149. Id. at 182 n.333.
150. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 n.5 (1987) (citing
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975)).
151. 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993).
152. Id. at 116.
153. See id. at 128.
154. Id. at 123.
155. Seeid.at 126.
156. When the EPA, in 1984, linked the definition of "Indian lands" in the SDWA to "Indian
country" under § 1151, the Supreme Court had already applied § 1151 in most of the cases discussed
in this section.
[Vol. 88:2436
HYDRO RESOURCES, INC. V US. EPA
tion to cover tax obligations and debt collection and to keep states from
taxing Indians in Indian country. At worst, reliance on the cited authority
allows the federal government to further encroach upon Indian sover-
eignty, as shown by the HRJ III holding.
Apparently, the doctrine of stare decisis trumps any injustice lev-
eled against Native Americans through the federal intrusion into tribal
sovereignty. Although the Tenth Circuit was bound to apply EPA's defi-
nition of "Indian lands" under Venetie's interpretation of § 1151, reliance
on the particular authority cited, as shown by HR III, threatens the abil-
ity of the Navajo Nation to protect its drinking water sources from con-
tamination.
B. Implications of Granting Jurisdiction to New Mexico
As a result of HRI III, the Tribe, despite its ban on uranium min-
ing, 157 will not be able to prevent devastation of tribal land from uranium
mining and, more importantly, the contamination of a source of drinking
water for its people. Although the EPA has not yet granted UIC permit-
ting authority to the Navajo for Class III wells, it could do so in the fu-
ture, and thereby give the Navajo control over the fate of the aquifer that
Hydro seeks to mine.
Because the court held that Hydro's land is not "Indian country,"
Hydro must get its UIC permit from NMED rather than the EPA, which
controls tribal permits. Although NMED regulations must be as stringent
as those of the EPA, 5 Hydro does not have to get approval from the
Navajo, who use the aquifer for drinking waterl59 and who would have
input to the EPA permit process.1 60
When the EPA approved NMED's request for an aquifer exemption
in 1989,161 it concluded that the aquifer did not serve, and would not in
the future serve, as a source for drinking water. 162 Currently, however,
the aquifer serves as a drinking water source for thousands of people. 163
157. See Dine Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1303 (2005).
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h, 300h-1 (2006); HRII, 198 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000); see
also Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy De-
mands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 397 (2006).
159. Brief of Intervenor-Respondent Navajo Nation, supra note 110, at 12; E-mail from Chris
Shuey, Dir. of the Uranium Impact Assessment Program, Sw. Research & Informational Ctr., to
Andrew Brooks, Student, Denver Univ. Sturm Coll. of Law (Sept. 17, 2010, 22:09 MST) (on file
with author).
160. See Memorandum from Alvin L. Alm, Deputy Adm'r to Assistant Adm'rs et al. 5 (Nov. 8,
1984) (on file with author); see also James M. Grijalva, The Origins ofEPA's Indian Program, 15
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 191, 290 (2006).
161. HRII, 198 F.3d at 1234.
162. HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
163. Brief of Intervenor-Respondent, supra note 110, at 12; E-mail from Chris Shuey to An-
drew Brooks, supra note 159. Apparently, the discrepancy exists because the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission "averaged good quality groundwater from outside the ore zone with bad quality water
from inside the ore zone for an average pre-mining water quality that look[ed] bad." E-mail from
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Because HRI III ruled that New Mexico has jurisdiction over Hydro's
land, Hydro will seek its permit from NMED.1 64
Unlike the EPA, New Mexico does not grant "aquifer exemptions,"
but it will grant "temporary aquifer designation status" for certain Class
III wells.1 6 5 Temporary aquifer designation status allows the mining of
aquifers that can be used as sources for drinking water as long as the
aquifer, in whole or a "portion thereof," (1) does not serve as a "domestic
or agricultural water supply"16 6 and (2) either is currently situated in a
"location which makes recovery of water for drinking or agricultural
purposes" impractical1 6 7 or is already so contaminated that "render[ing]
that water fit for human consumption or agricultural use" is impracti-
cal.168 In addition, miners must show that, once mining operations are
complete, they will restore the groundwater's quality to pre-mining lev-
els or better. 169
To comply with these regulations, Hydro must show that the portion
of the aquifer it seeks to mine is "not currently used" as a domestic water
supply.170 Because thousands of people currently use the aquifer for
drinking water,171 Hydro will have to argue that only the portion it will
mine is not currently used for drinking water. Specifically, because New
Mexico regulations require measurement of a minimum of one-quarter
mile surrounding the well site to determine the toxicity of an aquifer,172
Hydro must show that the water in the portion of the aquifer within one-
quarter mile around the proposed uranium in situ injection and recovery
wells is too toxic to be used for domestic or agricultural use.
Additionally, Hydro will have to show that it will restore the
groundwater's quality. Multiple authorities explain that restoration of
groundwater to pre-mining conditions after ISL mining is impossible. 173
Eric Jantz, Staff Attorney, N.M. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Andrew Brooks, Student, Denver Univ. Sturm
Coll. of Law (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:01 MST) (on file with author). The issue is moot, though, because
HRI will have to get a new permit from New Mexico before it can mine, and therefore a new calcu-
lation would be made. Telephone Interview with William C. Olson, Chief, N.M. Ground Water
Quality Bureau (Sept. 17, 2010).
164. E-mail from Eric Jantz, Staff Attorney, N.M. Envtl. Law Ctr., to Andrew Brooks, Student,
Denver Univ. Sturm Coll. of Law (Sept. 19, 2010, 10:45 MST) (on file with author).
165. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5101(C) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. CODE R. §
20.6.2.5103(A)(2).
166. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(1).
167. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(2)(a).
168. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(2)(b).
169. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5101(C)(2) (mandating that discharge permits address the
manner by which the permit holder will ensure that affected ground water will not have excess levels
of toxic pollutants); see also N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.3103 (listing various pollutants and the accept-
able concentrations thereof in New Mexico groundwater).
170. N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5103(C)(1).
171. See Brief of Intervenor-Respondent Navajo Nation, supra note 110, at 12-15; see also E-
mail from Chris Shucy to Andrew Brooks, supra note 159.
172. See N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2.5202(B).
173. SUSAN HALL, GROUNDWATER RESTORATION AT URANIUM IN-SITU RECOVERY MINES,
SOUTH TEXAS COASTAL PLAIN 30 (2009) (concluding that no ISL mine in the U.S. returned post-
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The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissionl 7 4 (NRC) admitted as
much in an August 2010 report. 175 Responding to comments that "resto-
ration of groundwater to baseline values for all groundwater constituents
in any ISL wellfield to date" has not been accomplished, the NRC stated
that "to date, restoration to backgroundwater quality for all constituents
has proven to be not practically achievable at licensed NRC [ISL]
,,l76sites.
Although New Mexico is not certain to grant Hydro's petition for
temporary aquifer designation status, approval could result in contamina-
tion of a Navajo drinking water source.
C. A Proposal Respecting Both Tribal Sovereignty and Venetie
The decision in HRI III, while correct under the SDWA and Vene-
tie, undermines the legislative intent behind § 1151 of avoiding checker-
board jurisdiction1 77 by reading out the word "communities" from §
1151(b). If New Mexico approves Hydro's permit, HRI III will lead to
the mining of an aquifer that the Navajo use for drinking water, ignoring
the Navajo's uranium mining ban. These problems can be remedied with
a simple solution. 178
Because the EPA chose to equate "Indian lands" in the SDWA to
"Indian country," as defined under § 1151,179 it can simply change its
definition of "Indian lands." Disassociation of § 1151 with the SDWA
would also dispose of the concomitant problems arising from reliance on
Venetie, which interpreted § 1151(b).
mining groundwater to pre-mining conditions based on data from Texas), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2009/1143/pdf/OF09-1143.pdf; Impacts of Uranium In-Situ Leaching, WISE
URANIUM PROJECT, http://www.wise-uranium.org/uisl.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2010); E-mail
from Eric Jantz to Andrew Brooks, supra note 164.
174. "[T]he NRC regulates in situ recovery facilities." Uranium Recovery, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/uranium-recovery.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
175. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
MOORE RANCH ISR PROJECT IN CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING: SUPPLEMENT TO THE GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR IN-SITU LEACH URANIUM MILLING FACILITIES B-36
(2010). Thanks to Eric Jantz for directing me to this report.
176. Id. (emphasis added). This statement directly contradicts one that the International Atomic
Energy Agency made in 2005. "[W]ith nearly three decades of operations, the [U.S.] ISL
mining industry has never caused a serious environmental, health or safety risk or failed to
restore an aquifer at one of its projects." INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, GUIDEBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR IN SITU LEACH MINING PROJECTS 56 (2005) (emphasis
added).
177. The holding in HRI III was that Section 8 was not "Indian country," HRI III, 608 F.3d
1131, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc), and therefore New Mexico retains UIC permitting jurisdic-
tion over Section 8. The adjacent Section 17 was held to be "Indian country," HRII, 198 F.3d 1224,
1254 (10th Cir. 2000), and, therefore, EPA retains UIC permitting jurisdiction there.
178. The HRI III majority suggested such a possibility: "EPA may seek to ... unhitch[] its UIC
permitting authority from § 1151." HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1166.
179. 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (2011).
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EPA should change the definition of "Indian lands" to refer to areas
that are occupied or substantially surrounded by tribal lands.' 80 Two ele-
ments should be used to make such a determination, factors that the Su-
preme Court in Venetie implicitly approved, but did not use, in interpret-
ing § 1151(b): "the degree of federal ownership of and control over the
area, and the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occu-
pancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."' 8 To achieve ad-
ministrative ease and judicial efficiency, the EPA should set specific
targets or thresholds that the areas must meet to constitute "Indian land."
For example, an area consisting of land, 50.1% of which is controlled by
the federal government and was set aside for Indians, could constitute
"Indian lands." Specific thresholds should also be used to define "area,"
such as requiring an analysis of land within a radius of, for example,
three miles of the disputed land. EPA should specify such thresholds
after receiving input from all interested parties: namely, the tribes, the
states, the federal government, and private landowners. Specificity will
allow both Indian communities and private parties to determine whether
disputed land constitutes "Indian lands" without the need for courts to
undergo an unpredictable post hoc analysis. Such specificity would avert
the HRI III majority's issues with Watchman "community of reference"
test, while simultaneously conforming to congressional authority.
Hydro's land would constitute "Indian lands" under such a defini-
tion. Applying the first element, Hydro's parcel on Section 8 would be
subject to EPA jurisdiction because "[t]he government has set aside 78%
of the land in the [Navajo Church Rock] Chapter for the use of Indians
either as trust land either for the tribe or for individuals in the form of
allotments." 82 Similarly, the second element leads to the same conclu-
sion because "the federal government retains title to 92% of the land in
the Chapter, and[,] as . . . owner [in fee,] certainly retains superinten-
dence over the land." 83
Ideally, the EPA would then delegate to the Navajo UIC permitting
authority over such land. This would give the Tribe the most respect for
its sovereignty and allow it to make its own decisions regarding its land
and the resources beneath such land. Even if the EPA retained jurisdic-
tion, the Navajo would be able to provide input when reviewing UIC
applications.
The advantages of such a definition would outweigh the disadvan-
tages. First, it would allow courts to avoid the checkerboard jurisdiction
problems resulting from Venetie and HRI III because interested parties
180. The proposal incorporates Indian reservations and Indian allotments as described in
§ 1151(a) and (c), respectively, into the definition of "Indian lands."
181. Venetie II, 522 U.S. 520, 531 n.7 (1998) (quoting Venetie1, 101 F.3d 1286, 1301 (9th Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. HR IIII, 608 F.3d at 1181 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
183. Id.at1182.
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would be able to determine upfront whether land constituted "Indian
lands." Second, the new definition would allow courts to respect tribal
sovereignty. In Hydro's case, if the Navajo were granted UIC permitting
authority from the EPA, the permit would be refused. If EPA retained
UIC permitting authority, EPA would seek input from the Chapter, and
the Chapter would emphasize the Navajo's ban on uranium mining, thus
allowing a certain level of respect for Navajo sovereignty.
Although the proposed definition of "Indian lands" breathes new
life into the "degree of federal ownership" and "extent set aside" factors
abrogated by Venetie, it does not resurrect the previous Ninth and Tenth
Circuit tests in their entirety. Rather, the proposal consists of the "more
relevant [factors]"l 84 adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Although courts may
analogize the proposed definition to Venetie, they would not be bound by
it because Venetie interpreted § 1151(b) and the proposed definition
would no longer be tethered to that section of the federal criminal code.
To avoid the § 1151 analogy, the EPA could, in the new definition of
"Indian lands," expressly proscribe reliance on § 1151 jurisprudence.' 8 5
CONCLUSION
The decision of HRI III demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's preference
for predictability over respect for tribal sovereignty. Although the deci-
sion allows property owners and authorities to easily determine which
government has jurisdiction, it relies on a criminal statute that was en-
acted to facilitate consistent enforcement of criminal law by federal
authorities. As a result of the opinion, Hydro must obtain temporary des-
ignation status not from the Navajo, but from the State of New Mexico
for its Section 8 land, in addition to an aquifer exemption from the EPA
for its adjacent Section 17 land. Should New Mexico allow Hydro to
mine, the Navajo community could suffer the contamination of a primary
drinking water source. This result may be avoided if EPA either grants
the Tribe UIC permitting authority or unlinks its definition of "Indian
184. Venetie II, 522 U.S. at 531 n.7.
185. Alternatively, Congress could amend the SDWA to drop the term "Indian lands" alto-
gether. Because aquifers are underground and do not follow land borders, tying jurisdiction to the
land under which the aquifer sits is certain to lead to disputes, as evidenced by HRiill. One possibil-
ity already exists in the oil recovery context. See, e.g., Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United
States, 966 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1992). Congress could mandate all overlying landowners to
enter into "unitization agreements" before any permits are granted. See generally BOSSELMAN ET
AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 310-11 (2nd Ed. 2006) (describing such agree-
ments in the oil recovery context and problems with arriving at such agreements). Unitization
agreements, however, are not a panacea. Because the Navajo are unlikely to agree to any extraction
of uranium from aquifers under Navajo land, Congress may force capitulation if the nation's need
for uranium becomes more urgent. Forced capitulation, then, would negate any respect for tribal
sovereignty. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a, 396d (2006) (giving the Secretary of the Interior discretion to
approve oil and gas unitization agreements involving Indian tribes). But see 25 C.F.R. 211.28(b)
(2011) (stating that "the Secretary [of the Interior] shall consult with the Indian mineral owner prior
to making a determination concerning [a unitization agreement]").
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lands" from § 1151. A two-part test that analyzes the extent to which the
federal government has set aside and controls a particular area would
both limit checkerboard jurisdiction and, more importantly, allow tribes
to retain the power to control the destiny of their valuable resources.
Andrew Brooks*
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor K.K. DuVivier for her invaluable guidance. I would also like to thank the Denver Univer-
sity Law Review Board of Editors and staff for their insight and advice. Additionally, I would like to
thank Professor Tanya Bartholomew, Freedom Cheteni, Phil Emerson, and my parents for being
enduring sources of inspiration and encouragement.
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BERRY& MURPHY, P.C. V. CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE
CO.: MALPRACTICE LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
American journalist and satirist, Ambrose Bierce, once referred to
insurance as, "[a]n ingenious modem game of chance in which the player
is permitted to enjoy the comfortable conviction that he is beating the
man who keeps the table."' However, as insurance policies become in-
creasingly complex, and new forms of liability insurance are created,
policyholders can no longer feel comfortable with the idea that an insur-
ance policy guarantees them coverage. Instead, "the man who keeps the
table" has the luxury of feeling much more comfortable. In Berry &
Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co.,2 the Tenth Circuit
interpreted a claims-made malpractice liability insurance policy in favor
of Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, resulting in a lack of coverage
for Berry & Murphy, P.C. 4 and a windfall for Carolina Casualty.5 In do-
ing so, the court incorrectly interpreted the term "insured" as defined in
the insurance policy,6 did not adhere to established precedent in Colorado
7law, and created a highly inequitable result. All attorneys covered by a
claims-made malpractice liability insurance policy should take notice of
the holding in Berry & Murphy due to its potentially damaging effects.
Part I of this Comment examines claims-made insurance policies
and how they compare to occurrence policies, the various pitfalls insured
parties face under this relatively recent form of coverage, how the judici-
ary has historically construed insurance policies, and the potential result
of an insurance company's arbitrary refusal to defend or pay a claim.
Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and the court's holding
and analysis in Berry & Murphy. Part III analyzes Berry & Murphy,
commends the court on its determination that the facts constitute a single
claim, criticizes the majority for its interpretation of the term "insured,"
and examines the fallacies and potential negative consequences of the
ruling. This Comment concludes by arguing that claims-made insurance
policies must be written with more precise definitions of key terms, and
that clearly defined precedent dictates favorable outcomes for insured
parties when insurance companies fail to heed such advice.
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 169 (Forum Books 1948) (1911).
2. 586 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter "Berry & Murphy"].
3. Id. at 816.
4. Id. at 815.
5. Id. at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 814-15 (majority opinion).
7. Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Colo. 1993) (noting that ambiguous
contractual provisions should be "construed against the insurer who drafted the policy and in favor
of the insured" (citing Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo. 1990))).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Contrasting Occurrence and Claims-Made Insurance Policies
Historically, "insurance policies have been written on an occurrence
basis, providing coverage for events that take place during the policy
period . . . ."8 Under an occurrence policy, the claim against the insured
can come at any time, essentially providing unlimited prospective cover-
age for events occurring while the policy was in effect.9 As the United
States became more industrialized and insurance claims increased, insur-
ance companies discovered that difficulties with the occurrence model
were quickly arising.' 0 In particular, due to the prospective nature of
these policies, unanticipated lag time between occurrences and filing of
claims created a "tail" in which the insurance companies could not pre-
dict the amount of money they would have to pay out, causing actuarial
estimation problems." For this reason, insurance companies sought to
avoid liability by arguing that events leading to insurance claims did not
take place during the policy period.12 However, the judiciary was willing
to broaden insurers' liability by developing three different theories that
worked in favor of the insured.13 As a result, insurance companies faced
increased business costs,14 which, in turn, were passed on to the in-
sured.' 5 A natural consequence of these increased rates was the insurer's
inability to obtain such rates due to the unwillingness of the insured to
pay a premium that approached the total recovery available.' 6
As insurers began to withdraw from the market due to financial in-
stability,17 carriers realized that a less expensive policy option would be
needed to counteract the rising premiums of occurrence policies.
Claims-made policies began to emerge, and this narrower form of cover-
age began to replace occurrence policies in areas such as professional
liability.' 9 Claims-made policies provide retroactive coverage 20 for
8. See Carolyn M. Frame, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: Closing the Gaps with Ret-
roactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 165, 165 (1987).
9. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 n.3 (citing I LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:5 (3d ed. 1996)).
10. See Frame, supra note 8, at 169-70.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 170.
13. Id. at 170-71 (describing the manifestation theory, exposure theory, and triple trigger
theory).
14. Id. at 171 ("Insurers were faced with inflation rates, escalating jury awards, and the gen-
eral proliferation of claims. These factors increased the insurer's business costs because the premi-
ums paid at the time of the occurrence were not sufficient to create the financial pool required to pay





19. Id. at 177-79 (describing that the proliferation of claims-made policies in the area of
professional liability is due, in pars, to the policy's relative cost and coverage compared to occur-
rence policies).
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claims that are made against the insured and reported during the policy
period. 21 The notable difference between the occurrence policy and
claims-made policy is that under a claims-made policy an insured can be
indemnified for an event that occurred before the policy began, as long
as the event is reported during the policy period.22 Because the insurer's
liability ends on a stated date, insurers are no longer exposed to the un-
certainty of future claims by the insured, thereby allowing the insurers to
calculate premiums with greater accuracy.23
B. Problems Associated With Claims-Made Policies
1. Notice-Prejudice Rule
Due to the strict notice and reporting requirements set forth in
claims-made insurance policies, commentators have suggested that a
more appropriate name for this type of policy should be "claims made
and reported." 24 Because an insured party must become aware of the
event giving rise to the claim and must report the claim within the policy
period, limiting the name of this type of policy to claims-made seems
misleading. The critical requirement of giving notice of a claim to the
insurer within the policy period has led to what is commonly referred to
as the "notice-prejudice" rule.25
This often-overlooked notice requirement 26 has led to litigation in
instances where a claim is made against an insured shortly before the
policy's coverage expired, not leaving a reasonable amount of time to
give notice,27 and in cases where an insured argues that circumstances
made it impractical to give notice to the insurer.28 However, in cases
such as these, courts have been reluctant to add a judicially created "tail"
to the end of a claims-made policy and have instead sided with insurance
companies in showing "prejudice" when the insured fails to report the
claim during the policy period.29 Due to the inherent differences between
occurrence policies and claims-made policies, courts have determined
that the notice provision is an essential element of claims-made policies
20. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 809 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing I Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 1:5).




24. Reed Millsaps, Avoiding the "Nightmares"-The "Notice-Prejudice" Rule and Claims
Made Policies, 28 No. 5 INs. LITIG. REP. 165, 165 (2006).
25. See id.
26. Id
27. E.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 513 (Fla. 1983).
28. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 433 (Colo. App.
1991).
29. See, e.g., id. at 435; Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
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and have held that any judicial extension of the policy period would re-
sult in an un-bargained-for extension of coverage.30
In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis,31 the Florida Su-
preme Court noted the stark differences between occurrence and claims-
made policies and cited economic ramifications as the basis for its deci-
sion that insurers must show "prejudice" under a claims-made policy. 3 2
As discussed above, the financial benefit conferred upon the insured in
such a policy is a lower premium for comparable coverage.33 However,
this comes at the cost of a shorter reporting period.34 The court refused to
extend the reporting period beyond the end of the policy because it
viewed this type of coverage as specifically bargained for between the
insurer and the insured. The philosophy of the Dolan court was "widely
followed by other courts[,] 3 6 with some courts extending the economic
analysis beyond premium setting, 3 effectively solidifying the notice-
prejudice rule.
2. Policy Language Ambiguities
Another problem facing claims-made insurance policies leading to
increased litigation is ambiguities in policy language.38 When insurance
companies write policies that lack clear terminology, yet propose to en-
force strict notice and reporting guidelines, the interpretation of whether
or not an insured is covered often become contentious. 39
In California, the word "may," in conjunction with the terms of
when a claim can be set forth, has led to such an ambiguity.40 In Cham-
berlin v. Smith, the California Court of Appeals followed precedent set in
Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co. in determining that the language of the
insurance policy was susceptible to two divergent interpretations. 4 1 The
30. E.g., Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
31. 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983).
32. See id. at 516. In a claims-made policy, unlike an occurrence policy, a claim will not arise
after the expiration of the policy; therefore, due to this reduced underwriting risk, claims-made
policies can be offered at a lower premium than occurrence policies. Id.
33. Millsaps, supra note 24, at 165.
34. Id.
35. Dolan, 433 So. 2d at 515.
36. Millsaps, supra note 24, at 165 (discussing the holdings of Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1994) and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d
432 (Colo. App. 1991) as examples of cases that have followed Dolan).
37. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 435 (Colo. App.
1991) (noting that the ability to accurately fix reserves leads to lower policy premiums); Hasbrouck
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Iowa 1993) (noting that insurer prejudice
allows for more accuracy in setting reserves).
38. See Garmisa, supra note 21, at 294.
39. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Armas, 527 N.E.2d 921, 925 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 514 P.2d 1219, 1220-21 (Cal. 1973); Chamberlin v.
Smith, 140 Cal. Rptr. 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1977).
41. Chamberlin, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98 ("First, the phrase might limit coverage to a claim
asserted within the policy period and exclude claims asserted afterward, making the words 'which
may be' superfluous. Secondly, the phrase might be construed as extending coverage to any claim
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pertinent language of the insurance policy read, "[T]o indemnify ...
against any claim or claims for breach of professional duty as Lawyers
which may be made against them during the period set forth in the Cer-
tificate by reason of any negligent act, error or omission, whenever or
wherever the same was or may have been committed .... The court
dismissed the idea that there was unnecessary language in the policy and
instead adopted a construction that provided coverage for an injury that
took place during the policy period, even when the claim was made sub-
sequent to the policy's expiration.43 In ambiguous situations such as this,
claims-made policies will likely lead to litigation due to the insurer's
unwillingness to indemnify the insured44 and the insured's rightful claim
that ambiguities must be construed in their favor.45
While many insurance companies have eliminated the word "may"
from their policies,46 even "plain language" policies can be encumbered
by ambiguities, leading to disagreements regarding the temporal re-
quirements of notice.47 For example, in St. Paul Insurance Co. of Illinois
v. Armas,48 the Illinois Appellate Court found that the plain language of a
malpractice liability insurance policy, in conjunction with a cancellation
form, resulted in an ambiguity that could conceivably allow an insured
party to report a claim after the expiration of the policy period.49 In this
policy, which lacked a definitional section,5 0 the insured was given no
guidance in determining what constituted a loss-leading the court to
determine that an ambiguity was created as to when a claim had to be
reported.5 1 The court held that the provisions created confusion, resulting
from conflicting terms.52 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's
ruling, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate.5 3 Such ambi-
guities in claims-made policies constitute another worrisome complica-
tion due to the increased potential for litigation and possibility that the
insured will not receive the coverage they thought they had purchased.
which arose and could have been asserted during the policy period, including claims not actually
asserted until after the policy's expiration." (quoting Gyler, 514 P.2d at 1221)).
42. Id. at 497 (second alteration in original).
43. Id. at 502.
44. See, e.g., Chamberlin, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
45. See id. at 498 ("The general rule is that if coverage is available under any reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous clause of an insurance policy, the insurer cannot escape its obliga-
tions.").
46. Garmisa, supra note 21, at 294.
47. Id.
48. 527 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
49. See id. at 925.
50. Id. at 924.
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Id. at 925.
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3. Avoidance of Liability
Due to the restrictive nature of claims-made policies, insurers typi-
cally require prospective policyholders to disclose whether they have
knowledge of potential claims against them at the time the policy is insti-
tuted. This attempt by insurance companies to avoid coverage gives rise
to problems regardless of the jurisdiction in which the policy is written
and has been interpreted both in favor of and against insured parties.54
A series of Illinois state cases illustrate the courts' varying interpre-
tations of whether a lack of disclosure on behalf of the insured at the
onset of the claims-made policy is considered misrepresentation. In
Great West Steel Industries v. Northbrook Insurance Co.,56 the court held
that no misrepresentation had taken place when the insured failed to re-
port a construction accident potentially related to steel it had manufac-
tured because it believed it was not responsible for the accident. 5 7 Al-
though the insured party was aware of the circumstances that might lead
to a claim, it did not believe it was at fault and the court construed the
policy language in their favor.58
In the malpractice liability context, courts have not been as forgiv-
ing when policyholders fail to report potential claims at the inception of
the policy.59 For example, in Stiefel v. Illinois Union Insurance Co.,60 an
attorney received a letter informing him of a potential malpractice law-
suit that would be filed against him six months before he took out a
claims-made insurance policy.6' Despite the argument that the attorney
believed the claim had been abandoned, the court did not reach a conclu-
sion consistent with Great West Steel Industries when the insurance
company subsequently denied coverage after a lawsuit was filed against
the insured within the policy period.6 2 Instead, the court explained that
the letter sent to the insured undoubtedly constituted notice of a potential
malpractice suit, regardless of the fact that the lawsuit was not filed when
the plaintiff claimed they would file it.63 In contrast to the holding in
Stiefel, an insurance company's attempt to avoid liability in similar cir-
cumstances was unsuccessful when an insured party denied knowledge
of a potential claim even though they had received a letter similar to that
54. See Garmisa, supra note 21, at 296.
55. Id.; Great W. Steel Indus. v. Northbrook Ins. Co., 484 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
Stiefel v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
56. 484 N.E. 2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
57. Id. at 853.
58. Id.
59. See Stiefel, 542 N.E.2d at 76.
60. 542 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
61. Id. at 74-75.
62. See id. at 77.
63. Id.
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64in Stiefel four years before the policy term. This departure from
Stiefel's holding indicates an increased potential for ambiguity in the
interpretation of this temporal aspect of claims-made policy applications,
giving rise to further complications with this type of insurance policy.
C. Insurance Policy Jurisprudence
When a dispute arises between an insurance company and a policy-
holder, Colorado law states that insurance policies should be interpreted
based on the principles of contract law.65 In construing the terms of the
policy, courts must attempt to "promote the intent of the parties" as they
would with any contract.66 As evidenced by a multitude of insurance
litigation, the intent of the parties is not always clear.67 In the insurance
context, courts seek to resolve disagreements about coverage and termi-
nology used in a written instrument by determining intent based on the
plain language of the instrument. 68 When the language is clear and un-
ambiguous, courts should "not rewrite a contractual provision"69 and
must instead "give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of its
terms."70
When the language is unclear, however, and uncertainty arises,
"courts should construe the policy in favor of the insured."7 ' Although a
mere disagreement between the insurance provider and policyholder does
not give rise to an ambiguity, when the policy "is susceptible on its face
to more than one reasonable interpretation" it is determined to be am-
biguous.7 2 Finally, in determining whether a policy is ambiguous on any
point, courts "must evaluate the policy as a whole."73
D. Bad Faith on Part ofInsurer
When an insurance company is held liable for a claim, state statutes
may also allow insured parties to recover reasonable attorney fees, court
64. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Co., 508 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) ("We also recognize that that foreseeability may have been diminished by the intervening time
period between the last correspondence between the parties in April, 1980 and the filing of the
complaint in February 1983. In our view, whether that period of silence lulled Stat-Tab into a false
assurance that there were no prior errors which would give rise to a potential claim, thereby acting as
a waiver of prior knowledge of potential claims, is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes
entry of a summary judgment.").
65. See Carl's Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639 (Colo. App. 2007) (citing
Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo.1990)).
66. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005).
67. See, e.g., Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263
(Cal. 1993); Prof'I Solutions Ins. Co. v. Mohrlang, No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706
(D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009).
68. Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1055 (Colo.
1994)
69. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988).
72. Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005).
73. Id.
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costs, and the covered benefits when an insurer's delay or refusal to pay
a claim constitutes bad faith.7 4 In Colorado, a first-party claimant in such
an action may recover two times the covered benefit.75 In the absence of
a bad faith statute, an insured may typically only recover special dam-
ages for the insurance company's refusal to indemnify the loss or the
actual amount due to the insured based on the loss. 7 6
An insurance company's mere denial of a claim does not necessar-
ily rise to the level of bad faith7 7 and, although similar, states differ in the
elements of this cause of action. 7 8 To establish a claim of bad faith in
Colorado the plaintiff must have damages or loss, the defendant must
have denied or delayed payment without reasonable basis for its action,
and the defendant's unreasonable conduct must have been the cause of
the plaintiffs damages or loss. 9 Because such statutes are penal in na-
ture, they are to be strictly construed and the burden is on the insured
seeking statutory recovery to prove arbitrariness or capriciousness on the
part of the insurer for failing to pay a claim.80 Insurance companies have
been held liable for statutory penalties after acting in bad faith in a vari-
ety of circumstances,8 including, among other things, denial of a claim
on the grounds that a particular person was not within the coverage af-
forded by the policy. 82 Illustrating the contentiousness of such litigation,
however, courts have also held to the contrary in cases involving similar
factual circumstances.
II. BERRY& MURPHY, P.C. V. CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
A. Facts
Berry & Murphy, P.C. involves the interpretation of a claims-
made insurance policy issued by Carolina Casualty84 to the named in-
sured "Timothy H. Berry, P.C."85 The issue in this case stems from a
series of disputes beginning with a personal injury lawsuit filed against
Joseph Ciri on behalf of Oksana and William Burkhardt.8 6 Seth Murphy,
a co-shareholder with the law firm of Berry & Murphy, P.C., represented
74. 14 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 207:1 (defining bad faith as "the arbitrary refusal
of an insurance company to pay a valid claim").
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1116(1) (2008).
76. George L. Blum, Annotation, What Constitutes Bad Faith on Part ofInsurer Rendering It
Liable for Statutory Penalty Imposed for Bad Faith in Failure to Pay, or Delay in Paying, Insured's
Claim-Particular Grounds for Denial ofClaim: Risks, Causes, and Extent ofLoss, Injury, Disability,
or Death, 123 A.L.R. 5TH 259 § 2[a] (2004).
77. Id. at § 2[b].
78. See 14 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 9, at § 207:3.
79. COLO. JURY INSTR., 4TH (CIVIL) § 25:4 (2010).
80. Blum, supra note 76, at § 2[b].
81. Id. at § 2[a].
82. Id. at § 3[a].
83. Id. at § 3[b].
84. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 814.
86. Id. at 805.
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the Burkhardts in this suit (the Ciri Lawsuit)-filed in January 2005 .87
March 2006, Mr. Murphy left Berry & Murphy, P.C., taking the Ciri
Lawsuit with him to his new firm, Richmond, Neiley, Sprouse, & Mur-
phy, LLC." Over the next several months, the court granted a motion to
withdraw as counsel filed by Mr. Murphy and granted, without prejudice,
a motion filed by the defendants to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to
prosecute.8 In November 2006, the court then granted a motion to recon-
sider the order dismissing the Ciri Lawsuit after the Burkhardts hired
Cindy Tester as new counsel. 90 Due to various instances in which Mr.
Murphy failed to comply with Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1,9'
which he did not opt out of, Ms. Tester sent a letter (the Tester Letter) to
Mr. Murphy in January 2007 at his new place of employment informing
him of a malpractice suit she planned to file on behalf of the Burk-
hardts. 92
Of great importance to the case is the fact that the Tester Letter was
sent only to Richmond, Neiley, Sprouse, & Murphy, LLC and not to Mr.
Murphy's former co-shareholder, Timothy H. Berry. 93 Furthermore, Mr.
Murphy followed the advice in the Tester Letter and provided his law
firm's malpractice insurance carrier with notice of the claim. 94 Nearly a
year later, in December 2007, the court granted a renewed motion to
dismiss the Ciri Lawsuit,95 which was followed by a legal malpractice
claim (the Malpractice Lawsuit) filed on behalf of the Burkhardts against
Mr. Murphy and Berry & Murphy, P.C., in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.96 The Malpractice Lawsuit alleged
that Mr. Murphy and Berry & Murphy, P.C. "missed the deadline for
filing notice to elect exclusion from Simplified Procedures pursuant to
[Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure] 16.1 in the Ciri Lawsuit," and that
both were "'negligent' and breached their 'fiduciary duty of loyalty' to
the Burkhardts." 97 On July 23, 2008, Mr. Berry accepted service of the
Malpractice Lawsuit and put Carolina Casualty on notice of the suit the




90. Id. at 806.
91. COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.1(a)(1) ("The purpose of [simplified procedure] is to provide maxi-
mum access to the district courts in civil actions; to enhance the provision of just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of civil actions; to provide the earliest practical trials; and to limit discovery
and its attendant expense.").
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Malpractice Lawsuit at the time he was served and was unaware of the
Tester Letter.99
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Berry & Murphy, P.C. and Timothy H. Berry, P.C. filed
suit to resolve a dispute with defendant Carolina Casualty regarding de-
fendant's denial of coverage for the Malpractice Lawsuit.100 Carolina
Casualty denied coverage "on the grounds that the alleged malpractice
claim was first made against an insured (i.e., Seth Murphy) prior to the
inception of the insurance policy (i.e., via the Tester Letter), thereby fal-
ling outside the claims-made coverage of the policy."'oi
The plaintiffs and Carolina Casualty filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment before the district court, which granted Carolina Casu-
alty's motion in its entirety.' 02 The district court based its ruling on the
fact that Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of the insur-
ance policy, that the Tester Letter constituted notice to the insured, and
that the "burden" should not fall on Carolina Casualty for Mr. Murphy's
failure to inform his former partner or firm of the claim.1o3 As the pre-
vailing party, Carolina Casualty was awarded costs.104 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo and applied
the substantive law of Colorado, the forum state.' 05
C The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Briscoe began her analysis by exam-
ining the language of the insurance policy at issue. o0 The claims-made
policy contained the following "Insuring Agreement":
This Policy shall pay on behalf of the Insured all Damages and
Claims Expense that the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay, arising from any Claim first made against an Insured during the
Policy Period and reported to the Insurer in writing during the Policy
Period or within 60 days thereafter, for any Wrongful Act, provided
that prior to the inception date of the first Lawyers' Professional Li-
ability Insurance Policy issued by the Insurer to the Named Insured,
which has been continuously renewed and maintained in effect to the






104. Id. at 807-08.
105. Id. at 808.
106. Id at 808-10.
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not reasonable foresee that such Wrongful Act might reasonably be
expected on the basis of a Claim.107
In analyzing this language and the policy's definitions of the terms
"Claim," 1o "Wrongful Act," 09 "Related Wrongful Act,"'110 and "Notice
of Claim and Multiple Claims,"' Judge Briscoe did not find any ambi-
guity and determined that the terms had "plain and ordinary meanings"
that could be applied to the language of the policy.11 2 Therefore, the ma-
jority found that the two essential inquiries were whether (1) the Tester
Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim'' and (2)
whether Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of the pol-
icy. 114
In deciding whether the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
should be considered as one "claim," the majority began by analyzing the
policy's definition of "related wrongful act."'' To support their position
that the claim in the Tester Letter was not "logically or causally con-
nected" to the claims made in the Malpractice Lawsuit, the plaintiffs
argued that Professional Solutions Insurance Co. v. Mohrlangll6 should
control." 7 In Mohrlang, the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado was faced with a task similar to the one in the current dis-
pute; to determine whether two malpractice claims were "related" by
examining the policy's definition of "related acts or omissions."" 8 Like
107. Id. at 808-09.
108. Id. at 809 ("[A] written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief including, but not
limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration proceeding .... A Claim shall be deemed to
have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is first received by any Insured." (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
109. Id. ("[A]ny actual or alleged act, omission, or Personal Injury arising out of Professional
Services rendered by an Insured or by any person for whose act or omission the Insured is legally
responsible .. . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. Id. ("Wrongful Acts which are logically or causally connected by reason of any common
fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, casualty, event or decision." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
111. Id. at 809-10 (stating in pertinent part: "(A) As a condition precedent to their rights under
this Policy, an Insured shall give the Insurer written notice of any Claim as soon as practicable ....
(C) All Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Acts or any Related Wrongful Acts,
or one or more series of similar, repeated or continuous Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful Acts,
shall be considered a single Claim. Each Claim shall be deemed to be first made at the earliest of the
following times: 1. when the earliest Claim arising out of such Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful
Acts is first made").
112. Id. at 810 (citing Carey v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 108 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. 2005)
("An insurance policy is ambiguous if it is susceptible on its face to more than one reasonable inter-
pretation . . . . A mere disagreement between the parties concerning interpretation of the policy does
not create an ambiguity. To determine whether a policy contains an ambiguity, we must evaluate the
policy as a whole." (internal citations omitted))).
113. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 810.
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id.at810-11.
116. No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009).
117. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 811-12.
118. Mohrlang, 2009 WL 321706, at *3 (defining "related acts or omissions" as "all acts or
omissions in the rendering of professional services that are temporally, logically or causally con-
nected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision").
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the Tenth Circuit in the current case, the Mohrlang court found no ambi-
guity in the policy's terms." 9 The district court found that the claim
against the attorney for breach of professional duties involving the sale
of stock 20 and the second claim for breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty,
disclosure, and candor involving the release of promissory notesl21 were
not temporally, logically, or causally connected and were not related
claims under the language of the policy.122
Refusing to adopt the result from Mohrlang, the majority distin-
guished the facts in the current case by using the district court's defini-
tion of "logically connected." 2 3 Because the Tester Letter faulted Mr.
Murphy for not opting out of Rule 16.1 and the Malpractice Lawsuit
"flows from Murphy's decision to proceed under Rule 16.1[,]" the court
found the two claims logically connected.124
Both the plaintiffs and Carolina Casualty then discussed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case, Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Law-
y ' CO.125yers' Mutual Insurance Co., which examined insurance policy term
definitions specific to a "claims-based" legal liability policy.12 6 The two
alleged claims of malpractice in this case were an attorney's failure to
serve a stop notice on a construction project's lenders and a failure to
timely foreclose on a mechanic's lien.12 7 Although it was argued that
these were two separate claims, both warranting indemnification,128 the
California Supreme Court disagreed and treated them as a single
claim.129 Carolina Casualty argued that the reasoning employed in Bay
Cities is applicable to the facts at hand and that the Tenth Circuit should
reach a similar result.13 0 The majority agreed with Carolina Casualty,
stating that "it seems logical" to connect multiple acts of malpractice as
"related" in this instance because a single client, the Burkhardts, suffered
a single injury from a single attorney. 131
The final argument made by Carolina Casualty regarding whether
the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim in-
volved a Florida District Court of Appeals case in which "[t]he alleged
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *13.
123. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co, 586 F.3d 803, 812 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Mohrlang, 2009 WL 321706, at *1l (defining "logically connected" as "connected by an inevitable
or predictable interrelation or sequence of events")).
124. Id.
125. 855 P.2d 1263 (Cal. 1993).
126. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 812.
127. Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1264.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. Id. at 1266 ("[W]hen, as in this case, a single client seeks to recover from a single attomey
alleged damages based on a single debt collection matter for which the attorney was retained-there is
a single claim under the attorney's professional liability insurance policy.").
130. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813.
131. See id.
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acts of malpractice were the attorney's failure to name a hospital and
each individual physician from that hospital as defendants in a medical
malpractice lawsuit."' 32 Despite the defendant's assertion that his attor-
ney's failure to join several defendants is akin to multiple wrongful acts,
and therefore multiple claims, the court held otherwise. Using reason-
ing similar to Bay Cities, the court in Eagle American Insurance Co. v.
Nicholsl34 found that all of the attorney's acts of negligence led to a sin-
gle injury on the part of the plaintiff.135 Based on the arguments pre-
sented by Carolina Casualty and consideration of the Bay Cities and
Nichols cases, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Tester Letter and the
Malpractice Lawsuit alleged "related wrongful acts" under the insurance
policy and were therefore one "claim" for indemnification purposes. 136
With the "single claim" dispute resolved, the court turned its atten-
tion to whether Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the terms of the in-
surance policy.137 The term "insured" had five distinct definitions within
the policy, with the pertinent definition stating that "insured" means,
"any individual or professional corporation who was a partner, officer,
director, stockholder, or employee of the Named Insured or Predecessor
Firm, but solely while acting within the scope of their duties on behalf of
the Named Insured or Predecessor Firm . . . ."138 Again, finding no am-
biguity in the policy language, the court proceeded to analyze the lan-
guage of this definition in two parts.' 3 9
The first limitation the definition required was that the individual
"was a partner, officer, director, stockholder, or employee" of the named
insured.140 The court held it "undisputed" that Mr. Murphy was a co-
shareholder in Murphy & Berry, P.C. and that he therefore fit this first
requirement. 141
The second limitation on the definition of "insured" was a much
more crucial determination for the court to make and effectively became
the decisive interpretation in this case.142 In the court's analysis of the
language, "but solely while acting ... on behalf of the Named Insured,"
it stated:
This clause, when read in context with the rest of this definitional
subsection, cannot mean that an individual is an insured only while
132. Id. (citing Eagle Am. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 814 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002)).
133. Nichols, 814 So. 2d at 1085-87.
134. 814 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
135. Id. at 1087.
136. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 814-15.
140. Id. at 814.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 815.
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acting on behalf of the named insured, but must mean that an indi-
vidual is an insured only if the claim being made is related to that in-
dividual's duties on behalf of the named insured. Otherwise, no for-
mer employee of the named insured could ever be an "insured." If
"insured" were interpreted to mean that an individual was an insured
only while acting within the scope of business of the named insured,
it would be paradoxical to define "insured" to include former em-
ployees-any individual "who was a partner, officer, director, stock-
holder, or employee of the Named Insured," Timothy H. Berry,
P.C.143
The court then explained what it believed to be a "better" view of
the definition of insured as including "an individual after he has left the
law firm if the claim involves that individual's acts or omissions that
occurred while at the law firm."l44 Because Mr. Murphy was an "in-
sured" under the court's view of the definition and notice of the "claim"
was given to Mr. Murphy as an insured before the policy period com-
menced, the court held that Carolina Casualty was under no duty to de-
fend or indemnify the plaintiffs. 145 Without a duty to defend or indemnify
a claim, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim failed and affirmed the
judgment of the district court.146
D. The Dissent
Dissenting, Judge Lucero crafted a strongly worded response to the
majority, arguing that, by denying Mr. Berry "the very coverage for
which he paid premiums," Carolina Casualty received a windfall.147 By
redefining "notice" Judge Lucero asserted that the majority created an
"escape hatch" for insurers, allowing them to promise coverage and col-
lect premiums, yet avoid responsibility by failing to uphold their end of
the insurance agreement and refusing to indemnify the insured.148
The focus of the dissenting opinion centered on the interpretation of
the term "insured" and, ultimately, whether notice was given to an in-
sured during the policy period.149 Through the dissection, and piecing
back together, of the policy's definition of insured, Judge Lucero inter-
preted the term in a more straightforward manner. By extracting the su-
perfluous language unrelated to the facts in the current dispute, he found
a better reading to be, "An individual . . . who was a . .. stockholder of
the . . . Predecessor Firm is an insured, but solely while acting within the
scope of their duties on behalf of the . . . Predecessor Firm."150 Based on
143. Id at 814-15.
144. Id at 815.
145. Id
146. Id.
147. Id. at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 818 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the dissent's reading of Colorado's caselaw related to contract interpreta-
tion,15' and careful evaluation of the definition of "insured" in the policy,
Judge Lucero argued that Mr. Murphy was not an insured when he re-
ceived notice of the Burkhardts' claim through the Tester Letter.152
By applying "the plain and ordinary meaning of [the definition's]
terms," 53 the dissent determined that a former employee, or stockholder
in this instance, of a predecessor firm is not an insured when acting out-
side the scope of his duties on behalf of the firm. 15 4 In this instance, Mr.
Murphy was no longer working for Berry & Murphy, P.C. when he re-
ceived the Tester Letter, cannot be said to have been working on behalf
of Berry & Murphy, P.C. at that time, and was therefore not an insured
when notice was given to him.iss
Continuing with its plain language interpretation of "insured," the
dissent directly refuted the majority's obscuring of the definition.' 5 6 In
response to the majority's "paradoxical" argument,157 Judge Lucero ar-
gued that interpreting the definition according to the words' plain mean-
ing did not render it meaningless but instead made it consistent with what
one might expect: that it is unlikely that a former stockholder can receive
notice of a claim.15 After outlining instances in which a former stock-
holder can receive notice sufficient to fulfill the requirement of a
claim,159 Judge Lucero reiterated the majority's careless disregard of
Colorado caselaw.160
151. Id. at 817 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stein, 940 P.2d 384, 387 (Colo. 1997)
(stating that Colorado courts construe insurance policies "to promote the intent of the parties");
Parrish Chiropractic Ctrs., P.C. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 1049, 1055 (Colo. 1994)
("Where there is a written instrument, the intent of the parties is determined from the plain language
of the instrument itself."); Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo.
1992) (stating that courts should "not rewrite a contractual provision that is clear and unambiguous,
but must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms"); Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan,
753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988) ("However, where there is ambiguity or uncertainty as to coverage,
courts should construe the policy in favor of the insured.")).
152. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (citing Wota, 831 P.2d at 1309).
154. Id. at 818.
155. Id.
156. Id at 816 ("In construing the policy's definition of 'Insured,' the majority opinion misap-
plies Colorado law. At a minimum, that definition is ambiguous as to whether a former stockholder
is an insured for notice purposes.").
157. Id. at 815 (majority opinion) ("[I]t would be paradoxical to define 'insured' to include
former employees .... ).
158. See id. at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
159. Id. ("Only if it is established that a former stockholder has given notice in fact to his
previous employer may an issue of notice in this context be properly raised.. . . An individual can be
both a former stockholder and acting on behalf of her former law firm in certain circumstances. An
individual might semi-retire from the practice of law and renounce stockholder status, but take
occasional cases on behalf of her former firm on a contract basis.").
160. Id. at 819 (citing Pub. Serv. Co. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 931 (Colo. 1999) (con-
struing policy language in favor of the insured when it is "susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation")).
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In its conclusion, the dissent stated its belief that Mr. Murphy was
not an insured at the time he received the Tester Letter, and that the
claim was instead first made against an insured when Mr. Berry accepted
service of the Burkhardts' complaint. 16 1 Because Mr. Berry accepted
service on July 23, 2008, the claim was made within the policy period
and the dissent would therefore reverse the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Carolina Casualty.16 2
III. ANALYSIS
In Berry & Murphy, P.C., the Tenth Circuit properly interpreted es-
tablished precedent in determining that the Tester Letter and Malpractice
Lawsuit constituted a single claim, but the majority's interpretation of
the term "insured" resulted in a holding that was not only inequitable, but
one that could have potentially hazardous effects. By defining the term
"insured" to include former employees in instances where the claim in-
volves his acts or omissions while working at his former law firm, the
court disregarded Colorado insurance jurisprudence, which, if followed,
would have led to a different outcome. The Tenth Circuit has also given
such individuals powerful discretion when receiving notice of a claim,
leading to potentially damaging effects.
A. Interpretation of "Related Wrongful Acts"
Although not explicitly stated, the court's first determination of
whether the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit constituted related
wrongful acts was paramount.163 Had the court reached the opposite con-
clusion it is almost certain that the Tenth Circuit would have had to re-
verse the district court's ruling. If the majority had determined that these
were separate claims and adopted the appellant's arguments,164 the
court's subsequent analysis would have proceeded much differently by
analyzing whether Mr. Berry, not Mr. Murphy, was an insured. Mr.
Berry would therefore likely be entitled to coverage because the dispute
over the term "insured" involved Mr. Murphy's status due to the court's
finding that the Tester Letter constituted the first claim against the in-
sured. 165
Instead, the majority devoted the bulk of its opinion to carefully
analyzing the arguments on both sides of the issue and interpreting the
authority used by both Mr. Berry and Carolina Casualty.' 66 Throughout
161. Id. at 819.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 810 (majority opinion) (stating that the first determination to be made is whether the
Tester Letter and Malpractice suits are considered one claim, and failing to discuss the ramifications
if they are determined not to be related wrongful acts).
164. Brief for Appellant at 21-24, Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d
803 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1004), 2009 WL 1064884.
165. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814.
166. Id. at 810-14.
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its discussion of these proffered cases, the Tenth Circuit chose not to
restate or directly comment on the appellant's arguments and instead
opted for a streamlined analysis that simply related the law and previous
holdings to the facts at hand.16 7 In finding the Tester Letter and Malprac-
tice Lawsuit to constitute "related wrongful acts[,]" the court correctly
interpreted Mohrlang and Bay Cities,168 while refusing to accept the ap-
pellant's coherent but ultimately misguided arguments.
1. The Mohrlang Decision
In focusing on Mohrlang's recitation of the clear definitions set
forth in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary of "logically con-
nected"170 and "causally connected"'71 the majority properly distin-
guished Mr. Berry's argument. Because insurance contract cases are so
fact-specific, and policies are written in vastly different ways, the court's
reliance on the definitions set forth in Mohrlang allowed for a well-
reasoned decision on this point.17 2 Mr. Berry's argument that the Tester
Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit were not logically connected because the
failure to file disclosures was not a "predictable result" of proceeding
under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1 fell flat due to the appel-
lant's misinterpretation of the definition of the term.' 73 The court's
search for a "predictable interrelation" rather than a "predictable result"
is a more faithful reading of the definition and one that is certainly found
in this instance. While Rule 16.1 adheres in principle to the disclosure
guidelines of Rule 26,174 Rule 16.1 also sets forth strict disclosure dead-
lines.17 5 By failing to opt out of Rule 16.1, Mr. Murphy subjected himself
to the timeframes dictated by the rule. Although failing to fulfill these
requirements may not be a "result" of proceeding under Rule 16.1, as
Mr. Murphy may have failed to make disclosures regardless of his course
of action, this shortcoming is certainly "interrelated" to Rule 16.1 due to
its setting of disclosure deadlines. 76
167. Id. at 811-14.
168. Id.
169. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 21-24.
170. Prof" Solutinns Ins_ Co- v- Mobriang, No. 07-cv-02481-PAB-KLM, 2009 WL 321706, at
*11 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2009) (defining "logically connected" as "connected by an inevitable or
predictable interrelation or sequence of events").
171. Id. (defining "casually connected" as "connected where one person or thing brings about
the other").
172. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 812 (using the definitions of the terms "logically connected"
and "causally connected" only in relation to the facts at hand).
173. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 22.
174. COLO. R. Civ. P. 16.1 (k)(2) (stating that certain provisions of Rule 26 apply to disclosure
of expert witnesses).
175. Id. ("Written disclosures of experts shall be served by parties asserting claims 90 days
before trial; by parties defending against claims 60 days before trial; and parties asserting claims
shall serve written disclosures for any rebuttal experts 35 days before trial.").
176. Id.
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The court's failure to address the "causally connected" argument set
forth by the appellant likely stems from the fact that such an analysis was
unnecessary. 17 7 If the Tenth Circuit had applied the Mohrlang court's
definition, it would have been difficult to find a causal connection be-
tween the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit. Any causal connection
that may have existed between proceeding under Rule 16.1, as cited in
the Malpractice Lawsuit, and Mr. Murphy's failure to make adequate
disclosures, as mentioned in the Tester Letter, was certainly broken by a
deliberate choice not to comply with the rule.'78 However, due to the
operative word, "or" in the definition of "related wrongful acts" the
court's determination that the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
were logically connected was sufficient to end this inquiry.' 79
2. The Bay Cities Decision
In an apparent attempt to add weight to its decision that only one
claim had been made, the Tenth Circuit discussed a California Supreme
Court case that was also construed in favor of Carolina Casualty.180 The
appellant's argument that "the Tester Letter and the Malpractice Lawsuit
did not arise from the same underlying cause"i81 did not persuade the
court to find multiple claims because of the straightforward language
used in Bay Cities.182 An attempt to argue that the results of Mr. Mur-
phy's failures as set forth in the Tester Letter and Malpractice Lawsuit
were differentl83 was clearly out of line with the reasoning of the Bay
Cities' court. 184 On this point, the appellant relied on the fact that the
claim in the Tester Letter cites dismissal of the Ciri Lawsuit, and the
Malpractice Lawsuit cites malpractice that did not lead to dismissal of
the Ciri Lawsuit.'8 However, as the majority properly pointed out, the
circumstances here included a single client, a single attorney, and a sin-
gle claim for which Mr. Murphy was retained. 186 Regarding the result, it
is also true that the Burkhardts suffered a single harm.187 Again, the
Tenth Circuit correctly applied persuasive authority despite the refusal to
directly comment on the appellant's argument.
177. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 (defining "related wrongful acts" as logically or caus-
ally connected).
178. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 19-21.
179. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 809 (defining "related wrongful acts" as logically or caus-
ally connected).
180. Id. at 812-13.
181. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 28.
182. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813 (discussing Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Law-
yers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1275 (Cal. 1993)).
183. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 27-28.
184. See Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1266.
185. Brief for Appellant, supra note 164, at 27-29.
186. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 813.
187. Id. (agreeing that the single harm which the Burkhardts suffered was "the lost opportunity
to recover some or all of their damages in the Ciri Lawsuit").
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B. Interpretation of "Insured"
One difficulty faced by the court, and one potential reason for the
stark difference between the majority and dissent's interpretations of the
term "insured," is that the term's definition varies greatly depending on
the type of insurance policy in which it is used.188 To make matters more
difficult, Colorado case law does not set forth a standard definition of
"insured" as used in a malpractice liability insurance policy, which is
likely due to the variable nature of insurance policies.189 Additionally, the
Colorado Revised Statutes do not provide any guidance because the term
"insured" is omitted from the definitions section of Title 10, Insurance.190
While "insurer" is defined,191 along with twenty-seven other terms and
phrases, the Colorado Legislature did not include a standard definition
for "insured."1 92
Faced with these uncertainties, the majority proceeded to improp-
erly craft a definition of this key term. While the Tenth Circuit should be
commended for its threshold determination that the Tester Letter and
Malpractice Lawsuit constituted a single claim, it should not be similarly
lauded for its interpretation of the term "insured." After deciding that the
Tester Letter constituted the initial claim, the appellant's right to indem-
nification hinged on whether Mr. Murphy was considered an insured
under the language of the policy at the time he received the letter. In de-
ciding that Mr. Murphy was in fact an insured, the majority created a
class of insured individuals that was likely not anticipated by the appel-
lant at the inception of the insurance policy.
1. The Majority's Definition
Mr. Murphy received the Tester Letter prior to the commencement
of the insurance policy at issue.193 Therefore, under the conditions of the
claims-made agreement, Mr. Murphy's judicially created status as an
insured caused the claim to be made outside the policy period,194 fore-
closing Berry & Murphy, P.C. from receiving indemnification.'9 5 In the
majority's brief discussion of this important issue, the Tenth Circuit's
188. JOHN W. GRUND, J. KENT MILLER & GRADEN P. JACKSON, 7A COLO. PRAC., PERSONAL
INJURY TORTS AND INSURANCE § 47.5 (2d ed. 2010).
189. See generally id.
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-1-102 (2006).
191. Id. ("'Insurer' means every person engaged as principal, indemnitor, surety, or contractor
in the business of making contracts of insurance.").
192. See id.
193. See Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Insur. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 805-07 (10th Cir.
2009).
194. Id. at 806-07. By determining that Mr. Murphy was an "insured" under the language of
the claims-made policy effective from February 6, 2008 to February 6, 2009, the court foreclosed
Berry & Murphy, P.C.'s opportunity to report a claim during the policy period because Mr. Murphy
had received the Tester Letter on January 10, 2007, constituting notice of the Malpractice Lawsuit.
Because this notice came before the inception of the claims-made policy, the claim was not made
during the policy period and Carolina Casualty avoided liability.
195. Id. at 815.
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decision turns a blind eye to Colorado precedent and distorts the lan-
guage of the insurance policy to fit the Court's ideals.
The majority begins its analysis of this topic by determining that
there is no ambiguity in the policy's definition of insured.19 6 However,
after a short discussion of the definition's third subsection and its limita-
tions, the court states what it believes to be a "better" view of the term
"insured."' 9 7 What the court appears to have done is rewrite the policy's
definition. Colorado insurance law explicitly states that courts should
"not rewrite a contractual provision that is clear and unambiguous,"' 9 8 a
point of law that the Tenth Circuit did not follow. In the majority's at-
tempt to avoid calling the language ambiguous, which would have led to
the court necessarily having to construe the policy in favor of the in-
sured,199 it instead implicitly decided there was an ambiguity by not only
rewriting the language but by acknowledging that it is susceptible to
more than one reading.2oo Through making these two points in its hold-
ing, the court creates a definition that is neither based on the clarity of
the policy language, nor construed in favor of the insured. Instead, the
court created a definition that protects Carolina Casualty and all other
malpractice insurance policy providers from defending and indemnifying
insured parties when a former employee receives notice of a claim.
2. The Dissent's Definition
In response to the majority's reading that was "wholly unmoored
from the text of the policy and violates Colorado jurisprudence regarding
insurance contract interpretation,"2 01 the dissent proposed a reading of
"insured" that is perfectly in-line with the policy's language.2 02 Due to a
lack of technical or specialized meaning in the words of the definition,
the dissent agreed that "the plain and ordinary meaning" of the words
should be adopted.203 In determining that Mr. Murphy was not an insured
204at the time he received the Tester Letter, the dissent made a proper
determination without having to side-step Colorado law.205 The dissent's
196. Id. at 814.
197. Id. at 815 ("In our opinion, the better view is that 'insured' is defined to include an indi-
vidual after he has left the law firm if the claim involves that individual's acts or omissions that
occurred while at the law firm.").
198. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992).
199. Republic Ins. Co. v. Jernigan, 753 P.2d 229, 232 (Colo. 1988).
200. See Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 815 n.6. Although the court reiterates the belief that the
language is clear and unambiguous, it proceeds to rebut the dissent's opinion that the majority is
misapplying the term "insured" in various situations. Id.
201. Id. at 817 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 818.
203. Id. (quoting Wota, 831 P.2d at 1309) (intemal quotation marks omitted).
204. Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 818 (Lucero, J., dissenting) ("Murphy is an insured for the
purposes of certain acts (acts committed within the scope of his duties on behalf of his former firm)
but not others (acts committed outside the scope of his duties). There is no dispute that Murphy was
not acting on behalf of Berry & Murphy, P.C. when he received the Tester Letter, thus notice to him
was not notice to an insured.").
205. See id. (determining that Mr. Murphy was not an insured).
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clear logic206 not only serves the best interest of public policy, it is also in
line with Colorado insurance and contract jurisprudence.207
3. Additional Jurisprudence
Because insurance policies take on many forms, determining who is
an "insured" under individual policies requires careful interpretation of
the policy language. Typically, those named on the declarations page are
considered "named insured" and coverage is extended to those individu-
als and entities.2 08 However, beyond those qualified as named insured,
discrepancies begin to arise when determining whom the policy cov-
ers. 209 In Berry & Murphy, the Tenth Circuit was not faced with a par-
ticularly unique challenge but nonetheless could have used decisions
from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey as
210guidance.21
In Jolley v. Marquess,211 the New Jersey Appellate Court was also
faced with the task of interpreting the definition of "insured" in a claims-
made malpractice liability policy, albeit under a set of circumstances
distinguishable from Berry & Murphy.212 In Jolley, Marquess was a for-
mer partner and employee of the law firm Marquess, Morrison, and
Trimble, P.A. (MMT).213 After leaving MMT, Marquess retained his title
of "senior trial attorney" with MMT and continued to represent one of
214his former firm's clients on an insurance matter. When a malpractice
lawsuit was filed against Marquess, MMT's insurance carrier, Zurich,
206. Id. ("According to the majority, 'but solely while acting within the scope of their duties on
behalf of a predecessor firm 'cannot mean that an individual is an insured only while acting on
behalf of a predecessor firm. Yet that is precisely how 'Insured' is defined in the policy.").
207. See Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo., 831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992) ("An
insurance policy is a contract and should be construed in accordance with general principles of
contractual interpretation."); Heller v. Fire Ins. Exch., 800 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Colo. 1990) ("To ascer-
tain whether certain provisions of an agreement are ambiguous, the language used must be examined
and construed in harmony with the plain, popular, and generally accepted meaning of the words
employed and with reference to all provisions of the document."); Terranova v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1990) ("In the absence of an ambiguity, an insurance policy
must be given effect according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms."); Urtado v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 528 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1974) ("Considering the contract as a whole, we cannot say that it
is ambiguous. Since it is not, this court may not rewrite it nor limit its effect by strained construc-
tion.").
208. John M. Palmeri & Franz Hardy, Protecting Your Law Practice: Malpractice Insurance
Basics, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 45, 46.
209. See Jolley v. Marquess, 923 A.2d 264, 271 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (interpreting
whether or not a former employee is an insured); See also London, Anderson & Hoeft, Ltd. v. Minn.
Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that only
named lawyers could be held liable for deductable).
210. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 264.
211. 923 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007).
212. Id. at 271.
213. Id. at 267.
214. Id. at 268. The distinguishing fact that Marquess retained his title of "senior trial attorney"
does not defeat the fact that the New Jersey Appellate Court was faced with a nearly identical task as
the 10th Circuit of interpreting the word "insured" in a claims-made malpractice liability insurance
policy. Id.
463
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
denied coverage arguing that Marquess was not a named insured at the
time any alleged malpractice may have occurred.2 15 The Jolley court then
had to determine if Marquess fit the definition of insured as stated in the
policy.21
6
In determining that Marquess was in fact an insured,2 17 the Jolley
court analyzed policy language nearly identical to that in Berry & Mur-
phy.218 The provision at issue read, "[t]he unqualified word 'insured',
whenever used in this policy means: ... (d) any former partner, officer,
director, or stockholder employee of the firm or predecessor firms named
in the Declaration while acting solely in a professional capacity on behalf
of such firms." 219 This is strikingly similar to the language in Berry &
Murphy, with the greatest difference being the substitution of "within the
scope of their duties" in the Carolina Casualty policy 2 20 for "solely in a
professional capacity" in the Zurich policy.221
The Jolley court, unlike the majority in Berry & Murphy, deter-
mined that this subsection of the definition was ambiguous and focused
on construing it in "conformity [with] public policy and principles of
fairness."222 With these principles in mind, the Jolley court construed the
policy language in favor of Marquess-and to the detriment of the insur-
ance company. 223 Stating that subsection (d) was limited to those former
employees who are "representing a party who remains a client of the
insured firm," 224 the Jolley court made a ruling that was favorable to the
insured in this case and that should have provided guidance to the Tenth
Circuit in its attempt to interpret the policy language.
First, this seemingly plain language was determined to be suscepti-
ble to multiple interpretations,225 just as the policy language in Berry &
Murphy could have been determined to be ambiguous.226 Had Berry &
Murphy decided that the language was ambiguous in the same manner,
established precedent may have forced a substantially different outcome.
215. Id. at 269. While the argument in this case is opposite that of the argument in Berry &
Murphy, in that the insurance company in Jolley is arguing that Marquess is not an insured, the fact
still remains that both the New Jersey Appellate Court and the 10th Circuit were faced with nearly
identical tasks in interpreting the term "insured" in claims-made malpractice liability insurance
policies. Id.
216. Id. at 271.
217. Id. at 272-73.
218. See id. at 270-71.
219. Id. (emphasis omitted).
220. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 814 (10th Cir. 2009).
221. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 271.
222. Id. at 272 (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J.
1992)).
223. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 273.
224. Id. at 272.
225. See id
226. See Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 816-19 (10th Cir.
2009) (Lucero, J., dissenting). Multiple interpretations are evidenced by the fact that the dissent's
interpretation deviated greatly from the majority. Id
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Second, the definition employed by the Jolley court could have guided
the court in Berry & Murphy. If the majority interpreted the definition of
insured in a similar manner to Jolley when it ruled that acting "solely in a
professional capacity on behalf of such firms" is limited to instances
where a former attorney is representing a party who remains a client of
the insured firm,227 Mr. Murphy surely would not have been considered
an insured.
C. Practical Effects of Holding
By creating a class of insured individuals who are no longer part-
ners or employees of a law firm, yet are still considered "insured" when
they receive a claim based on acts or omissions that took place while
employed at their former law firm, 228 the Tenth Circuit has created a
situation in which law firms may not receive coverage for the premiums
they are paying.229 Based on this holding, the Tenth Circuit has devel-
oped disturbing precedent with potentially severe consequences for law-
yers, law firms, and insurance companies alike. In the wake of this deci-
sion a potentially hazardous set of circumstances may arise when former
employees are faced with the discretion to notify their former employer
of a potential or actual claim.
In light of this holding, law firms are now at the mercy of their for-
mer employees when an injured client sends notice of a potential mal-
practice claim directly to the attorney who is being accused of malprac-
tice, rather than to the law firm itself. As was seen in Berry & Murphy,
the former employee is then faced with the sole decision of whether or
not to tell his former law firm about the claim. Even when the former
employee heeds the advice of the client and informs his insurance carrier
of the potential lawsuit, the former law firm remains in great danger of
230 weeabeing denied coverage. In cases where an employee was fired from his
position as an attorney, or decided to leave his law firm as a result of a
bad business relationship with his employer, the Tenth Circuit now gives
these individuals the power to vindictively withhold knowledge of a
claim with the intention of financially damaging his former employer. By
simply taking out an individual malpractice liability insurance policy
upon leaving a law firm, former employees are able to rest assured that
they will be covered in the event a claim is made against them but will
also be able to take comfort in the idea that withholding information of a
claim against their former employer will not affect them as an individual.
227. Jolley, 923 A.2d at 272.
228. See Berry & Murphy, 586 F.3d at 814-15.
229. Id at 816 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
230. Although Mr. Murphy took the advice of the Tester Letter and put his malpractice insur-
ance carrier on notice, Carolina Casualty nonetheless escaped liability. See id.
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1. Curing the Effects
One possible remedy to this unfortunate outcome would be for
courts to employ an "impossibility" doctrine in claims-made insurance
policies. In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis,2 3 1 the Florida
Supreme Court noted that "if an impossibility prevented notice being
given to an insurer at the very end of the policy period, it may well be
that an insured would be relieved of giving notice during the period of
such impossibility." 232 Although that issue was not before the court, it
held the possibility open for future cases. 2 33 It would certainly be in the
best interest of insured parties if courts were to recognize the impossibil-
ity doctrine when a law firm does not receive notice of a claim within a
policy period because notice was first given to a former employee. When
situations such as this arise, courts could then look to when the insured
law firm, rather than the former employee, received notice of the claim
when determining whether a claim was made within the policy period.
This recognition of impossibility would be in line with the idea set forth
by the Florida Supreme Court but would extend to claims made before
the policy period began, rather than notice given after the policy period
expired.
An additional approach that can be taken to cure the outcome of
Berry & Murphy is legislative intervention. In Colorado, claims-made
insurance policies are subject to regulation by the Insurance Commis-
sioner under Colorado Revised Statute § 10-4-419, Claims-made policy
forms.234 Within this statute, mandatory disclosures and alerts to the in-
sured are set forth, including the following:
(A) A description of the principal benefits and coverage provided in
the policy;
(B) A statement of the exceptions, reductions, and limitations con-
tained in the policy;
(C) A statement of the renewal provisions including any reservation
by the insurer of a right to change premiums;
(D) A statement that the outline of coverage is a summary of the pol-
icy issued or applied for and that the policy should be consulted to
determine governing contractual provisions. 235
Beyond these disclosures, § 10-4-419 requires that the policy in-
clude numerous additional definitions and provisions and governs vari-
231. 433 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1983).
232. Id. at 515 n.1.
233. Id.
234. COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-419 (2010).
235. Id.
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ous other aspects of claims-made policies. 236 The term "insured," how-
ever, is not set forth in this statute, and insurers are not required to meet
any statutory guidelines or follow any regulations when defining this
important term in insurance policies. 237 An amendment to this statute
requiring clear, unambiguous definitions of key terms such as "insured,"
and a requirement that such definitions be submitted and reviewed by the
Insurance Commissioner would undoubtedly be in the best interest of
public policy because such requirements would reduce or even eliminate
the risk of litigation. While it may be impractical to list every person
covered by the insurance policy as a named insured, all parties involved
would benefit from a clearer understanding of exactly who is covered
through the use of straightforward explanations of troublesome terms.
A final recommendation for curing the effects of this ruling is for
lawyers and law firms to take a proactive approach with their insurance
policies. Because the changing structure of a law firm has the ability to
negatively impact insurance coverage, 238 partners and stockholders
should inform their insurance company when attorneys are no longer
employed with the firm. This simple step of informing an insurance
company, or inquiring about potential ramifications, can put the carrier
on notice that an employee is no longer a member of the firm, and the
insured law firm can be confident that former employees who receive
notices of claims will have no bearing over their malpractice insurance
coverage.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., the Tenth
Circuit properly construed the insurance policy's definition of "related
wrongful acts" but improperly rewrote the definition of "insured" to fit
the court's ideals. In doing so, the court failed to follow established
Colorado precedent in its analysis and created a class of insured indi-
viduals who now carry a dangerous amount of discretion. All attorneys
carrying malpractice liability insurance should understand the potential
consequences of this ruling, and the judiciary and legislature should be-
gin to take notice of alternative measures that can be taken to cure this
inequitable result. It seems clear that when a court rewrites the definition
of a term within an insurance policy, an ambiguity has arisen, and the
beneficiary of such an ambiguity should be the insured.
236. Id. (including, but not limited to, definitions of events and conditions which trigger cover-
age, a provision that guarantees the ability to purchase an extended reporting period upon cancella-
tion or nonrenewal, and mandatory submission of new claims-made policy forms to the Insurance
Commissioner before such forms are used).
237. See id.
238. See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J.
LEGAL PROF. 41, 55 (2004).
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A CIRCUIT SPLIT SURVEY ON VIOLENT FELONIES AND
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: WHERE DOES THE TENTH CIRCUIT
STAND?
INTRODUCTION
Criminal recidivism was a buzzword in the media, Congress, and
the criminal justice system long before the "crime wave" of the 1980s
and the subsequent "War on Drugs." Congress began to target career
criminals after social research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed
a small number of "habitual offenders" were responsible for a large por-
tion of crimes.' During the mid-to-late 1980s, Congress and the Federal
Sentencing Commission took action to isolate recidivist criminals and
ensure their removal from the general public via incarceration. However,
it seems that the ambiguity in both Congress's Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) 2 and the United States' Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) 3 has
largely served to increase litigation and divide the federal court system.
The ACCA increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a felon
in possession of a firearm,4 from 10 years to 15 years if the person has
three previous, separate convictions for a "violent felony" or a serious
drug offense.5 Similarly, the USSG increases a person's base offense
level depending on previous convictions for a "crime of violence."6 For
example, a person would receive a base offense level of at least 24,7 if he
or she committed the instant offense after having two or more felony
1. James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the US. Sentencing Guide-
lines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 537, 545 (2009).
2. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (instituting mandatory prison
terms of not less than fifteen years for certain repeat offenders).
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2K2.1, 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2010) (defining
offense levels for crimes related to firearms and unlawfully entering or remaining in the United
States).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (defining the unlawful act of felon in possession of a firearm).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1.
7. Base offense levels are points assigned to defendants based on the offense committed,
their prior criminal convictions, and specific circumstances of those crimes, i.e. whether the crimes
were committed while serving a criminal justice sentence (probation, parole, work release, etc.), id. §
4A1 1(d), or with a weapon, id. § 4B1.4. These points are designed to reflect the likelihood of re-
cidivism and future criminal behavior of defendants with prior criminal histories. Courts are to
determine the relevant offense guideline section from chapter two of the USSG based on the offense
of conviction or the offense to which the defendant stipulated. Id. § I B 1.1. The base offense level
of a crime is determined in chapter two and may be adjusted based on the criteria listed in chapter
three (e.g. adjustments related to the victim, the defendant's role in the offense, and whether the
defendant accepted responsibility). Id. chs. 2, 3, pts. A, B, E. For example, burglary of a residence
is given a base offense level of 17 in chapter two, but may be adjusted to 15 because the defendant
"clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his offense." Id. §§ 2B2.1, § 3E1.L. How-
ever, criminal history of crime of violence may increase the base level according to sections 2K2.1
and 4A1.l.
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convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.8
Predictably, the issues that are most often litigated when dealing with the
ACCA, the USSG, or both are the definition and scope of "violent fel-
ony" and "crime of violence."
In the Tenth Circuit alone, between September 1, 2009 and August
31, 2010, there were six cases addressing the application of the recidi-
vism sentencing enhancements of the ACCA and the USSG. 9 Other cir-
cuits faced many of the same legal issues and published their own opin-
ions, sometimes in harmony with the Tenth Circuit, and other times
promulgating a different interpretation of the USSG or ACCA, creating a
circuit split.10 Furthermore, cases in all circuits have relied upon various
precedents in their opinions, exhibiting a rich body of USSG and ACCA
law.
This Comment surveys recent Tenth Circuit ACCA and USSG case
law during the period of September 2009 through August 2010, and
highlights some of the critical questions dividing the circuits. First, this
Comment provides background on the ACCA and USSG. Next, it gives
an overview of the law common to ACCA and USSG interpretations and
briefs the relevant cases in recent Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. The third
section discusses recent circuit splits regarding the characterization of
convictions for fleeing a police officer and the definition of "burglary of
a dwelling." And finally, this Comment analyzes the controversy of us-
ing juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses under the ACCA and
predicts how the Tenth Circuit may rule on the issue.
I. THE STATUTES
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act: Violent Felonies
Passed in 1984, the ACCA is just one federal law aimed at recidi-
vists. t' The text of the ACCA provides:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [by
being a felon in possession of a firearm] and has three previous con-
victions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(2).
9. United States v. Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. McConnell, 605
F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to interpret
a violation of fleeing a peace officer statute as a "crime of violence" under the USSG in contrast to
Wise and McConnell); United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
the enumerated felony of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG in contrast to Rivera-Oros).
]1. United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 1992); H.R. REP. No. 98-1159, at 4
(1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006) (federal "Three Strikes Law").
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committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall
be fined ... and imprisoned not less than fifteen years ... .12
The statute defines "serious drug offense," "violent felony," and
"conviction," in subsections (2)(A) through (C), respectively 3 :
(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delin-
quency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destruc-
tive device that would be punishable by imprisonment of such term if
committed by an adult, that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another; and
(C) the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person has com-
mitted an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.14
The phrase, "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious po-
tential risk of physical injury to another," is referred to as the "residual
provision" of the ACCA15 and it is the source of frequent litigation, and
the topic of several Supreme Court opinions.16
In Taylor v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court defined the generic
definition of "burglary" under the ACCA as an "unlawful or unprivileged
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit
a crime."1 When a state statute defines burglary more broadly than this
generic definition, a court can look to the charging document and other
records to determine if the necessary Taylor elements were satisfied.' 9
B. United States Sentencing Guidelines: Crimes of Violence
Three years after the passage of the ACCA, federal sentencing
guidelines created a structure for increasing base offense levels20 accord-
12. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
13. § 924(e)(2)(A)-(C).
14. § 924(e)(2)(B)-(C).
15. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2010).
16. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 129 S.
Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192
(2007); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
17. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
18. Id. at 599.
19. Id. at 602.
20. The Introductory Commentary to chapter four of the USSG states that a defendant with
prior criminal history is more culpable than a first time offender, and as such, deserves greater pun-
ishment. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2010). In addition,
base offense levels can be increased or decreased based on the adjustment categories enumerated in
chapter three and within individual offense guidelines in chapter two. Id. ch. 3; see, e.g.,id § 2Al.2.
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ing to previous convictions for "crimes of violence" or a "controlled sub-
stance offense." 21 The Application Notes for the USSG cross-reference
section 4B1.2(a) for the definition of a crime of violence. Section
4B1.2(a) is strikingly similar to the ACCA definition of crime of vio-
lence, and in fact, the biggest difference is the ACCA's enumerated fel-
ony of "burglary," versus "burglary of a dwelling" in the USSG.22 The
definition reads:
The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or
state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of ex-
plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.23
Similar to the ACCA, the "otherwise involves" phrase of the USSG
is referred to as the residual clause.24 As to convictions, the USSG disal-
25lows juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses. A crime committed
by a person under eighteen does not qualify as a predicate offense unless
"it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the defendant was convicted." 2 6
A key issue of contention among the circuits is whether the ACCA
enumerated offense of "burglary" and the USSG enumerated offense of
"burglary of a dwelling" are limited to immutable, physical structures.
Taylor's general definition of "burglary" is specifically limited to "build-
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1.
22. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B 1.2(a). Interestingly, the USSG also provides for increasing base offense levels if the defendant
had been deported after "a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; [or] (iv) a
child pomography offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Not only
does the deportation section provide more enumerated offenses for a level increase, but it also lists
twelve enumerated offenses that constitute a crime of violence, as opposed to the four for persons
who are not subject to deportation. § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (enumerated crimes are: murder, man-
slaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the
conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary,
incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extor-
tionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling). This difference is at issue in the Tenth Circuit
case of United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a).
24. E.g., United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. A predicate offense in the
context of a discussion about the ACCA and USSG is a prior conviction that qualifies as a "violent
felony" or "crime of violence" and thus produces a sentencing enhancement under the Act or the
Guidelines, or both.
26. Id. Thus, in the state of Colorado, a juvenile convicted of a crime in adult criminal court
under the direct file statute, COLD. REV. STAT. § 19-2-517 (2010), would likely be subject to future
sentencing enhancements under the USSG.
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ing[s] or structure[s],"2  and specifies that state statutes including auto-
mobiles, vending machines, and tents as structures are too broad.28 In
interpreting "burglary of a dwelling," the Tenth Circuit holds that con-
duct constituting such a crime is a subtype of burglary, and therefore,
requires a separate general definition. 29 The Tenth Circuit does not limit
the Taylor definition to buildings or structures used as dwellings, but
defines "burglary of a dwelling" as burglary of "any enclosed space that
is used or intended for use as a human habitation." 30 The Ninth Circuit
disagrees and applies the Taylor definition, limiting the definition of
dwelling to buildings and structures not including automobiles, vending
machines, and tents.3 ' The Ninth Circuit concludes that Washington resi-
dential burglary is beyond the scope of a "crime of violence" because the
statutory definition of "dwelling" includes places that are not struc-
tures.32
II. THE CASE LAW
When interpreting crimes of violence and violent felonies, the cir-
cuit courts deal with several preliminary issues that are noted here to
provide background for discussion of the following opinions. First,
whether a prior offense is a crime of violence or a violent felony is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo by the appellate circuits. 33
Second, because of the similar language in the definitions of "crime
of violence" and "violent felony," the Tenth Circuit and other courts
generally look to their own precedent for categorizing a crime as a vio-
lent felony under the ACCA when dealing with the same crime under the
USSG, and vice versa.34
Finally, when deciding whether a conviction for an enumerated fel-
ony in a given state is a conviction for the offense as intended by Con-
gress or the Sentencing Commission, courts typically use a categorical
27. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
28. See id. at 602.
29. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009).
30. Id. at 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2003).
32. Id. at 972-73.
33. E.g., United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 2010); Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1125.
34. E.g., Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1173 ("This language is very similar to the ACCA language
defining the term violent felony. And we have looked to interpretations of the ACCA to guide our
reading of § 4B1.2(a)."); United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) ("The residual
clause of the ACCA is worded almost identically to that of § 4B1.2(a), and we have held that in
interpreting 'crime of violence' under § 4B13.2, we may look for guidance to cases construing the
ACCA's parallel provision."); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 724 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Al-
though the Gordon court was analyzing whether an offense constituted a 'violent felony' under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, we employ the same test to decide whether and offense constitutes a
'crime of violence' under the Sentencing Guidelines because the definitions of 'violent felony' and
'crime of violence' are virtually identical.").
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approach to analyze the state's criminal statute. 3 5 This categorical ap-
proach requires that courts look at the text of the statute to make its de-
termination and not consider the underlying facts of the defendant's
case.36 However, in instances where the offense could have been com-
mitted in a number of ways or where the offense includes both conduct
that falls under the ACCA or USSG and conduct that does not, courts
will look to the charging documents, plea agreements, and other court
records to see with what specific crime the defendant was charged.3 7
Courts do not consider the specific conduct of the defendant in this modi-
fied approach, but rather, consider the record to determine with which
subsection of the statute the defendant was charged, and thus, which sub-
section the court should examine on its face.38 This paradigm is called
the modified categorical approach.39
A. Tenth Circuit Survey
The cases discussed below are seven of the most recent Tenth Cir-
cuit cases regarding the application of the ACCA and the USSG.
1. United States v. Strah1o
In 1988, Mr. Strahl pled guilty to possession of firearms after being
convicted of a felony. Accordingly, the court then considered his 1968
California conviction for burglary, his 1975 Utah conviction for at-
tempted burglary, and his 1979 Utah conviction for burglary as predicate
offenses and increased his sentence from 5 years to 15 years, as required
under the ACCA at the time.4 1 The defendant appealed his enhanced
sentence, arguing that California's definition of burglary is outside the
generic definition of burglary, and attempted burglary is not a predicate
offense under the ACCA.42
35. E.g., Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1127.
36. Id. ("To determine whether a previous conviction satisfies the generic meaning of the
offense, ordinarily we apply 'a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions
of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions."' (quoting Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990))). This categorical approach is similar to the approach
taken by courts in deciding if a felony was "inherently dangerous" under the Felony Murder Rule. In
cases where the Felony Murder Rule has been applied to a defendant who did not commit one of the
enumerated felonies (burglary, arson, robbery, rape, or kidnapping), the court views the felony
statute in the abstract (language only) and does not consider the underlying facts of the case at hand.
If the felony could be completed in a safe manner, then, similar to when a crime falls outside of a
generic definition of an enumerated offense, the Felony Murder Rule (or the ACCA or USSG), does
not apply. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 526-27 (5th ed. 2009).
37. Eg., Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144 (The modified approach "look[s] to the statutory elements,
the defendant's charging documents, plea agreement and colloquy (if any), and uncontested facts
found by the district judge to determine whether the particular defendant's conduct violated the
portion of the statute that is a crime of violence").
38. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825.
39. Id; see also Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144.
40. 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 982. At the time Mr. Strahl pled guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm charge,
the sentence was five years imprisonment. Id.
42. Strahl, 958 F.2d at 982-83.
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The Strahl court found that the district court erred in considering
both the California and Utah convictions. 4 3 The court found the Califor-
nia conviction not to be a "violent felony" because the California defini-
tion of burglary is outside the generic definition of burglary given by the
Supreme Court." In Taylor, the Supreme Court defined burglary under
the ACCA as an "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit a crime."45
Furthermore, when a state defines burglary more broadly by elimi-
nating the requirement of unlawful entry or including automobiles and
vending machines as structures, the court may look to jury instructions
and indictment information to determine if the necessary elements of
burglary were charged.4 6 The Strahl court references California case law
to show that its definition of burglary is a non-generic definition because
it does not require unlawful entry and it includes places other than build-
47
ings and structures. Moreover, in reviewing the charging document as
per a modified categorical approach, the court found that Strahl's entry
into a store with intent to commit a felony or theft did not satisfy the
Taylor definition because he was not charged with unlawful entry of the
store.48 Therefore, because Strahl's conduct did not fall within the Taylor
definition of burglary, his prior conviction did not constitute a predicate
offense.
As to the issue of attempt, the Tenth Circuit decided that the defen-
dant's attempted burglary conviction was not a predicate offense because
Utah's definition of attempt includes attenuated conduct that does not
present a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 49 After
reviewing the legislative history of the ACCA, the court found that Con-
gress included burglary as an enumerated offense primarily because it is
a crime that is perpetrated by many repeat offenders and because it poses
the serious risk of violent confrontation with investigating officers or
occupants of the building.o The court noted that a defendant in Utah
could be convicted of attempted burglary based on duplicating a key,
surveilling the targeted building, or obtaining floor plans, none of which
create a "high risk of violent confrontation inherent in a completed bur-
glary."51 Thus, a conviction for attempted burglary under the Utah statute
52is not a predicate offense under the ACCA's residual clause.
43. Id. at 984, 986.
44. Id. at 983-84.
45. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
46. See Strahl, 958 F.2d at 983-84 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). This is an example of a
modified categorical approach.
47. Strahl, 958 F.2d at 983.
48. Id at 984.
49. Id. at 986.
50. Id. at 985.
51. Id. at 986.
52. Id.
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2. United States v. Permenter,53 United States v. Fell,54 & United
States v. Martinez
The Permenter court used the Strahl analysis to reverse an en-
hanced ACCA sentence based on an Oklahoma attempted burglary
charge.56 The court found that because the Oklahoma attempt statute
provided that "any act" directed toward the completion of the substantive
offense constituted attempt, it was not a violent felony.5 7 The court rea-
soned that a defendant's conduct would not pose a serious potential risk
to others.
The Tenth Circuit reconsidered its inchoate offense analysis in Fell
and Martinez in light of the Supreme Court decision in James v. United
States.59 Contrary to the other cases in this section, James found at-
tempted burglary to be a violent felony because Florida case law had
limited the definition of attempted burglary to a significant step toward
entry of a building or structure.60 This narrowed definition reflected the
main risk of burglary: violent confrontation with the building's occu-
pants or law enforcement.61
In its opinion, the James Court held that courts should only look at
the elements of the predicate inchoate offense to determine whether it
presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, not at the elements
of the underlying substantive offense.62 The Tenth Circuit in Fell stated
that, by holding that only elements of the inchoate crimes should be con-
sidered, James rejected the Circuit's approach in Strahl and Permenter.63
The Tenth Circuit first applied the James methodology in Fell. The
Fell court determined that conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary
in Colorado is not a violent felony under the ACCA because-in analyz-
ing the statutory elements of conspiracy rather than second-degree bur-
glary-the court held that, in Colorado, conspiracy does not require an
act directed toward entry of a building, and therefore, there is no poten-
tial risk of serious injury to another.64
53. 969 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1992).
54. 511 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. 602 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2010).
56. Permenter, 969 F.2d at 915.
57. Id. at 913.
58. Id.
59. 550 U.S. 192, 202-09 (2007) (finding Florida attempted burglary a violent felony under
the ACCA because Florida law defined attempted burglary as a significant step towards entry of the
building or structure, and therefore did not criminalize attenuated conduct. The Florida definition
also reflected the main risk of burglary-violent confrontation).
60. Id. at 202, 209.
61. Id. at 203.
62. Id. at 208.
63. Fell, 511 F.3d at 1039-40.
64. Id. at 1041-43.
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When the inchoate issue was again considered in Martinez, the
Tenth Circuit-employing the reasoning in James-focused on the par-
ties' arguments as to whether Arizona law had limited the definition of
attempted burglary to a significant step towards entry into a building as
the Florida courts had done in James.65 The Tenth Circuit was not per-
suaded in Martinez that Arizona attempt law was narrowed to exclude
preparatory conduct; the Tenth Circuit found that the Arizona Supreme
Court has never used the "substantial step test," and even if that test had
been adopted, a substantial step towards the completion of a burglary can
still include the attenuated conduct unaddressed by the James court and
66at issue in the Strahl progeny.
In line with the cases proceeding from Strahl, the Tenth Circuit
found that "[i]f one can commit the offense of attempted burglary in
many ways without an act directed toward entry of the building, the risk
of physical injury to another is too speculative to satisfy the residual pro-
vision of [the ACCA]."6 7 Once again, only looking at the elements of the
inchoate offense, the Circuit concludes that Arizona has not similarly
limited its attempted burglary definition because, like Strahl and Per-
menter, attenuated conduct such as "casing" a building qualifies as an
attempted burglary. 68 Thus, Martinez's Arizona attempt conviction was
not a predicate offense under the ACCA.
Martinez, however, had a second holding. On the basis of his Ari-
zona attempted burglary conviction, the defendant challenged both his
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA and his increased base offense
level under the USSG.70 In a split holding, the Tenth Circuit held that
while attempted burglary was not a violent felony in Arizona, it is a
crime of violence under the USSG.7' To interpret Sentencing Guideline
language, the court looked to the Sentencing Commission's commentary,
which "is binding and authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or
a federal statute, or is inconsistent with . .. that guideline."72
The commentary to section 4B1.2-the section defining crimes of
violence-states that crimes of violence include their inchoate counter-
parts. 7 3 The court goes further to hypothesize that the Sentencing Com-
mission included inchoate offenses because of empirical evidence show-
ing that attempt crimes often pose a similar risk of injury as completed
65. United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 1172.
67. Id.at1170.
68. Id. at 1172-73.
69. Id. at 1173.
70. Id.at1168.
71. Id.at1173,1175.
72. Id. at 1173-74.
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt n.. (2010) ("'Crime of violence'
... include[s] the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such of-
fenses.").
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offenses.74 Therefore, the court found that it "cannot invalidate an appli-
cation note merely because our view of empirical data differs from that
of the Sentencing Commission" and found that attempted burglary was a
crime of violence under the USSG.75
3. United States v. Rivera-Oros76
In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit addressed the enumerated felony
of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG definition of crime of vio-
lence.77 The defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary in Ari-
zona, which is defined as "entering or remaining unlawfully in or on a
residential structure with the intent to commit any theft or any felony
therein."78 Mr. Rivera-Oros unlawfully entered the home of his girl-
friend's mother and was found on the premises by police; the mother told
police that jewelry was missing from her home.79 On appeal, he chal-
lenged the sentencing enhancement for this conviction on the basis that it
was improperly characterized as "burglary of a dwelling" under USSG
section 2Ll.2(b).so
Unlike Strahl, the Rivera-Oros court did not use the Taylor defini-
tion of generic burglary because Taylor addressed the enumerated felony
of "burglary" under the ACCA, and the definition at issue here was
"burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG. 8'
While the courts generally use precedent analyzing the ACCA to in-
form decisions regarding interpretation of the USSG,82 and vice versa,
the Tenth Circuit explicitly refused to do so in Rivera-Oros because the
ACCA enumerates "burglary" while the USSG enumerates "burglary of
a dwelling"; in deciding if a previous conviction is a crime of violence,
the generic meaning of "burglary of a dwelling" must be used, not "bur-
74. Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1174-75 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206
(2007)).
75. Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1175. It is this kind of disparate result that leads some authors to
conclude that reforms are desperately needed in the ACCA. Levine, supra note 1, at 548-66. Levine
argues that because the aims of the both the ACCA and USSG are similar, in fact, almost identical,
the ACCA should be reformed to reflect certain aspects of the USSG. Id at 549-50. He puts forth
that the ACCA has not been amended in over twenty years while the USSG is frequently amended to
take into account trends in recidivism and the motivation and controls of criminal behavior. Id. at
550. Levine specifically advocates for the ACCA to conform to the USSG in temporal qualities (i.e.
if there is more than fifteen years separating the instant offense and a prior felony conviction that
conviction should not count as a predicate offense, and juvenile offenses should not count as predi-
cate offenses) and the scope of predicate offenses (i.e. change "burglary" to "burglary of a dwelling"
and escape qualifies only if the conduct expressly charged, by its nature, presented a potential seri-
ous risk of physical injury). Id. at 551-66. Interestingly, these changes could eliminate the circuit
splits outlined in this article.
76. 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 1126.
78. Id. at 1133 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1507(A) (2010)).
79. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1125 n. 1.
80. Id. at 1124-25.
81. Id.at1l28.
82. See United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010).
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glary." Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant was sentenced
under section 2L1.2(b), which defines crime of violence differently than
the ACCA because of the deportation element. 84
To form the generic definition of burglary of a dwelling, the court
looked to legislative history and the Sentencing Commission's height-
ened concern for the physical and psychological harms associated with
residential burglaries; the historical recognition of those harms date back
to Blackstone, and the common understanding of the word "dwelling."8 s
The court defined dwelling under section 2L1.2 as "any 'enclosed space
that is used or intended for use as a human habitation,"' 86 and noted that
its conclusion is in line with the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Murillo-
Lopez.87
The court next considered whether, using the categorical approach,
the statute under which the defendant was convicted corresponded to the
generic definition. To find that a state statute criminalizes activity out-
side the generic definition of an enumerated offense "requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the state would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime."89
Arizona case law considers the character and use of a structure in deter-
mining if it is a dwelling.90 Under this analysis, a gift shop in a hotel does
not qualify as a dwelling, but a guest room in that same hotel would, in
fact, qualify. 9' Thus, the term "residential structure" in the statute in
question substantially conformed to the generic definition of dwelling
and the Rivera-Oros court affirmed the defendant's enhanced sentence. 92
4. United States v. Wise 93 & United States v. McConnell 4
Wise and McConnell are concerned with the characterization of
failure to stop for, or fleeing from a police officer as a crime of violence
under the residual clause of USSG section 4Bl.2(a). Both cases were
decided within the past year and both considered the characterization in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Chambers v. United States96 that
escape crimes are not categorically violent felonies under the ACCA,97
83. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1128-29.
84. Id. at 1129 n.5; see supra text accompanying note 21.
85. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132.
86. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (9th ed. 2009)).
87. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132 (citing United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (5th
Cir. 2006)).
88. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1126-27.
89. Id. at 1133 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
90. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133-34.
91. Id.at1133.
92. Id.at1134.
93. 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010).
94. 605 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 823; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1142.
96. 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).
97. Id. at 692-93.
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holding contrary to Tenth Circuit precedent. 98 Furthermore, both Wise
and McConnell use the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Begay
v. United States,9 9 which declared DUls are not predicate offenses' 00 to
determine whether fleeing falls into the residual clause of USSG section
4B1.2(a).o'0 The only differences in analysis for these two cases are the
text of the state statutes in question: Utah in Wise and Kansas in McCon-
nell.102
The Tenth Circuit Court begins its analysis in Wise and McConnell
by applying the modified categorical approachl 0 3 to the fleeing statutes to
determine if they qualify as a crime of violence.104 In Begay, the Su-
preme Court elaborated upon the method of determining if an offense is a
crime of violence under the residual clauses. The Begay test requires not
only that the offense present a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another, but it must also be "roughly similar, in kind as well as degree of
risk posed" to the enumerated offenses. 05 A crime is "roughly similar" to
an enumerated offense if it "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,'
and 'aggressive' conduct."' 06
The next step the Wise and McConnell courts took in their analysis
was to recount prior Tenth Circuit fleeing precedent.107 In United States
v. West'08-where a defendant fled a traffic stop and accelerated through
city streets, disregarding traffic signals and ultimately losing control of
his vehicle-the Tenth Circuit applied the Begay test to the Utah fleeing
statute, and found that both subsections constitute a violent felony under
the ACCA.09 The court analogized the conduct of fleeing to an escape
offense because both involve conduct that greatly increases the risk of
violent confrontation with law enforcement and third parties." 0 The Utah
fleeing statute at issue in West was the same as the statute at issue in
Wise, and defines failure to stop at a signal of a police officer as "op-
erat[ing] the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or at-
98. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 828; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1145.
99. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
100. Id. at 148.
101. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 826-27; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144-45.
102. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825-26; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143-44.
103. The modified approach was used in these cases because both statutes at issue had multiple
subsections that could present different "potential risk[s] of physical injury to another," U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a) (2010), and therefore the courts must determine with
which subsection the defendants were charged, McConnell, 605 F.3d at 824-29; Wise, 597 F.3d at
1143-47.
104. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825-26; Wise, 597 F.3d at 144.
105. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008).
106. Id. at 143-45.
107. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 827-30 (discussing United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952 (10th
Cir. 2008)); Wise, 597 F.3d at 1145-48 (also discussing the West opinion).
108. 550 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 960-65.
110. Id. at 964-65.
480 [Vol. 88:2
2011] VIOLENT FELONIES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
tempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means."' 1 The
question Wise posed was: Is West good law after the Supreme Court held
that not all escape crimes are violent felonies?ll 2 In other words, does
Chambers implicitly overrule West's reliance on the Tenth Circuit prece-
dent that categorically defined escape as a violent crime under the USSG
and ACCA?i 3 In response to these questions, both Wise and McConnell
determined that West remains good law because the Supreme Court's
holding in Chambers is narrow, pertaining only to escape crimes involv-
ing inaction and no danger to third parties.' 14
Because the Utah statute requires deliberate action by the defendant
(willful or wanton disregard), the violation must necessarily be commit-
ted in the presence of a police officer (fleeing or eluding a police officer),
the violation is likely to endanger third parties, and the violation poses a
threat of direct confrontation between the police officer and the defen-
dant(s), there is an increased risk of serious potential injury." 5
Similarly, the Kansas stautory subsection under which McConnell
was charged requires the conduct to be willful and occur in the presence
of a police officer." 6 In addition, McConnell's conviction included the
element of a car accident or damage to property, a further risk of serious
physical injury.117 The McConnell court also notes that there is a circuit
split on this issue, but the Tenth Circuit's findings are in accord with the
majority of circuits. 8
5. United States v. Silva"9
The Silva case dealt with two separate crimes and their classifica-
tion as a violent felony under the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit first ad-
dressed whether burglary of a shed under New Mexico law is a violent
felony.120 Second, the court turned to whether apprehension causing ag-
gravated assault under New Mexico law is a violent felony.121
Ill. Id. at 961.
112. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009).
113. United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that all escape crimes are
violent crimes under the ACCA and USSG).
114. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 829; United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010).
115. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1146-47.
116. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 828-29. McConnell's charging document stated that he willfully
failed to bring his vehicle to a stop at a police officer's command and while fleeing, he was involved
in a motor vehicle accident or intentionally caused damage to property. Id. at 826.
117. Id. at 829.
118. Id. at 830 (the Tenth Circuit is in accord with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, but is
in disagreement with the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits).
119. 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010).
120. Id. at 665-69.
121. Id. at 669-75.
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a. Burglary of "a Structure, a Shed"l 22
In its analysis, the Silva court employed a modified categorical ap-
proach because New Mexico's statute-as compared to the Taylor defi-
nition of burglary l-provides for a non-generic definition of bur-
glary.124 The defendant argued that the shed he burgled did not meet the
"building or other structure" element of the Taylor definition.12 5 Using
precedent from the Ninth Circuit, Silva argued that "building or struc-
ture" means only those spaces that are permanent and designed for hu-
man habitation or business.' 26
The Tenth Circuit rejected Silva's structural permanency argument
by finding fault with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and using Supreme
Court precedent to find a broader definition of "building or other struc-
ture" as used in Taylor.12 7 Since the Taylor decision, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the "building or other structure" compo-
nent is broader than the Ninth Circuit's requirement of permanency. 128
Shepard v. United States,'29 the Court found that the ACCA makes bur-
glary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed
space.130 In Silva, the Tenth Circuit found the Ninth Circuit's analysis,
and the defendant's arguments incomplete because they did not discuss
Shepard.' 3 ' Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's own precedent in Rivera-
Oros and United States v. Cummingsl32 rejected such a narrow reading of
"building or other structure" and declined the Ninth Circuit's invitation
to find the "or other structure" phrase superfluous.133 Therefore, the court
concluded that the defendant's guilty plea to burglary of "a structure, a
shed" under New Mexico law was a violent felony.134
122. Id. at 666.
123. "[A]n unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure,
with intent to commit a crime." Id. at 667 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598
(1990)).
124. Silva, 608 F.3d at 665-66.
125. Id. at 666.
126. Id. The court notes that the defendant presented evidence that the shed had been moved to
various points in the victim's yard. Id. at 679.
127. Id. at 668.
128. Compare Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15-16 (2005), with United States v.
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("[A] structure designed for occupancy that is
intended for use in one place.").
129. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
130. Id at 15-16.
131. Silva, 608 F.3d at 668.
132. 531 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's holding that found the
phrase "or other structure" superfluous because the generic definition of burglary broadly construes
the settings for burglary and does not include only buildings).
133. These cases interpret Grisel as finding the "or other structure" clause of the Taylor defini-
tion superfluous. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1128 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009); Cum-
mings, 531 F.3d at 1235.
134. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669.
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b. Apprehension Causing Assault
The second charge used for Silva's ACCA mandatory minimum
sentence was a conviction for aggravated assault; the district court de-
termined that this conviction had "as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." 3 5
Once again, the Tenth Circuit employed a categorical approach, looking
only to the statutory text.
Recently, in Johnson v. United States,136 the Supreme Court found
that "physical force" under the ACCA means "violent force-that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person."' 37
Under New Mexico statute, assault is defined as "any unlawful act, threat
or menacing conduct which causes another person to reasonably believe
that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery."' 3 8 Aggravated
assault adds the element of a deadly weapon.13 9
The mens rea for aggravated assault is general criminal intent,
which the New Mexico Supreme Court has defined as "conscious
wrongdoing or purposeful doing of an act the law declares to be a
crime." 40 Thus, the Tenth Circuit framed the issue before them as
"whether 'apprehension causing' aggravated assault-which requires
proof that a defendant purposefully threatened or engaged in menacing
conduct toward a victim, with a weapon 'capable of producing death or
great bodily harm'-is a violent felony under the ACCA."l 41
The defendant argued that because apprehension causing aggravated
assault "does not require proof of 'any intent with respect to the per-
ceived threat [the defendant] has raised in the mind of the victim,' . . . [it]
'does not have as an element the intentional use, attempted use or threat-
ened use of physical force."'l 42 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument
because the defendant's plea of aggravated assault meant that he pled to
a general intent crime whereby he consciously or purposefully commit-
ted an illegal act.143 In contrast to the dissent, the majority argued that
apprehension causing aggravated assault required more than a "display
of dexterity in handling a weapon; [rather] the crime requires proof that a
defendant purposefully threatened or engaged in menacing conduct [with
a deadly weapon] toward a victim."'"
135. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006)).
136. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
137. Id.at1271.
138. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-1 (2006)).
139. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669 (quoting § 30-3-2(A)).
140. Silva, 608 F.3d at 670 (quoting State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1277 n.5 (N.M. 1996)).
141. Silva, 608 F.3d at 670.
142. Id. at 672 (quoting United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008))
(first alteration in original).
143. Id. at 673.
144. Id. at 674.
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c. Dissent in Silva
The dissent concurred with the majority as to the defendant's bur-
glary charge, but disagreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the
apprehension causing assault.14 5 Judge Hartz's interpretation of New
Mexico law was that one can be guilty of assault "if one causes the vic-
tim to reasonably believe that he or she is about to be battered, even if
one does not intend to create that belief."l 4 6 The dissent's example was a
person who purposefully shows his dexterity with a weapon without the
intention of causing fear or apprehension to any bystanders. 147
This perspective is contrary to Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
precedents that hold an offense does not have as "an element the threat-
ened use of physical force against the person of another" unless it also
has as an element that the offender intend that the victim feel threat-
ened.148 Judge Hartz reasoned that the intent that is important is the intent
to use force; one does not accidentally use physical force against some-
thing.149
Furthermore, Judge Hartz argued that Tenth Circuit precedent states
that mere recklessness does not satisfy the physical force requirement. In
United States v. Zuniga-Soto,15 0 the Tenth Circuit held that because the
defendant could have been convicted of recklessly assaulting a public
servant, the use of physical force was not an element of the crime.
Carrying this precedent to the next logical step, Judge Hartz's dissent
concluded that the threatened use of physical force requires an inten-
tional threat just as the use of physical force requires the intentional use
of force.15 2 Thus, because Silva could have been convicted of aggravated
assault without the element of an intentional threat, the dissent concluded
that his conviction is not a violent felony under the ACCA, and therefore,
the mandatory minimum sentence required by that Act does not apply. 53
145. Id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
146. Id at 675.
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)).
150. 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008).
151. Id.at1125.
152. Silva, 608 F.3d at 676 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
153. Idat674,679.
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B. Circuit Splits
The below section builds upon the previous case briefs and de-
scribes the current legal splits among the circuits regarding crimes of
violence and violent felonies.
1. Burglary of a Dwelling
Currently, the circuits are split regarding the application of the Tay-
lor definition of generic burglary under the ACCA to the enumerated
offense of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG.
a. United States v. Wennerl54 vs. Rivera-Oros
As explained above, much of the Rivera-Oros opinion turned on the
court's reasoning that although the Taylor definition of generic burglary
under the ACCA is useful, it is not controlling when defining the USSG
enumerated felony of "burglary of a dwelling."155 The Tenth Circuit
made a careful note that while their analysis aligns with an earlier Fifth
Circuit case, 15 its approach is the exact opposite of the one taken by the
Ninth Circuit in 2003.'15
In the Ninth Circuit Wenner case, Mr. Wenner was convicted under
the Washington residential burglary statute, which is defined as "'en-
ter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle'
with the intent to commit a crime."' 5 8 Similar to Mr. Rivera-Oros, Mr.
Wenner's charging document stated that he "enter[ed] or remain[ed]
unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle, the residence of Mike
Jewell."l 59 In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the Wenner court reasoned
that the Taylor definition of "burglary" informs the definition of "bur-
glary of a dwelling" under the USSG.160 "Thus, the most logical and sen-
sible reading of the Guidelines and the reading that is consistent with our
cases is to construe 'burglary of a dwelling' as the Taylor definition of
burglary, with the narrowing qualification that the burglary occur in a
dwelling."l61
The court then considered the face of the Washington statute defin-
ing "dwelling" and concluded that because the definition includes a
fenced area, a railroad car, or a cargo container, it is broader than Taylor,
154. 351 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009).
156. Id. at 1132 (analyzing United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2006)).
157. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132-33 (analyzing Wenner).
158. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 972 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.025(1) (2003)) (alterations
in original).
159. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 974.
160. Id. at 972-73.
161. Id. at 973.
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which limits burglary to buildings and other structures, and therefore, is
not a crime of violence. 6 2
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes the Third and Eighth
Circuit decisions that expansively define dwelling as any enclosed space
used or intended for use as a human habitation. 16 3 Both of these prece-
dents were used in Rivera-Oros for support of the court's generic defini-
tion of dwelling.'TM The Wenner court distinguishes these cases because
neither holds that burglary defined as broadly as "residential burglaries"
under Washington law would qualify as "burglary of a dwelling" under
the USSG; they merely establish that burglary of hotel rooms and shel-
ters used as weekend fishing retreats are crimes of violence.165
b. The Wenner Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Wallace followed the same reasoning as the
Tenth Circuit-that the Taylor definition does not apply to the more pre-
cise definition of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG-and further
reasoned that Washington's residential burglary statute falls under the
residual clause of the USSG.16 Therefore, because the Taylor definition
of burglary does not apply to the more precise offense of "burglary of a
dwelling," the court should have determined whether "burglary of fenced
areas, railway cars, or cargo containers used for lodging constitutes bur-
glary of a dwelling under the Guidelines."l 6 7 Similar to the Tenth Cir-
cuit-and persuaded by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' decisions-Judge
Wallace then created a general definition of "dwelling."' 6 8 The dissent
concluded that "dwelling" is any enclosed space, which is used or in-
tended for use as a human habitation; therefore, Washington's statute
should not be considered outside the definition of "burglary of a dwell-
ing" under the USSG.16 9
Alternatively, the dissent argued that the defendant's crime of resi-
dential burglary falls under the Guideline's residual clause: "conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."170 Because
the classification of a crime as a "crime of violence" is a question of law
the court reviews de novo, the dissent stated the court has the option of
finding this alternative even if it was not raised in the parties' briefs and
the district court did not apply the residual clause.' 7 Furthermore, the
162. Id. (citing § 9A.04.110(5)).
163. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973-74 (distinguishing the holdings in United States v. McClenton,
53 F.3d 584, 587 (3d Cir. 1995) and United States v. Graham, 982 F.2d 315, 316 (8th Cir. 1992)).
164. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2009).
165. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973.
166. Id. at 977 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 978.
168. Id. at 978-79 (citing McClenton, 53 F.3d at 587 and Graham, 982 F.2d at 316, respec-
tively).
169. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 978 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 980 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1l.2(a)(2) (2002)).
171. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 980 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit's precedent and other sources unanimously concluded that
burglarizing a residence is a crime that presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another because of the very real possibility of violent confronta-
tion with the owner or with an investigating police officer.17
c. Discussion
One of the aims of the USSG is to provide a uniform structure for
sentencing. However, when both the Tenth and Ninth Circuits were pre-
sented with defendants receiving enhanced sentences for unlawfully en-
tering another's house, the courts followed different methods resulting in
different outcomes. The Tenth Circuit defined "burglary of a dwelling"
and found the defendant's conduct fit within this newly created generic
definition and was consequently a prior conviction for USSG pur-
poses.173 The Ninth Circuit limited the Taylor definition of "burglary" to
buildings or structures that are used as dwellings and found the defen-
dant's conduct did not constitute a prior conviction under the USSG be-
cause the statutory definition of dwelling was too broad. 174
The Tenth Circuit appears to have adopted a more thorough and
logical legal analysis in Rivera-Oros because there is a substantive dif-
ference between the USSG and the ACCA in this instance and burglary
of a house-the conduct at issue in Rivera-Oros and Wenner-is the
quintessential "burglary of a dwelling" imagined by the Sentencing
Commission. Both the Wenner and Rivera-Oros courts make note of the
Sentencing Commission's explicit divergence from the ACCA in the
area of burglary,' 75 but the Wenner court merely mentions the divergence
in a footnote and does not address it in its analysis. Furthermore, the
Wenner court does not consider the text of the guideline in question, or
the rationale for the differing language.176
Although the Tenth Circuit declines to apply the Taylor definition,
the circuit does not ignore Taylor in its analysis. Rivera-Oros is an ex-
ample of a court applying the Taylor methodology in creating a generic
definition for the enumerated felony at issue. Thus, Taylor is given due
deference and the court adheres to its procedure and looks at a wide
range of sources to determine the generic definition of an enumerated
offense. 77
In contrast, the Wenner court merely uses Taylor's generic defini-
tion of a similar, but different, enumerated offense, and applies it in con-
172. Id. at 981 (relying on United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000)).
173. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009).
174. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 972-73, 976.
175. See Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1129; Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973 n.2.
176. But see Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1129 ("Our analysis must be attuned to the particular
statute or guideline in question.").
177. See id. at 1126-27.
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junction with Washington's definition of dwelling.'78 In this manner, the
court determined that Mr. Wenner's conviction for entering Mr. Jewell's
residence falls outside of the enumerated offense and thus is not a crime
of violence.179 Instead of finding a generic definition of "dwelling," the
Ninth Circuit used Taylor's limitation to buildings and structures to find
Mr. Wenner's conviction of entering or remaining unlawfully in the resi-
dence of Mike Jewell outside the scope of burglary of a dwelling. 8 0
The Tenth Circuit's approach may mean that the USSG definition
of "burglary of a dwelling" encompasses more crimes than the more
general ACCA definition of burglary. But, this broader definition em-
phasizes the increased risk of physical and psychological harm caused by
the burglary of one's home, regardless of its architectural form.
In comparison, the Ninth Circuit's approach skips the step of con-
sidering what the Sentencing Commission intended by enumerating bur-
glary of a dwelling as opposed to burglary: the physical and psychologi-
cal harm that befalls victims of a burglary of their living space.' 8' There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit's approach means that burglarizing a camping tent
or motor home, a temporary lodging in Washington, may not be a crime
of violence because a tent is not a building or structure under Taylor's
burglary definition, and therefore, would not constitute a dwelling.182
Furthermore, while the Wenner dissent adopted much of the reason-
ing in Rivera-Oros, it did not consider the Supreme Court's ruling that
there must be a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that
the crime falls outside of the generic definition of an enumerated of-
fense.183 In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit considered Arizona case law
in finding whether the defendant's conviction fell outside the definition
of "burglary of a dwelling."' 84 Because the state interpreted its statute to
necessitate an inquiry into the nature and character of the space burglar-
ized (i.e., was the burgled space a place used for temporary habitation or
merely a gift shop in a hotel lobby'85 ), the defendant's conviction did not
fall outside of the generic definition of "dwelling."' 86
In Rivera-Oros, neither the majority nor the dissent made an inquiry
into Washington law and whether the state courts consider the "character
178. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973.
179. Id. at 976.
180. Id. at 972-73, 976.
181. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1130.
182. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (citing statutes that were broader
than the generic definition because they included places other than buildings, including a Missouri
statute that defined burglary as breaking and entering any booth or tent).
183. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007)).
184. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133-34.
185. Id.at1133.
186. Id at l34.
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of the use of the structure actually entered."' 87 Because of this missing
analysis, even the dissent's reasoning-that closely parallel's the Tenth
Circuit's-is problematic. The Wenner dissent presented no authority
that Washington considers the nature and character of the space when
charging a defendant with residential burglary. Thus, under the Ninth
Circuit's approach, courts are left with the text of the statute, which de-
fines "dwelling" as any building or structure used for lodging; there is no
evidence that, for instance, unlawfully entering shops housed in an
apartment building or nursing home would not constitute burglary of a
dwelling as the shops are in a building used by a person for lodging or as
a residence.
d. Will the Supreme Court Weigh-In?
Because the conflict between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits is one of
procedural application of a Supreme Court case, this split will likely be
heard by the High Court. The question posed by this conflict is the scope
of Taylor's definition and when a court is to engage in the method of
defining the "generic, contemporary meaning" 8 8 of an enumerated of-
fense under the ACCA and USSG. Clarifying these points may help re-
duce litigation and identify differences between the ACCA and USSG. A
Supreme Court decision on the matter would also be particularly helpful
in instances where there are more than four enumerated offenses, such as
USSG section 2L1.2(b), where crime of violence is defined by twelve
enumerated offenses. 189
2. Fleeing a Police Officer
Analyzing the circuit court decisions regarding the crime of fleeing
the police in a motor vehicle leads to unresolved, contradicting issues.
Due to a circuit split, either the Eighth Circuit needs to resolve the issue
or the Supreme Court should review.
a. United States v. Tyler'90 vs. Wise and McConnell
In Tyler, a case involving a defendant who wrecked his vehicle
while fleeing the police at excessive speeds and ignoring traffic signals,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Minnesota "crime of fleeing a
peace officer in a motor vehicle" is not a crime of violence under the
USSG.191 Applying the Begay test,192 thc court determined that the de-
187. Id. at 1133 (quoting State v. Gardella, 751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)).
188. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
189. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2010).
190. 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009).
191. Id. at 726.
192. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.137, 1584-86 (2008). The threshold question in
determining if the offense falls within the residual clause of the ACCA is whether it presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id at 1584. Second, the court must determine if
the offense is "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed" to the enumerated of-
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fendant's conduct-although purposeful--did not typically involve con-
duct presenting a serious risk of physical injury to another, or conduct
that is violent and aggressive.' 93 The court concluded that fleeing a police
officer does not pose a serious risk of bodily injury because the Minne-
sota statute does not require high speed or reckless driving.1 94 Further-
more, the statute includes a separate subsection that criminalizes the act
of fleeing when it causes death or bodily injury, indicating to the Tyler
court that simply fleeing a police officer is mere disobedience and nor-
mally does not rise to the level of posing a serious risk of physical in-
jury.19
5
Similarly, the offense cannot be said to typically involve violent and
aggressive conduct. In defining "flee," Minnesota criminalizes conduct
that is not violent and aggressive because "flee" includes turning off
headlights and taillights and increasing the speed of the vehicle.196 Such
actions do not reveal the propensity of an offender to act violently to-
wards others.197 Likewise, these actions do not necessarily lead to chase
and/or confrontation as the government contends. The statute does not
make confrontation an element of the crime, and in fact, requires no
"conduct presenting a serious risk of physical injury to another or con-
duct that is violent and aggressive."l 98
The Eighth Circuit is aware that its reasoning differs from the deci-
sions in the Tenth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, but manages to distinguish
or disregard each of these opinions. The court distinguishes West, and
thus the later decisions of Wise and McConnell, and the Fifth circuit
case' 99 because the statutes at issue in those cases do not define "flee" so
broadly as to include behavior such as increasing speed and extinguish-
ing headlights and taillights. 20 0 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. La-
Casse,201 however, considered a statute similar to the Minnesota statute
at issue in Tyler and found that the crime was a violent felony under the
ACCA.20 2 The Eighth Circuit merely states they disagree with the Sixth
Circuit and terminates the discussion, with no further elaboration on the
ensuing circuit split. 203
fenses. Id at 1585. A crime is "roughly similar" if it "typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct." Id. at 1586 (internal quotation marks omitted).






199. Id. at 726 (referencing United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 2009)).
200. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.
201. 567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009).
202. Id. at 765-67.
203. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.
[Vol. 88:2490
2011] VIOLENT FELONIES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
Expressing profound concern about the majority's decision in Tyler,
Judge Limbaugh wrote a dissent that critiqued the majority's failure to
consider the actual language of the residual clause and its failure to con-
204sider the record of the case at issue. First, the dissent accused the ma-
jority of misreading the residual clause; Judge Limbaugh argued that the
clause calls for a potential serious risk of injury as opposed to an actual
risk.205 The potential serious risk is definitely present when a defendant
extinguishes headlights or taillights while fleeing an officer; the lack of
vehicle lighting means that other drivers and peace officers cannot see
the fleeing car, therefore creating the potential serious risk of vehicle
accidents. 206
Furthermore, the dissent argued that the presence of a separate sub-
division creating additional penalty for fleeing an officer that results in
death or great bodily injury is an argument for classification of the crime
as a crime of violence. 207 The separate subdivision in question criminal-
izes the exact same conduct if death or serious bodily injury occurs; the
subdivision does not add extra requirements of reckless driving or con-
frontation.208 The dissent reasoned that because the same conduct is more
seriously punished in the instance of death or bodily injury, it points to
the offense as one that has potential serious risk of injury to another.209
The dissent also used the underlying facts of the defendant's con-
viction to show the typical way the offense occurs and determine the
specific elements for which the defendant was charged.2 10 The dissent
intended to demonstrate that by isolating only one way the offense may
be committed-extinguishing headlights or increasing speed-the major-
ity was directly contradicting the Eighth Circuit's holding 211 in United
States v. Gordon.212 Tyler was driving at "excessive speeds" while ignor-
ing traffic signals and signs, and lost control of his car, running into a
213cemetery gate. Furthermore, even if the majority was correct in
"cherry-picking" 214 one way the offense can be committed, its reasoning
does not hold because the conduct must be coupled with the intent to
204. See id. at 727-29 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Limbaugh argued that precedent
clearly states the court is within its power to use a modified categorical appmach. Id. at 730.
205. Id. at 727.
206. Id
207. Id. at 728.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 727.
210. Id. at 727-28.
211. Id. at 729.
212. 557 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A] statute can be violated in a number of ways, 'we
look to the charging papers for the limited purpose of determining the specific elements for which
[the defendant] was convicted."').
213. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 728 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 729.
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elude a police officer, 2 15 and therefore, increases the potential serious risk
for injury to another in the form of a chase or confrontation.216
b. Discussion
The Tenth Circuit and the Tyler dissent make the more compelling
legal and logical argument for several reasons. First, the residual clause
of USSG section 4B1.2 reads: "conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another."2 17 By ignoring the word "potential" in
the residual clause, the Tyler majority made a crucial mistake because it
disregards the firmly held belief by Congress and the courts that certain
crimes increase the probability of violent confrontation. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court-in the context of a burglary analysis-has stated that
"potential risk" expressed congressional intent to "encompass possibili-
ties even more contingent or remote than a simple 'risk,' much less a
certainty." 218 Some form of burglary has been an enumerated offense in
the ACCA and the USSG since their promulgation in the mid-1980s. An
examination of legislative history and case law has repeatedly shown the
rationale behind enumerating burglary is the potential for violent con-
frontation with the occupant or investigating officers. 219 Generic bur-
glary, like the Minnesota fleeing statute, does not require confrontation
as an element, but it is nevertheless considered conduct that presents a
potential serious risk of physical harm because of increased risk of vio-
lent confrontation. Simply because the Minnesota statute does not require
confrontation does not mean that it is not a potential risk of the pro-
scribed conduct. The majority errs in its reasoning when it looks for con-
duct that "necessarily . . . present[s] a serious risk of physical injury to
another;" rather, the question is whether the potential for risk exists. 22 0
Second, the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the circuit split is mis-
placed. Given the opportunity-and following its precedent established
in West, Wise, and McConnell-the Tenth Circuit would have likely con-
cluded that fleeing a police officer under the Minnesota statute was a
crime of violence for two main reasons: (1) similar to the Eighth Circuit,
the Tenth Circuit has justified a modified categorical approach and an
examination of the charging documents and plea agreement when there is
more than one way in which to commit the offense; 221 and (2) the Tenth
Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the notion that statutes criminalizing
215. Id.
216. See id. at 729-30.
217. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a)(2) (2010).
218. James, 550 U.S. at 207-08; see also April K. Whitescarver, Chambers v. United States:
Filling the Gaps When Interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act, 13 JONES L. REv. 89, 95
(2009).
219. E.g., James, 550 U.S. at 209; Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1169-70; Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at
1130.
220. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725.
221. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144.
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flight from a police officer are similar to escape in that they create an
increased potential for serious injury to others because the crime is
committed in the presence of a police officer.222
Because the Minnesota statute can be violated by several types of
conduct, the Tenth Circuit would have employed a modified categorical
approach and looked to the charging documents for the specific violation
with which the defendant was charged and would have likely con-
cluded-similar to the Tyler dissent-that Mr. Tyler's charging docu-
ments indicate the conduct is a crime of violence.223 Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit emphasizes the potential confrontation and presence of
third parties in its decisions addressing both fleeing 2 24 and burglary. 22 5
The definition of "flee" in the Minnesota statute would have likely con-
cerned the Tenth Circuit, but the potential for the police officer to pursue
the driver who extinguishes his headlights and creates the potential for
violent confrontation or traffic accidents would have prevailed; the Tenth
Circuit, unlike the Tyler majority, would have focused on the potential
aspect of the residual clause because of its precedent 226 emphasizing po-
tential for confrontation during the commission of a burglary.
In the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Harrimon,227 a modified
categorical approach was not employed because the Texas statute did not
have multiple subsections and could only be violated in one way.228
Thus, the charging documents never become became a relevant line of
inquiry for the court. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit is in line with the
other circuits in determining that fleeing a police officer is aggressive
and violent in nature because it is a challenge to the officer's authority
and typically initiates pursuit, similar to an escape from custody. 229 The
definition of "flee" was not at issue in this case.
The only case that agreed with Tyler's assessment that fleeing does
not lead to potential serious risk of injury to another came from the Elev-
enth Circuit, United States v. Harrison.230 Similar to Tyler, Harrison held
that a statute that criminalizes fleeing without the inclusion of a reckless
or high-speed element is not the type of career criminal the USSG or the
ACCA intended to punish. 2 3 1 The court stated that statistics showing the
likelihood of physical injury in willful fleeing crimes that do not have the
222. E.g., id. at 1146.
223. See id. at 1144.
224. Id. at 1147.
225. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1169-70(10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
226. See Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1169; Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1130.
227. 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009).
228. See id. at 533 n.2.
229. Id. at 534-35.
230. 558 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11 th Cir. 2009).
231. Id. at 1295-96.
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elements of high speed or recklessness would have been helpful and il-
232lustrative.
Given these concurrent holdings, why is it, then, that the Tyler court
did not mention the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in its analysis? The
answer may lie in the fact that the Eleventh Circuit pursued a modified
categorical approach, one that was rejected by the court in Tyler. 233In-
deed, in Harrison, the Eleventh Circuit differentiated between the differ-
ent subsections to determine with what, exactly, the defendant was
charged.234 The court in Harrison noted that the defendant was not
charged with the subsection of the statute requiring high speed or reck-
2351-thless driving. As a result, the defendant was found guilty of the less
serious conduct of disobeying a peace officer by driving away at a rea-
sonable speed.236
Similarly, the majority in Tyler misread the LaCasse case because
the statute at issue was not in fact similar to that in Tyler.23 According to
the Tyler majority, LaCasse analyzed a statute similar to Minnesota's
and found that the defendant's conviction constituted a crime of vio-
lence. 238 The defendant in LaCasse was convicted of third-degree fleeing
or eluding, which requires that the fleeing conduct occur in a thirty-five
mile per hour zone or that the violation resulted in an accident. 23 9 The
LaCasse court used a modified categorical approach to determine the
specific crime of which the defendant was convicted.20 The court con-
cluded that these requirements translated to purposeful and aggressive
conduct that had the potential for serious injury to another and was thus a
crime of violence, despite the statute's definition of "flee." 24 1 The defini-
tion of "flee" was not addressed by the court, and consequently it did not
decide that a defendant convicted of fleeing by extinguishing headlights
and taillights was a crime of violence. Therefore, the Tyler court incor-
rectly cited LaCasse as a case dealing with a similar definition of "flee."
Finally, the Eighth Circuit has created an intra-circuit split. The Ty-
ler opinion was filed in June of 2009 and a decision was rendered in Sep-
242tember of 2009. A second Eighth Circuit case addressing a fleeing
statute, United States v. Hudson,24 3 was filed in April of 2009 and a deci-
232. Id. at 1295.
233. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 724-25.
234. Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1284-85.
235. See id. at 1290-91.
236. Id.
237. See United States v. LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763, 765, 767 (2009) (finding that a fleeing of-
fense under Michigan statute is a violent felony).
238. Id. at 765.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 765-66.
241. Id.at766.
242. United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 722 (8th Cir. 2009).
243. 577 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2009).
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sion was rendered in August of 2009.244 Hudson addressed a Missouri
statute and found that a conviction for fleeing was a crime of violence.245
Interestingly, Tyler does not discuss Hudson. This is especially odd be-
cause Hudson explicitly found that resisting arrest by fleeing "inevitably
,246invites confrontation," creating a direct contradiction with the court in
247
Tyler.
It is arguable that the Eighth Circuit has not contradicted itself be-
cause the statute at issue in Hudson expressly stated that resisting arrest
or fleeing must be conducted in such a manner that the person fleeing
"creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any per-
son."248 In Hudson, the Eighth Circuit did not question the presence of a
potential risk of injury because it was an express element of the statute.
The question was one of language as opposed to legal substance. Thus, a
new question is presented: whether a state can linguistically create a
crime of violence or violent felony by merely inserting key phrases from
the ACCA or USSG into its statute.
After summarily dispatching the potential injury question, the Hud-
son court found "purposeful conduct" because the defendant knowingly
fled a police officer. 249 Additionally the court found "violent and aggres-
sive conduct" because "[r]esisting arrest by fleeing inevitably invites
confrontation" and "resisting arrest by fleeing in a dangerous manner
involves more violent and aggressive conduct." 250 The Tyler court would
likely respond that there was no indication that the Missouri statute
broadly defined "flee," and that by requiring fleeing in a manner physi-
cally harmful to others, the definition of "flee" is narrow and can there-
fore be considered a crime of violence. This is the same way the Tyler
court distinguished the Tenth and Fifth Circuits and is subject to the
same legal and logistical problems discussed above. Furthermore, the
Hudson court never addressed the definition of "flee" and had no cause
to do so.
c. Will the Supreme Court Weigh-In?
The Eighth Circuit Tyler case is an anomaly in ACCA and USSG
jurisprudence regarding the crime of fleeing the police in a motor vehi-
cle. Tyler splits with the Tenth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, and in light of
Hudson, seems to create an intra-circuit split. Because of these splits and
considcring the Supreme Court's recent attention to recidivist sentencing
issues, the Court would likely grant certiorari in order to clarify the usage
244. Id. at 883.
245. Id. at 886.
246. Id.
247. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725.
248. Hudson, 577 F.3d at 885 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 886.
250. Id.
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of categorical and modified categorical approaches and the potential se-
rious risk involved in fleeing a police officer. In addition, the Supreme
Court may hear the issue if the Eighth Circuit does not resolve contra-
dicting opinions: Does fleeing invite confrontation, or not?
3. Juvenile Adjudications as Prior Convictions
In another matter, there is a controversial split regarding the use of
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses for the ACCA. The Ninth
Circuit is the outlier in this split and reasons that juvenile adjudications
should not be predicate offenses in light of the Supreme Court decisions
in Apprendi v. New Jersey251 and Jones v. United States (Jones I),252
which imply that facts for sentencing enhancements must be subject to
the safeguards of a jury.2 5 3 The right to a jury trial accorded to criminal
defendants by the Sixth Amendment does not apply to juvenile adjudica-
tion proceedings, and therefore, adjudications are not prior convictions to
be used for sentencing enhancements under the ACCA.254
However, all other circuits that have addressed this issue find that a
jury trial is not a prerequisite for using a prior conviction as a predicate
offense for the ACCA;255 all that is required is that the defendant receives
256all the due process required at the time of his conviction. Due process
does not demand jury trials for juvenile adjudications, but juveniles are
afforded many other procedural safeguards that make the adjudications
sufficiently reliable for Apprendi purposes.2 57 Therefore, these circuits
concluded that juvenile adjudications are predicate offenses for purposes
of the ACCA.2 58
The Tenth Circuit has not yet considered this issue, but below is an
outline of the major cases defining the circuit split. The next section ana-
lyzes the reasoning of these cases and predicts where the Tenth Circuit
may fall.
a. United States v. Tighe 259: Adjudications are Not Predicate
Offenses
In its solitary decision, the Tighe court begins by limiting the appli-
cability of its earlier precedent, United States v. Williams,260 which stated
251. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
252. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
253. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2001).
254. Id. at 1194.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2002).
256. See id.
257. See id. at 1033.
258. See id; see also United Stated v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); United
States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750-51 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183,
1190-91 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003).
259. 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
260. 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the use of juvenile adjudications-as predicate offenses for sentencing
enhancements-did not violate due process.261 The court notes that this
decision was made "pre-Apprendi" and the nature of the sentencing deci-
sion was fundamentally different than the ACCA.262 In the Williams case,
the defendant's ultimate sentence was within the statutorily mandated
maximum for the offense; in contrast, the ACCA goes beyond the statu-
tory maximum and mandates an additional five years, making the sen-
263tence at least fifteen years of incarceration. The Ninth Circuit poses an
entirely different question in Tighe. There, the court considered the use
of juvenile adjudications in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ap-
prendi, which defined the due process requirements when a court seeks
to sentence a defendant beyond the statutory maximum.264
Tighe analyzes the cases leading up to Apprendi to find that jury tri-
als and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are due process requirements
for increasing a defendant's maximum sentence.265 The Supreme Court
in Apprendi stated that the certainty of procedural safeguards was crucial
to the decision of Almendarez-Torres, finding prior convictions to be
sentencing factors that are not required to be charged in an indictment.266
Later, in Jones I, the Court found that a prior conviction is different from
other sentence enhancing facts, and therefore, does not have to be sub-
mitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because it must
have been established through procedures satisfying fair notice, reason-
able doubt, and jury trial guarantees.267 The Tighe majority takes the
three safeguards enumerated in Jones I and makes them the necessary
elements required for all facts increasing a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum: (1) fair notice; (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3)
261. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192; Williams, 891 F.2d at 215.
262. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192.
263. Id. at 1192 & n.2; see Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
264. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000).
265. First, the court looks at Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which
labeled prior convictions a sentencing factor that was not a separate element of the crime that had to
be charged in the indictment. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (discussing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at
243). Next, the Tighe court analyzes Jones I to show why the fact of a prior conviction is constitu-
tionally distinct from other sentence-enhancing facts (such as use of a deadly weapon, use of explo-
sives, committing an offense with extreme cruelty, etc.). Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (discussing Jones I,
526 U.S. 227, 249 (1998)). In Jones 1 the Court finds that a prior conviction must have been estab-
lished through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 526
U.S. at 249. Lastly, the Tighe court turns to Apprendi where the Supreme Court created an exception
for prior convictions in its due process requirement for facts enhancing a sentence beyond the statu-
tory maximum. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94 (discussing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). This is referred
to as the Apprendi exception. See, e.g., Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. The exception states: "Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490. Therefore, the issue becomes the definition of "conviction" under Apprendi.
266. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488; Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 243 (citing Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)).
267. Jones I, 526 U.S. at 249.
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the right to a jury trial constitute "the fundamental triumvirate of proce-
,,268dural protections.
Thus, the Tighe court reads Apprendi as requiring a jury trial in or-
der to satisfy the procedural safeguards necessary to constitute a prior
conviction that would enhance a defendant's sentence beyond a statutory
maximum. 269 In justifying their decision, the Ninth Circuit quotes Ap-
prendi:
There is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defen-
dant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to
find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.270
The Tighe court reasoned that the Apprendi exception for prior con-
victions must be limited to convictions that were obtained through pro-
ceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.271 In conclusion, the Tighe court found that because the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is not afforded in juvenile adjudications,
those proceedings are not prior convictions that constitute predicate of-
fenses for the ACCA.2 72
The Tighe dissent took the diametrically opposed position. The dis-
sent argued that juvenile adjudications are predicate offenses because the
language in Jones I and Apprendi merely means that prior convictions
need not be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt
because they have due process procedural safeguards in place that make
this sentencing factor sufficiently reliable. 2 73 The dissent interpreted
Jones I as holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing factors
that are subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant re-
ceived all the process that was due to him when he was convicted of the
earlier crime.274 In Tighe, the defendant was adjudicated delinquent with
all the due process due to him at the time, and this did not include a jury
trial.275 The fact that there was not a jury trial does not preclude the de-
linquent adjudication from being a prior conviction and predicate offense
under the ACCA.276
Furthermore, the dissent contends that if the prosecution has to
prove a prior juvenile adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt-as the
268. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
269. Id. at 1194-95.
270. Id. at 1194 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496).
271. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
272. Id
273. Id at 1200 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
274. Id
275. See id. at 1198-99.
276. Id at 1200.
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majority requires-this will allow the jury to hear about prior offenses, a
277
procedure that would be unduly prejudicial. The defendant will have to
make a choice: stipulate, or allow the jury to hear.278
b. United States v. Smalley,279 United States v. Jones (Jones
I),280 United States v. Burge,281 United States v. Mat-
thews,282 and United States v. Crowell
283
In chronological order, the Eighth, Third, Eleventh, First, and Sixth
Circuits found fault with the Tighe majority and adopted the reasoning of
the Tighe dissent. These courts found that juvenile adjudications were
constitutionally sound convictions under Apprendi and could therefore be
considered prior convictions for sentencing enhancement under the
ACCA.
Because the post-Tighe opinions have strikingly little variation in
their reasoning, the following is a summary of the Smalley court's opin-
284ion.
The Smalley court first recounts Tighe and then states that it respect-
fully disagrees with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and proceeds with its
own.285 The Smalley court adopted the certainty of procedural protections
language in Apprendi and uses it as the foundation of the opinion:
We think that while the Court [in Apprendi] established what consti-
tutes sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings
under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on
possibilities that lie in between these two poles. 286
According to the Smalley court, the Ninth Circuit erred when it
found that the procedural triumvirate was necessary instead of sufficient
because Jones I did not intend to define the term "prior conviction" as
that which had been established through fair notice, reasonable doubt,
and trial by jury guarantees.287
Moreover, Smalley reasoned that the decision should not turn on the
"parsing of words" of Supreme Court opinions, but on the reliability of a
288prior conviction. Juvenile adjudications are reliable because they are
277. Id. at 1201.
278. Id. at 1200-01.
279. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
280. 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003).
281. 407 F.3d 1183 (1 th Cir. 2005).
282. 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
283. 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2007).
284. Any differences in the other opinions are noted in the following text.
285. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1032-33.
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afforded the safeguards of right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 289 The court con-
cluded these guarantees "are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability
that Apprendi requires." 290 To support its conclusion that these proce-
dures are more than sufficient, the court quoted a Supreme Court case
from 1971 that found the use of a jury in a juvenile adjudication would
"'not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function' and is not
constitutionally required."291
Jones II and Burge have conspicuously added little to this analysis;
both merely go through the decisions of Tighe and Smalley and conclude
292they agree with the Tighe dissent and Smalley's reasoning. Jones II
primarily uses the Tighe dissent to justify its analysis; the court finds that
the defendant was afforded all the procedural safeguards that he was
constitutionally due at the time of his adjudication.2 93 Burge analyzes
Jones I and Apprendi, but it is largely an amalgamation of quotes from
the Tighe dissent and Smalley.294 Crowell simply combined Smalley,
Jones II, and the Tighe dissent. The Crowell court cites Jones II and
Tighe for the proposition that a defendant need only receive all the proc-
ess he was due when convicted. 2 9 5 It also cites to Smalley for the proposi-
tion of evaluating the realities and procedural safeguards of juvenile
296court and the resulting reliability of juvenile adjudications. However,
the Crowell court did not discuss juvenile court procedures or statistics to
illuminate the "reality" to which it refers. Crowell "join[s] the Third,
Eighth, and Eleventh circuits in finding that the imposition of a sentence
enhancement under the ACCA based on a defendant's juvenile adjudica-
tion without a jury trial does not violate the defendant's due process right
or run afoul of Apprendi."297 The court made no further analysis.298
289. Id at 1033.
290. Id.
291. Id (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
292. United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2005); Jones II, 332 F.3d 688,
694-97 (3d Cir 2003).
293. Jones II, 332 F.3d at 695-96, 698; see United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200-01
(9th Cir. 2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
294. See Burge, 407 F.3d at 1188-90.
295. United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Matthews is the one case with slight, but insubstantial differences. The defendant in Mat-
thews first argued that Massachusetts law did not classify juvenile adjudications as criminal and
therefore they could not be predicate offenses under the ACCA. United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d
25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007). Although the court refused to address this argument because it was not raised
and preserved at trial, it gave a succinct insight into what it might have ruled. Id. The court noted
that: "[The defendant] cites no cases holding that Congress oversteps constitutional bounds by ignor-
ing state law classifications and treating particular juvenile acts as criminal in nature." Id. The
ACCA only narrowly extended juvenile adjudications into criminal convictions and it saw no basis
for denying Congress this prerogative. Id. The court in Matthews then predictably proceeded to
rehash Tighe, disagree, and quote Smalley for the proposition that the safeguards required in juvenile
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c. The Juvenile Adjudication Quandary and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 299
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to Tighe; a defendant
appealed his sentence enhancement based on a prior juvenile adjudica-
tion.300 Although the sentencing enhancement in Boyd v. Newland301 was
based on California law-as opposed to federal law-and did not involve
the ACCA, 302 the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is nonetheless relevant to the
juvenile adjudication circuit split.
The Boyd court noted that it had previously held that the Apprendi
exception does not apply to juvenile adjudications, and therefore, such
adjudications cannot be prior convictions for sentencing enhance-
ments.303 However, it then stated, "California courts disagree with Tighe.
They conclude that Apprendi does not preclude the use of nonjury juve-
nile adjudications to enhance the sentence of an adult offender."304 The
court further noted that the Third and Eighth Circuits also disagree with
Tighe and found it unpersuasive.30s In concluding, without overruling
Tighe, the Ninth Circuit upheld Boyd's enhanced sentence using the pro-
cedural situation of the case: a habeas petition under the AEDPA, §
2254(d)(1). 3 06 The Boyd court stated:
In general, Ninth Circuit precedent remains persuasive authority in
determining what is clearly established federal law. But, in the face
of authority that is directly contrary to Tighe, and in the absence of
explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the
California courts' use of Petitioner's juvenile adjudication as a sen-
tencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, Supreme Court precedent.307
The phrase "clearly established federal law" and the requirement of
a Supreme Court ruling on the issue for a higher court to reverse a lower
court's sentencing decision (a habeas matter) is a result of the AEDPA.30
The relevant provision is § 2254(d)(1), which states:
adjudications were "more than sufficient" for reliability under Apprendi standards. Id. at 34-35. The
only remaining difference is that the defendant in Matthews was offered a jury trial in accordance
with Massachusetts law and refused. Thus, the court need not decide the necessity of the jury issue
(but strongly implied its decision in dicta). Id. at 35.
299. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
300. Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2004).
301. 393 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2004).
302. Id. at 1016.
303. Id. (citing United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001)).
304. Boyd, 393 F.3d at 1017 (citing People v. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002), a California case upholding the use of a juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense for
the California Three Strikes law).
305. Boyd, 393 F.3d at 1017 (discussing Smalley and Jones II).
306. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).




An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
... unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States .... 309
Thus, as a result of the AEDPA and its cornerstone habeas provi-
sion under § 2254(d)(1), the Ninth Circuit cannot follow its precedent in
Tighe and reverse sentence enhancements based on juvenile adjudica-
tions for defendants in state custody because the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue as required by § 2254(d)(1). 310 Yet, if a defendant in
federal court is merely appealing his federal trial court's sentence, the
AEDPA does not apply, and Tighe remains applicable.
d. Discussion
When reading the above ACCA cases in succession, the lack of
unique and independent analysis is jarring. Once Tighe and its dissent
were published, the subsequent discussions of the Apprendi exception
and procedural protections in Jones I were mirror images of one another
with little, if any, variation in arguments. In fact, some courts merely
quoted language from other circuits, coming to conclusions without any
further justification or examination."
For example, in Burge, the court engaged in a summary of Tighe,
Smalley, and Jones II and concluded: "After reviewing the record, we
conclude that this application was correct. We base our holding on the
reasoning of our sister circuits in Smalley and Jones [II]."312 Like "the
Smalley court, we find nothing in Apprendi or Jones [II], two cases re-
lied upon by the Tighe court . .. that requires us to hold that prior non-
jury juvenile adjudications ... cannot be used to enhance a sentence un-
der the ACCA."313 Thus, it would seem that both Jones II and Burge
complacently use the Smalley decision without questioning its findings
or reasoning. Matthews and Crowell also adopt the Smalley analysis
without considering the actual procedure of juvenile adjudications as
opposed to their theoretical due process protections.314
309. Id
310. Similarly, in a one-page memorandum from the Ninth Circuit, the court, citing Boyd,
again decided that using a defendant's juvenile adjudication for a predicate offense under Califor-
nia's Three-Strikes law was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Solorzano v. Yates, 264 F. App'x 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2008). The court also notes that certiorari was
denied in the Boyd case. Id.
311. E.g., United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (1Ith Cir. 2005).
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Jones II, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003)).
314. United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A]ll of the courts to con-
sider the issue have agreed that 'the question of whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt
from Apprendi's general rule should [ ] turn on ... an examination of whether juvenile adjudica-
tions, like adult adjudications, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an
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The analysis most pertinent to the prior conviction issue is the as-
sumptions made about the practice of due process in juvenile court and
the reliability of adjudications because of that process. Although outlined
in more detail below in Part II.C.2,3 " the issue of juvenile adjudication
reliability bears mentioning here. The Smalley court pointed out the ex-
tensive due process protections mandated by the Supreme Court in juve-
nile proceedings and concluded that the adjudications are reliable be-
cause of these procedures.3 16 Smalley pontificates that the decision
should not rest on a "narrow parsing of words," but the "reality of the
actual juvenile adjudications to determine whether it is sufficiently reli-
able so as not to offend" the juvenile's due process rights. 317
Nonetheless, the court never engages in an investigation of juvenile
court realities; it merely notes that juveniles are required to receive suffi-
cient due process rights to make them akin to the procedural certainty of
adult criminal court. 31 8 This oversight ignores the original philosophies
of informality and rehabilitation underlying the juvenile court system and
the increasingly narrow line between juvenile court and adult criminal
court.
More specifically, the Tighe dissent and its progeny also have prob-
lematic legal arguments regarding the application of Apprendi to juvenile
adjudications. First, in dismissing the Jones I's enumeration of the pro-
cedures making a prior conviction constitutionally distinct, 319 the Tighe
dissent and its progeny do not consider the syntax of the enumeration.
Second, the Tighe dissent's worry about unduly prejudicing the defen-
dant by forcing the prosecution to prove adjudications beyond a reason-
able doubt to a jury is easily alleviated.320
The Jones I language that the Tighe majority emphasized is as fol-
lows:
One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of prior convictions]
is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to en-
exemption.' We share that view of the question." (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); United
States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e join the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh
circuits in finding that the imposition of a sentence enhancement under the ACCA based on a defen-
dant's juvenile adjudication without a jury trial does not violate the defendant's due process right or
run afoul of Apprendi.").
315. See discussion infra Part IC3.
316. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002). Procedures include the
right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege
against self incrimination, and a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
317. Jones II, 332 F.3d at 696; Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
318. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
319. The Court in Jones I enumerates three characteristics that make a prior conviction distinct
from other facts increasing a defendant's sentence. Jones 1, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (noting "a
prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees").
320. See United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2010) (Brunetti, J., dissent-
ing).
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large the possible penalty for an offense . .. a prior conviction must
itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair
notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.321
Tighe also emphasized that Apprendi identified trial by jury as a requisite
procedural safeguard. 22 Many of the post Tighe courts noted that Jones I
did not intend to establish the criteria for the procedures necessary for a
prior conviction, 323 but these opinions do not recognize that the language
of Jones I is a list of procedures joined by the conjunction "and": "pro-
cedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guaran-
tees."324 Thus, a linguistic analysis reveals that these procedures are all
necessary for a prior conviction. Furthermore, Jones I uses a serial
comma before the "and," indicating that the procedures are three separate
and distinct entities that establish the constitutional distinction of a prior
325conviction.32 Interestingly, some courts misquote Jones I by leaving out
this final comma.326
The argument that this language is dicta is strong; however, the only
court to make this argument is a California state court;327 none of the
federal opinions relying on the Tighe dissent or Smalley decision make
an argument concerning dicta. Yet, even if the Jones I language is dic-
tum, the fact that it is a recent Supreme Court case addressing sentencing
enhancements that increase the statutory maximum sentence, the exact
effect of the ACCA sentencing enhancement, makes the dicta arguably
more persuasive and authoritative. 328
The dissent in Tighe further argues that the majority's opinion pre-
sents a procedural issue that will unduly prejudice the defendant by put-
ting his prior crimes before the jury.329 The dissent underscores the sig-
nificant prejudice created when prior crimes are introduced, and articu-
lates its fear that "a defendant with a prior juvenile adjudication will be
321. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Jones I, 526 U.S. at 249).
322. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000).
323. See, e.g., Jones II, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003); Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032 ("We do
not think, moreover, that Jones [1] meant to define the term 'prior conviction' for constitutional
purposes as a conviction 'that has been established through procedures satisfying fair notice, reason-
able doubt and jury trial guarantees."').
324. Jones 1, 526 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
325. See id.
326. See, e.g., Jones II, 332 F.3d at 695; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
327. See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 956 (Cal. 2009), a California Supreme Court
decision disagreeing with Tighe, puts forth the dicta argument.
328. The Third Circuit, home of the Jones II opinion, finds Supreme Court dicta to be highly
persuasive. In a recently published opinion, the court states: "The Supreme Court grants certiorari in
fewer than 85 cases annually, and thus, provides precedent on very few issues. Accordingly, the
Court's dicta is highly persuasive and should be treated as binding unless there are indications to the
contrary . . . ." United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 735 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J., dissent-
ing). The persuasiveness of Supreme Court dicta is well-established in the Third Circuit. See also
Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007); Official Comm. of Unse-
cured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003).
329. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200-01 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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put to the Hobson's choice of stipulating to the priors or parading them
before a jury."330 However, as the majority makes clear, such a prejudice
can be avoided by a separate jury sentencing phase or other procedural
protections. 3 31 The dissent's objection seems to be pro forma as other
courts have fashioned procedures for minimizing the prejudice of prior
convictions when the prior conviction is a sentencing factor.332
C. The Tenth Circuit and Juvenile Adjudications
1. How will the Tenth Circuit Rule?
As of April 2011, the Tenth Circuit had not yet considered the ques-
tion of juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses under the ACCA.
This section aims to predict how the Tenth Circuit may rule on the con-
troversial issue. First, the Tenth Circuit seems to have a different inter-
pretation of ACCA and USSG challenges than the Ninth Circuit. Second,
there is no indication that the Circuit will engage in any further analysis
than Smalley and its progeny. And third, the Circuit has considered the
application of Apprendi to juvenile law issues and has concluded that
Apprendi does not apply.333
As mentioned, the Tenth Circuit parted from the Ninth Circuit in
Rivera-Oros, on the issue of the meaning and scope of ACCA and
USSG. In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit declined to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's approach to defining "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Taylor procedure for defining the generic
definition of an enumerated crime, but found that Taylor's definition of
mere "burglary" under the ACCA should not be applied to "burglary of a
dwelling" under the USSG. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied Tay-
lor's definition. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning reversed the enhanced
sentence of the defendant under the USSG, finding that Washington
"residential burglary" is outside the generic definition of "burglary of a
dwelling." The Tenth Circuit's analysis found that burglary of a "resi-
dential structure" under Arizona law was within the definition of "bur-
glary of dwelling" under the USSG and upheld the enhanced sentence. In
fact, all of the above cases decided by the Tenth Circuit upheld the sen-
tence enhancement imposed by the District Court, save Martinez, which
found that only part of the sentence enhancement, the enhancement un-
der the USSG, could be upheld. Thus, when one considers the Tenth
Circuit's prevalent rejection of Ninth Circuit reasoning, 334 and its recent
330. Id
331. Id. at 1195 n.5 (majority opinion).
332. Id.
333. Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008).
334. See, e.g., Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132-33 (rejecting the recent Ninth Circuit decision).
For splits between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits on other issues, see Unareroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d
1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit's per se rule regarding credibility
of an immigrant who has lied to gain entry into the United States to avoid persecution); Admin.
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trend upholding sentencing enhancements under the ACCA and USSG, it
is likely that the court will uphold the hypothetical use of juvenile adju-
dications as predicate offenses.
Furthermore, even if the Tenth Circuit's hypothetical analysis of
this issue favored the Tighe majority, or adopted some of the analysis in
Part II.C.23 3' below, the AEDPA means the court can only do so if the
defendant is in federal custody. If the defendant is in state custody, the
Tenth Circuit may find itself restricted by § 2254 as there is no Supreme
Court ruling on the issue of juvenile adjudications as prior convictions or
predicate offenses under the ACCA.
Nevertheless, the most concrete evidence of the Tenth Circuit's po-
sition on the issue is its 2008 decision in Gonzales v. Tafoya.16 Notably,
this decision comes after the Tighe and Smalley progeny. In Gonzales,
the court considered whether it was a violation of Apprendi to have a
judge determine that a juvenile is not amenable to treatment or eligible
for commitment to a mental health facility under New Mexico law. 3 3 7
Mr. Gonzales was a fourteen-year-old boy who accepted a plea agree-
ment to be sentenced to twenty-two years in an adult prison for the
crimes of second-degree murder, aggravated residential burglary, aggra-
vated battery with a firearm, and two counts of aggravated assault.338
New Mexico does not have any mechanism for the transfer of a juvenile
to adult criminal court; instead, all juveniles are heard in the Children's
Court, which has the ability to issue juvenile and adult sentences.339
The Children's Court, after considering many factors, can sentence
a juvenile to time in an adult facility if "(1) the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities, and [2] the
child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmen-
tally disabled or mentally disordered." 3 4 0 Despite evidence of and expert
testimony regarding Mr. Gonzales's mental illness, the court, in an ame-
nability hearing, found that Mr. Gonzales was not amenable to rehabilita-
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir.
2004) (declining to follow "the Ninth Circuit's highly restrictive view of the scope of 'appropriate
and equitable relief"); Yerkovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 994-95 (10th Cir. 2004) (acknowledg-
ing the Ninth Circuit's differing view concerning a federal statute barring judicial review of an
immigration judge's discretionary decision, but declining to follow it); United States v. James, 257
F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001) (declining to use the Ninth Circuit's approach to review selective
prosecution discovery orders with an abuse of discretion standard, and instead holding that such
orders should be reviewed de novo); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001)
(agreeing with the reasoning of the Eighth, Eleventh, Fifth, Seventh, First, and Fourth circuits and
declining to adopt the position of the Ninth Circuit concerning whether application of certain sen-
tencing guidelines violates the ex post facto clause); United States v. La. Pac. Corp., 106 F.3d 345,
348 (10th Cir. 1997) (declining to adopt the Ninth Circuit's discrete basis test).
335. See discussion infra Part ll.C.3.
336. 515 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2008).
337. Id. at 1104.
338. Id.at1104,1106.
339. Id. at 1103.
340. Id. at 1104 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20(B) (2010)).
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tion and not eligible for commitment in an institution for the develop-
mentally disabled.3 4 1 The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that
it was a violation of his due process rights under Apprendi to have the
amenability findings made by a judge and not a jury.342 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals upheld the adult sentence and the defendant submitted
a habeas corpus petition to the federal district court.34 3 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas peti-
344tion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the facts leading to Mr. Gonzales's adult
sentence were not "fact[s] that increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum" under Apprendi.345 Instead, the court
reasoned that the factors the judge had to weigh were not questions of
historical fact, as in Apprendi, but value judgments as to the juvenile's
amenability to rehabilitation and eligibility for treatment. 346 The Tenth
Circuit held that value judgments are typically in the purview of judicial
discretion and thus, a defendant's right to a jury is never implicated.347
Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that many of the factors to be
weighed by the judge are questions of historical fact, the court found that
these factors were not at issue in the case because of Mr. Gonzales's plea
agreement.3 48
The court also applied the Smalley holding that juvenile proceedings
do not require the procedural protection of a jury trial. 349 The Gonzales
court cites Supreme Court precedent regarding the due process protec-
tions afforded to juveniles in the juvenile court system to show that a
jury is not required for juvenile transfer proceedings;3so the juvenile is
merely entitled to a hearing, a statement of the reasons for the decision to
transfer, and assistance of counsel.35 ' Therefore, the court concludes that
because the factors determining Mr. Gonzales's adult sentence and lack
of amenability are value judgments-not issues of historical fact-and
juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury findings, Apprendi does
not apply because it dealt with the determination of historical facts and
341. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1107.
342. Id. at 1108.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1101 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000)).
346. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1113-14.
347. Id. at 1114. Legal scholars have called the distinction between value judgments and his-
torical fact into question. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and
the Jury's Role in Capital Sentencing 40-41 (Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-11, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1564465.
348. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1114.
349. Id at 1114-15.
350. Id. (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-51 (1971) (plurality opinion); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-57 (1967); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 554-565 (1966)).
351. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1115.
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adult sentences.35 2 The Tenth Circuit held that the refusal of the New
Mexico Court of Appeals to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer proceed-
ings was not contrary to established federal law. 35 3
Because of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the applicability of
Apprendi to juvenile situations, there is little reason to believe that the
Tenth Circuit will find that juvenile adjudications are not predicate of-
fenses for sentencing enhancements because of their lack of a jury trial.
Similar to the issue in Tighe and its progeny, transfer of a juvenile to
adult court (or sentencing a juvenile to adult imprisonment) increases the
maximum sentence the defendant will endure. The Tenth Circuit has
already shown its support for the argument that juvenile adjudications do
not constitutionally require trial-by-jury. Nonetheless, the court based its
decision on the lack of historical facts found in the amenability hearing
and not the lack of a jury trial right in juvenile proceedings. Thus, there
is still hope that the Tenth Circuit will question Supreme Court precedent
from the 1970s because the court's dicta leaves the question open of the
importance of the lack of a jury trial right in juvenile proceedings: "[T]he
mere fact that juveniles may not have a federal constitutional right to a
jury trial in delinquency proceedings does not seem sufficient to distin-
guish Apprendi when the findings at issue authorize an adult sen-
tence."354
Furthermore, the court seems to ignore the issue of a "constitutional
no man's land" in which a juvenile can be denied the benefits of a juve-
nile justice system and the protections of the adult criminal system.355
After mentioning this troublesome quandary, the Tenth Circuit distin-
guished Apprendi by stating: "Nevertheless, in our view, the distinction
between the kinds of findings made at the amenability hearing and find-
ings traditionally made by juries is a plausible one."356 The lack of con-
cern for the constitutional no man's land creates little optimism that the
Tenth Circuit would be the first court to examine the policies and prac-
tices of the juvenile justice system and what they mean regarding the
reliability of a juvenile adjudication and its qualification as a prior con-
viction for ACCA purposes.
2. Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Constitute a Prior Conviction
under the Apprendi Exception
When taken at face value, the arguments made in both the Tighe
majority and dissent each have merit and are each based on strong textual
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent. The argument seems to
largely depend on one's view of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
352. Id.atlIl5,1117.
353. Id. at 117.




VIOLENT FELONIES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
trial and the rights afforded to juveniles during adjudications. Unfortu-
nately, it is in this arena that both the majorities and the dissents fail to
fully extrapolate the issues. Thorough analysis of the juvenile court sys-
tem is conspicuously absent from the Tighe and Smalley progeny. If the
courts engaged in such a discussion, the conclusion that juvenile adjudi-
cations do not meet the Apprendi exception would become obvious sim-
ply because they cannot be considered prior convictions.
Juvenile adjudications are not on par with criminal convictions for
myriad reasons. This section presents a combined due process and social
justice argument for prohibiting juvenile adjudications from constituting
prior convictions and predicate offenses under the ACCA. This argument
is largely built on the missing analyses in the Tighe and Smalley progeny:
a philosophical and empirical discussion of the differences between ju-
venile and adult court, and consideration of the rights afforded to juve-
niles in adjudications versus the "realities" or practices of juvenile court.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated in recent decisions that it
considers the neurological evidence of juvenile immaturity, underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility, and poor impulse control as important evi-
dence for tempering the sentences given to juveniles, even those sen-
tenced as adult offenders.357
a. The Realities of Juvenile Court
The only "realities" of the juvenile court that the opinions discuss
are the supposed reliability of adjudications.35 8 Each opinion notes that
there are differences between juvenile and criminal courts, but none
delve into the philosophy behind those differences or empirical evidence
of what the differences actually mean. These courts argue that juveniles
are essentially afforded all the due process rights as adults except for the
right to a jury trial, which would not enhance the fact-finding function of
the court. 359 A judge must still find that the juvenile is delinquent beyond
a reasonable doubt.360 No court, however, addresses what a bench adju-
dication means to a juvenile.
In 1971, the Supreme Court was optimistic regarding the reliability
of judicial fact-finding, 3 6 1 but since that time, studies have been pub-
lished showing that judges are more likely than juries to develop biases
favoring police. 36 2 Studies have also shown that the unique discussion
format of jury deliberations enhances reliability, and the diversity of ex-
357. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-
71 (2005).
358. See United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones II, 332 F.3d 688,
696 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir 2002).
359. See Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
360. Id.
361. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion).
362. Recent Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 705, 709 (2002).
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periences among a twelve-person jury "increases the fairness of its
evaluations as compared to those of a single judge."363
Furthermore, seven years after McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,364 the
Court recognized empirical evidence-in a plurality opinion authored by
the same Justice as the McKeiver opinion-that larger groups of fact-
finders are more reliable than smaller ones.365 In juvenile adjudications,
the factfinding body is reduced to one, the judge. Moreover, the plurality
in McKeiver noted that "[t]oo often the juvenile court judge falls far short
of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system envis-
aged."366 Thus, the reliance on McKeiver by Smalley and subsequent
courts is flawed as it fails to consider the true realities of the juvenile
justice system.
In addition to the judicial factfinder issue, the courts do not take into
account the considerable evidence that procedural guarantees, although
mandated, are not applied with any regularity.367 Juvenile courts were
created at the turn of the twentieth century with a focus on rehabilitation
and informality in a non-criminal context.368 However, the line between
juvenile and criminal court has become exceedingly gray within the last
three decades; juveniles can now be sentenced to a mix of juvenile incar-
ceration and adult imprisonment, juveniles can be charged as adults,
avoiding the juvenile justice system altogether, and as the cases above
demonstrate, juvenile adjudications now have serious consequences in
adulthood.3 69 Furthermore, because of the false perception of juvenile
courts as lenient entities, juveniles may not dispute a particular accusa-
tion because of a lenient judge, inadequate counsel, or because his family
thinks treatment-otherwise unaffordable or unattainable-may help the
child.370 Thus, the informal system that promotes discretionary sentenc-
ing and creates an atmosphere of factual and procedural laxness, which
results in facts that can rarely be classified as undisputed, is the same
system that may ultimately lead to a person's sentence of a minimum of
fifteen years, or in California's case, an indeterminate life sentence. 371
363. Id. (citing Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 553, 575-79
(1998)).
364. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
365. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that five
jurors is too few); see also Recent Case, supra note 361, at 709.
366. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544.
367. See Richard E. Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is it Sound Policy?, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 231, 243-51
(2002) (discussing the lack of full due process and lack of or poor representation accorded to juve-
niles during adjudication).
368. See Jason Abbott, The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 85 B.U. L. REV. 263, 265 (2005); Redding, supra note 366, at 231.
369. Redding, supra note 366, at 231-32.
370. See Abbott, supra note 367, at 279.
371. See id
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Juvenile adjudications are unreliable not only because of question-
able factfinding, but also because of the patchwork of due process rights
actually afforded in adjudications, including the inconsistent right to ef-
fective counsel at adjudication proceedings. Because of the original goals
behind juvenile adjudications, such as individualized and rehabilitative
dispositions, in practice, the procedural requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court372 are frequently relaxed; juvenile courts often follow
evidentiary and procedural rules less rigorously and are characterized by
more frequent procedural errors.373 Furthermore, a study in 1989 that
interviewed 100 juvenile court workers found that one-fourth of the re-
spondents felt that juveniles did not receive a fair trial, judges often ad-
mitted clearly inadmissible evidence and failed to consider defense mo-
tions, and would often enter an adjudication of delinquency with insuffi-
cient evidence of guilt.374
The underlying philosophy of juvenile court also leads to unpredict-
able results between the states and even within a state. This "justice by
geography" is the result of juvenile court emphasis on individual consid-
eration of the juvenile's particular situation and, often, their need for
treatment and mental health services that are otherwise not available. 375
Thus, if a judge wants to get a juvenile into treatment-as per the phi-
losophy of the juvenile justice system-they may declare them delin-
376quent based on insufficient evidence. But that adjudication can come
back to haunt the adult when he or she is given an increased sentenced
based on "career criminality." The Bureau of Justice Statistics has con-
cluded that sentencing laws that count juvenile adjudications as predicate
offenses "assume that there is some substantive meaning to a juvenile
adjudication for a particular offense . . . . Because the juvenile justice
system is often treatment-oriented, there is no necessary relationship
between the adjudicated offense and the 'sentence' imposed by the
court."377
372. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31(1967).
373. Redding, supra note 366, at 243; see generally Caterina Ditraglia, "The Worst of Both
Worlds": Defending Children in Juvenile Court, 63 Mo. L. REV. 477 (1988) (arguing that juvenile
courts provide a procedural matrix under which few adults would consent to be tried because of the
less rigorous adherence to procedural rules, frequent procedural errors, and the less adversarial
setting).
374. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Remnants ofParens Patriae in the Adjudicatory Hearing: Is a
Fair Trial Possible in Juvenile Court?, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 599, 603-04 (1994).
375. Redding, supra note 366, at 244.
376. See id at 244-45. On December 10, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tapia
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010), a Ninth Circuit case that considers whether a federal judge
can give a convicted defendant a longer sentence in order to give the defendant access to drug treat-
ment.
377. Neal Miller, National Assessment of Criminal Court Use of Defendants' Juvenile Adjudi-
cation Records, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL AND NONCRIMINAL JUSTICE
USES 27, 29 (1997), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/NCJJR.PDF.
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Another assumption that the court made in Smalley-and subse-
quent courts continue to make-is that juveniles are actually meaning-
fully provided with an attorney.378 This is not a reality. Many juveniles
waive their right to an attorney, but there is strong evidence that such
waivers are not made "voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently." 7 An
ABA study found that 46% of public defenders say a colloquy is given
only "sometimes" or "rarely" and 45% responded that when the colloquy
is given, it is only "sometimes" or "rarely" as thorough as one given to
adult defendants.3o Furthermore, the waivers "are sometimes induced by
suggestions that lawyers are not needed because no serious dispositional
consequences are anticipated . . . . These circumstances raise the possi-
bility-perhaps the likelihood-that a substantial number of juvenile
waivers are not 'knowing and intelligent." 381 The thought that serious
dispositional consequences are not possible is patently false with the
advent of the ACCA. Additionally, studies conducted in the 1980s show
that juveniles often fail to understand or appreciate their rights, including
their right to counsel.382
Assuming juveniles do not waive their right and are provided with
counsel, there is also the concern of effective representation. Juveniles
appearing for adjudication hearings are often represented by public de-
fenders who have no training in juvenile law, deal with heavy caseloads,
and who are criticized for zealous representation. 383 Moreover, there is an
extremely low professional status associated with juvenile law that is part
of the systemic problem of poor representation at juvenile adjudica-
tions.384 The same ABA study indicated that:
In some courts, attorneys are subtly reminded by the court, the prose-
cutor, and other court personnel that zealous advocacy is considered
inappropriate and counter-productive. Lawyers who refuse to temper
their advocacy . . . may suffer from subtle disapproval or . . . fee re-
ductions or being excluded from the panel of court-appointed attor-
385
neys.
In failing utterly to consider the actual realities of the juvenile jus-
tice system, Smalley and its progeny committed a disservice to juveniles
across the United States. The message is one of hypocrisy. As a govern-
378. See Redding, supra note 366, at 247 ("Representation rates vary widely within and across
states, but in many jurisdictions it is less than 50%, with first-time offenders having the lowest
representation rates." (footnote omitted)).
379. Id; see also AM. BAR ASS'N, A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 7 (1995), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfifull.pdf [hereinafter ABA].
380. ABA, supra note 378, at 7.
381. Id. at 7-8.
382. Redding, supra note 366, at 248.
383. Id. at 250-51.
384. Id. at 250.
385. ABA, supra note 378, at 27.
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ment and as a court system we proclaim juveniles are the future leaders
of America, who are resilient, amenable to rehabilitation and worth pro-
tecting; yet, juvenile offenses, which are characterized by the informality
and rehabilitative emphasis of the juvenile court, are historical factors
leading to the prolonged imprisonment of the adult juvenile offender. 38 6
387b. Neuroscience of the Juvenile: Roper v. Simmons & Gra-
ham v. Florida388
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed juvenile sentencing and
has categorically prohibited sentencing a juvenile to death or life without
the "realistic opportunity" of parole for a non-homicide crime.' 89 In the
analyses, both opinions refer to the lack of maturity and underdeveloped
sense of responsibility of defendants under eighteen and their resulting
lesser culpability and greater susceptibility to change. 39 0 Both opinions
also found it telling that it is difficult for psychologists to differentiate
between an impulsive youthful offender and a habitual criminal. 391 Roper
recognizes that mental health professionals are not allowed to diagnose a
person under eighteen as having antisocial personality disorder (i.e., psy-
chopathy or sociopathy) because of their developing personalities.39 2
Similarly, Graham argues that psychology and brain science continue to
show that parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to ma-
ture through late adolescence.39 3
These conclusions concerning the developing personality of the ju-
venile and their diminished culpability serve the argument that adjudica-
tions should not be treated as predicate offenses for state or federal sen-
tencing enhancements. If the juvenile is not as culpable when he or she is
judged to be delinquent by the court, how can such offenses be deemed
violent felonies or crimes of violence on par with adult convictions? The
Supreme Court relies on evidence that the juvenile's brain is not fully
formed in the area of decision-making and impulse control and thus, their
adjudications do not have the equivalent mens rea of adult convictions. 394
In Begay v. United States, the Court recognized the importance of mens
rea in finding a "violent felony" under the ACCA and concluded that a
DUI is not a violent felony because the offense is one of strict liability. 3 95
386. See generally Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 771 (2010) (argu-
ing that the widespread nature of ineffective representation in juvenile adjudications and the serious
future consequences of adjudications necessitates a fom of legal redress for those harmed by sub-
standard legal representation in juvenile proceedings).
387. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
388. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
389. Id. at 2033-34.
390. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71.
391. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-74.
392. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
393. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
394. See id. at 2026-27.
395. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146-48 (2008).
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While juvenile offenses do not completely lack a mens rea requirement,
the scientific evidence used by the Supreme Court indicates that juve-
niles do not commit offenses with the same "guilty mind"396 as an adult
offender.
However, the applicability of the neurological evidence used in
Roper and Graham should not be assumed. Both courts made their hold-
ings narrow and confined their decisions to sentences that effectively
ended the juvenile's life. 3 9 7 The issue of juvenile adjudications as predi-
cate offenses is not always as severe. While an offender could face a very
tough sentencing enhancement that results in an indeterminate life sen-
tence (i.e., a Three-Strikes law), others may be sentenced to the mini-
mum under the ACCA, fifteen years. Thus the Supreme Court may see
an enhanced sentence as a way to give the defendant "separat[ion] from
society for some time in order to prevent . . . an escalating pattern of
criminal conduct . . . ."398 But, the appeal to the Supreme Court would
not likely proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim, which makes the
length and proportionality of the sentence relevant; the claim is likely to
proceed under a Fourteenth Amendment violation of due process and
thus, the neurological evidence may be used in a new and unique man-
ner.
The Tighe dissent and the Smalley progeny rely in large part on the
similar reliability of a juvenile adjudication to the adult criminal convic-
tion and the "sufficient" due process rights afforded to juveniles that
secures this reliability. However, as the above studies and literature
show, the reliability of adjudications and protection from due process
procedures are highly questionable. Sentences may be imposed in order
to place the juvenile in treatment as opposed to the offense having been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; a single fact-finder is less reliable
than a jury; colloquies regarding a juvenile's right to counsel are sub-
standard and juvenile waivers may often not be "knowing or intelligent;"
when counsel is present in adjudication proceedings, bars to effective
counsel abound; etc. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that
juveniles are less culpable than adult defendants. It follows that a less
culpable defendant should not later be punished for what the Supreme
Court has characterized as impulsive actions.
Thus, a juvenile adjudication cannot be considered on par with the
reliability of an adult conviction because the due process rights mandated
in juvenile proceedings are not "more than sufficient" to ensure that reli-
ability. The lack of a right to a jury trial emphasized in Apprendi is just
one of the issues with juvenile adjudications that should legally preclude
396. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
397. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75.
398. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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an adjudication from constituting a prior conviction and predicate of-
fense under Apprendi and the ACCA.
3. Will the Supreme Court Ever Weigh-In?
As some of the cases above have noted, the Supreme Court has de-
nied multiple opportunities to hear this issue. And, traditionally, the
Court is reluctant to hear issues on juvenile matters, reasoning that these
issues are better left to the police powers of the states. Indeed, juvenile
law rarely becomes a federal issue because juveniles are considered part
of family law, an issue reserved to the powers of the states. Each of these
factors points to the continued silence from the Supreme Court. Nonethe-
less, there are several factors that might give the Supreme Court the im-
petus to grant certiorari: there is a circuit split; the Supreme Court has
recently taken on several issues concerning the application of the
ACCA 399 and sentencing of juveniles; 400 and at least one court has based
its decision on the fact that there is no clearly established federal law.401
Furthermore, after forty years,402 the Supreme Court may feel that it is
time to reevaluate the processes and practices of the juvenile court and
the necessary procedural protections.
CONCLUSION
In just one year of litigation, a single federal circuit issued six opin-
ions regarding the interpretation of the ACCA or USSG and created two
circuit splits. The Supreme Court has noted that the resolution of these
splits and others like them "could occupy the Court for years."403 And
while the Tenth Circuit seems to conduct a more thorough analysis of the
burglary and eluding cases because of their adherence to Taylor's generic
definition methodology and consistent use of the modified categorical
approach, the Tenth Circuit has yet to address the issue of juvenile adju-
dications.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to address the issue of juvenile
adjudications as predicate offenses will most certainly have to end in the
near future, but at what costs? Will the Court redefine the juvenile court?
Will the goals of the juvenile system be eradicated? Will the reliability
399. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1268 (2010) (deciding whether the Florida
statutory crime of battery constitutes a "violent felony" under the ACCA); Chambers v. United
States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 (2009) (deciding whether failure to report to prison constitutes a "violcnt
felony" under the ACCA); Begay, 553 U.S. at 139 (deciding whether DUI is a "violent felony"
under the ACCA); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 198 (2007) (finding that attempt crimes
may qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA when they involve conduct that presents a seri-
ous potential risk to another).
400. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18; Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56.
401. Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006).
402. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Winship is a decision in the middle of a line of
Supreme Court cases that mandated the due process rights to be afforded to juveniles in the adjudica-
tion process. It was decided in 1970, predating McKeiver and following In re Gault.
403. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122 (Alito, J., concurring).
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and due process protection of juvenile adjudications be examined? Or,
will the Court simply decide that, contrary to their previous decisions,
the ACCA is too vague to continue and thereby force Congress to reform
its Act for the first time since 1986. Regardless, as the survey above
shows, the ACCA and USSG recidivist sections have created substantial
litigation and resulted in many a judicial quandary and disagreement.
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